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Abstract 
Many practitioners and academics have argued that the risk of investing in 
international markets has increased in the last ten years; and that the greater the 
real or perceived risk of an investment, the less likely it is that a particular 
investment will be made.   
 
The effectiveness with which these risks are managed in the oil and natural gas 
industry are important for several reasons.  First, oil and natural gas are 
essential for sustaining current economic activity and promoting economic 
growth.  Second, the balance between supply and demand determines the price of 
oil and natural gas and their impact on the economies of all nations.  Therefore 
the price and availability of oil and natural gas are also matters of national 
security.  Third, the search for a secure supply of oil and natural gas affects the 
political, military and economic relations between countries.   
 
This study addresses four questions.  What institutions and strategies are 
available for managing political and investment risk in the international oil and 
gas industry?  How and when did they develop?  In what circumstances is each 
used?  How effective have they been?   
 
The institutions available for managing risk include oil and gas exploration 
contracts, domestic courts, national constitutions, bilateral investment treaties, 
multilateral investment treaties, governmental and non-governmental regulatory 
agencies and international energy forums.  The organizations that manage 
uncertainty and risk include international oil companies, oil service companies, 
national oil companies, and public and private providers of financial capital and 
insurance.  Their strategies include corporate finance, joint ventures, project 
finance, alliances and energy diplomacy.   
 
This study supports the view that existing institutions change and new institutions 
are created when organizations perceive that a change in the status quo will 
enhance the profitability of existing projects and make new projects economically 
feasible.  However, the process by which these institutions are created and evolve 
is easier to describe in theory than it is to explain in practice, because 
institutional development takes place in small steps; and frequently involves 
several organizations, some trying to change the existing institutional 
environment and others trying to preserve it.   
 
Finally, the institutions supporting the international oil and gas industry can be 
arranged in a hierarchy based on their relative importance.  Contracts, informal 
relationships and transparency are the most important institutional mechanisms 
used by international oil and natural gas companies to manage risk.  The second 
line of defense includes domestic law, bilateral treaties, and international courts 
and tribunals.  A third line of defense includes multilateral treaties and 
international forums. 
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Chapter 1- Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the Problem  
Many practitioners and academics have argued that the risk of investing in international markets 
has increased in the last ten years.  The evidence cited for this conclusion include: (1) the Arab 
Spring and its aftermath and more recently the military conflicts in Syria and Iraq, which 
demonstrate the risks associated with even seemingly stable regimes (2) forced contract 
renegotiations and expropriations in the mining, oil and natural gas sector in several resource-
rich countries (Venezuela, Argentina and Russia) and (3) recurring financial crises and the need 
for more regulation of financial organizations (for example, Basel II and III, Solvency II).   More 
generally, after a period of relatively low investment claim losses, there is a renewed awareness 
that investment risk, driven by political events, is still difficult to predict.
1
   
 
This is particularly true in the international oil and natural gas industry in which there is often a 
shift in bargaining power over the life of a project between the nation supplying the natural 
resource, the transit countries through which the export pipeline passes, and the multinational 
companies providing the financial capital and technical expertise needed to develop and export 
the resource.  Until exploration is completed and the field development facilities and pipeline 
infrastructure are built, superior bargaining power lies with the multinational companies, 
because the host government often does not have the financial, technical, and marketing 
resources needed to find and produce the oil and natural gas.  However, after the investment in 
the facilities and export infrastructure have been made by the foreign investors, the bargaining 
power shifts to the host government and the transit countries, because they have the power to 
interrupt operations, pass legislation that impairs the value of the investment or in the worst 
case, expropriate the project assets.
2
   
 
In addition, oil and gas projects often extend over several decades.  During that time, the host 
government and its economic policy and political ideology may change.  Consequently, what 
the host government and transit countries previously considered attractive financial terms, may 
                                                          
1
 Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency, World Investment and Political Risk, World Bank Group (Washington, 
DC 20433, 2012), p. 42 
2
 David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and Russell E. 
Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013), p. 243 
9 
 
no longer meet their expectations.  Raymond Vernon described this phenomenon as an 
“obsolescing bargain”.3  The new regime may demand larger financial returns than originally 
agreed, from what have become, mature, low risk projects.  The demands usually take the form 
of forced contract renegotiation, increased fiscal take or expropriation.
4
  
 
The inclination of host governments to demand more favorable terms, are not just observed in 
developing countries.  For example: (1) the state of Alaska has increased the financial burden 
levied on oil investors several times since the commissioning of the TAPS (Trans-Alaska 
Pipeline System) in 1977.  More recently, the ACES (Alaska’s Clear and Equitable Share) fiscal 
system implemented in 2007, significantly increased the fiscal take from the oil companies.
5
  (2) 
The government of the United Kingdom increased the corporate tax on North Sea oil producers 
(termed supplemental corporation tax) three times between 2002 and 2011, placing an increased 
fiscal burden on oil companies operating mature oilfields with declining production.  (3) In the 
OECD countries (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development), asset 
expropriation is rare and tax increases are usually not made on a retroactive basis, but in the 
developing world, outright expropriation and the forced acceptance of onerous financial terms by 
investors were still common between 2000 and 2010, for example, in Algeria, Ecuador, 
Kazakhstan, Russia, Argentina and Venezuela.
6
   
 
1.2 Importance of the Problem 
The effective management of these risks is important for several reasons.  First, oil and natural 
gas are essential for sustaining current economic activity and promoting economic growth.  
Second, the balance between supply and demand determines the price of oil and natural gas; and 
their impact on the economies of all nations.  Therefore the price and availability of oil and 
natural gas are also matters of national security.  Third, the search for a secure supply of oil and 
                                                          
3
 Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of US Enterprises, (New York: Basic Books., 1971) 
4
 David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and Russell E. 
Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) p. 242 
5
 Dan E. Dickinson and David Wood, “Alaska Tax Reform: Intent Met with Oil” (Part 1 of 2), Oil & Gas Journal, May 
25, 2009, 20-24.; Dan E. Dickinson and David Wood, “Alaska Tax Reform: Gas Raises Questions” (Part 2 of 2, Oil & 
Gas Journal, June 1, 2009, 20-26. 
6
 David A. Wood, “Long Term Fiscal Contractual Stability Proves Elusive, Part 1”, Petroleum Review, February 2005, 
38-42.; David A. Wood, “Long Term Fiscal Contractual Stability Proves Elusive, Part 2.” Petroleum Review, April 
2005, 44-48. 
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natural gas affects the political, military and economic relations between countries.  
Consequently, every developed and developing country has placed energy policy at or near the 
top of its national priorities.  
 
Supply and Demand 
World consumption of petroleum liquids (crude oil and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), has 
increased from 63.1 MBPD (million barrels per day) in 1980 to 90.5 MBPD in 2013.
7
  The 
consumption of petroleum liquids is expected to increase from 90.5 MBPD in 2013 to 115.0 
MBPD in 2040 (Table A.1).  The production of petroleum liquids is expected to increase from 
90.1 MBPD 
8
 (Table A.2) in 2013 to 96.6 MBPD by 2020 and 115.0 MBPD in 2040.  These 
forecasts are based on the assumption that the price of crude oil rises to $106 per barrel in 2020 
and $163 per barrel in 2040.
9
 
 
Increasing oil production from 90.5 MBPD in 2013 to 115.0 MBPD in 2040 would be 
challenging even if the world’s existing and future reserves were under the control of oil 
importing nations, however sixteen of the twenty largest oil companies are national oil 
companies (NOCs); and Saudi Arabian Oil Company, Saudi Arabia’s national oil company, 
controls ten times the reserves that ExxonMobil does.
10
  NOCs own between 73% and 90% of 
the world’s oil reserves and accounted for 61% of oil production in 2012.  NOCs also own 68% 
of the world’s natural gas reserves and account for 52% of natural gas production.11  The U.S. 
Energy Information Administration’s (EIA) reference case projects that OPEC production will 
increase slightly in absolute terms, but decline in relative terms from 61% of world production in 
2012, to somewhere between 39% and 43% of total global liquids production by 2040.
12
  In 
addition, an estimated 60% of the world’s undiscovered reserves are likely to be in countries, in 
                                                          
7
 U.S. Energy Information Administration, http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/steo/report/global_oil.cfm, EIA, 
September 9, 2014 
8
 Ibid 
9
 U. S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040 (Washington, DC: 
EIA, 2013), p. 31 
10
The Economist, “Really Big Oil, National Oil Companies”, August 10, 2006 referenced in Andrew Inkpen and 
Michael Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy & Finance (Tulsa, OK: PennWell 
Corporation, 2010), p. 52 
11
 David G. Victor, David R. Hults and Mark C. Thurber, Oil and Governance – State-Owned Enterprises and the 
World Energy Supply (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 3 
12
 U. S. Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook 2013 with Projections to 2040 (Washington, DC: 
EIA, 2013) p. 31 
11 
 
which the domestic NOC has essentially exclusive access to onshore and offshore oil prospects in 
its home country.
13
  NOCs are therefore of great importance to their country’s economy; to the 
energy security of importing countries; and the balance between supply and demand.  Figure A.1 
presents the historical record of oil prices from 1861 through 2013, before and after adjusting for 
inflation.   
 
Global capital expenditures and exploration expense (CAPEX) in the exploration and production 
sector of the oil and gas industry are expected to increase from $682 billion in 2013 to $723 
billion in 2014.
14
  The increase in CAPEX has been driven by increasing exploration and 
production activity in deep and ultra-deep offshore areas and the continuing strong demand for 
oil and natural gas.
15
  However, the price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) has declined from 
approximately $106 per barrel in June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of 2014.  Consequently, 
CAPEX in 2015 is expected to decline to $571 billion.  This level of expenditures assumes that 
the average price of WTI in 2015 rebounds to $70 per barrel.
16
  On January 5, 2015 the spot 
price of WTI was $50.05 per barrel.   
 
The amount of financial and physical capital involved in oil and natural gas exploration make 
them particularly vulnerable to the obsolescing bargain.  Consequently, as the risk of contract 
renegotiation and expropriation increases, investments in oil and natural gas that would 
otherwise be made will not be made; reducing the supply and increasing the price of oil and 
natural gas.  This risk can be reduced or reallocated by the development of appropriate 
institutions.  Understanding how these institutions can and do reduce risk is important to 
developed and developing countries for several reasons. 
 
                                                          
13
 Silvana Tordo, Brandon S. Tracy and Noora Arfaa, National Oil Companies and Value Creation, World Bank, 
Working Paper 218, (Washington, DC: 2011), p. xi 
14
 Barclays, Global 2014 Capital Spending Outlook, December 9, 2013, 
http://www.pennenergy.com/content/dam/Pennenergy/online-
articles/2013/December/Global%202014%20EP%20Spending%20Outlook.pdf 
15
 PR Newswire Services, “Global Oil and Gas CAPEX to Increase to $1,201 Billion in 2013,” 
http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/global-oil-and-gas-capex-to-increase-to-1201-billion-in-2013-
187890961.html 
16
 Oil & Gas Journal, “Sharp drop expected in global E&P spending in 2015, study says”, Oil & Gas Journal, January 
8, 2015, http://www.ogj.com/articles/2015/01/sharp-drop-expected-in-global-e-p-spending-in-2015-study-
says.html?cmpid=EnlDailyJanuary82015 
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First, most of the “easy oil” has been found and is being depleted through production by the 
NOCs.  Second, the Saudi Arabian Oil Company is operating close to maximum production 
capacity, 11.5 MBPD, and will eventually be unable to act as a “swing” producer, that is, a 
producer that can increase production when oil supplies are “tight” to ensure a balance between 
supply and demand, and the stability of the price of oil.  
 
Third, the periodic resurgence of resource nationalism in democratic oil exporting countries like 
Mexico and Venezuela; and the policies of more authoritarian regimes like Russia to retain or 
regain control of their oil and natural gas resources is a continuing threat to direct foreign 
investment and reduces the opportunities for IOCs (international oil companies) to explore for oil 
and natural gas.   
 
Fourth, IOCs possess technology that could be used successfully in countries that rely almost 
exclusively on their national oil companies (NOCs) for exploration and production technology.  
Because the NOCs and their governments have been reluctant to allow the international oil 
companies (IOCs) to explore in their countries, the IOCs have been forced to engage in 
exploration in more difficult environments, for example, ultra-deep water and the Arctic Circle 
where exploration and production cost and technological risk are much higher.   
 
Fifth, many national oil companies, for example, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX) in Mexico, 
Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) in Venezuela and the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) 
in Iran have not reinvested enough of their oil and gas revenue in the discovery of new oil and 
natural gas reserves to replace the reserves that are being depleted.  Sixth, the inability of most 
NOCs to focus exclusively on commercial objectives and the absence of a true bottom line have 
frequently led to the mismanagement of financial resources.   
 
Seventh, the lack of transparency in the operation and financial performance of many national oil 
companies makes private sector lenders reluctant to lend to these NOCs, consequently not all 
sources of capital are available to national oil companies.  Eighth, international law provides 
limited enforcement mechanisms as a deterrent to the expropriation of assets owned by IOCs in 
developing countries, or to the unilateral abrogation of agreements between host countries and 
international oil companies.    
13 
 
1.3 Purpose of the Study 
The challenges created by these issues can be met to varying degrees by the development of 
appropriate institutions.  Understanding how these institutions have developed and how effective 
they have been in managing political and investment risk is important to the economic efficiency 
of the oil and natural gas industry and to the world economy.  In addition, understanding the 
development of and the role played by institutions in the oil and natural gas industry can expand 
our knowledge of institutional development, economic history and political development in 
general. 
 
1.4 Defining Risk 
Risk is frequently understood to mean the possibility of failure or loss, but it is better understood 
as a dispersion or range of the possible outcomes.  Risk is therefore a measure of the degree of 
uncertainty or variability of outcome and does not necessarily reflect a high probability of failure 
or loss.
17
  This definition is applicable to political risk as well as commercial and financial risk. 
 
In the upstream sector of the petroleum industry (exploration and production) risk can be divided 
into two major categories, below ground risk and above ground risk.  Below ground risk includes 
resource uncertainty, technical uncertainty and environmental uncertainty.  Resource uncertainty 
refers to the presence or absence of oil and natural gas in a specific drilling prospect, it is either 
there or it is not (a discrete uncertainty); and the amount of oil and natural gas, if a discovery is 
made (a continuous uncertainty).  Technical uncertainty refers to the potential, but unknown 
engineering problems that may be encountered in producing the oil or gas.  Environmental 
uncertainty refers to the potential for accidental damage to land or marine life.  Above ground 
risk includes adverse changes in economic conditions (intentional or unintentional), the inability 
to enforce the terms of a contract, changed fiscal terms imposed by the host government 
(division of revenue), resource nationalism, discriminatory regulatory behavior and the 
placement of geopolitical considerations (national security, energy security, and political 
alliances) above legal and financial commitments.  Table A.3, in Appendix I presents a more 
complete list of risks and uncertainties in the oil and natural gas industry.  
                                                          
17
 David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and Russell E. 
Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of Energy 
(Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) p. 239 
14 
 
1.5 Foreign Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment 
Lipson (1985) noted that “until recently…portfolio investments [debt] and direct investment 
[equity] had long shared roughly similar treatment [levels of protection].  They could be 
characterized jointly in a single regime governing all foreign capital”.18  He traced the 
divergence to the late 1960s, when expropriations proliferated, but debt renunciation (and default 
more generally) did not.  He concluded that “The fundamental difference is the better 
institutionalization of international finance [emphasis in the original]. …. The answer lies in two 
basic differences between the network of international lending and equity investments [foreign 
direct investment]”.19   First , multinational corporations have largely independent interests in 
expropriation disputes, but financial organizations have joint interests because of the network of 
interbank liabilities.  Second, because the interests of direct investors are separable, their home 
governments have less incentive to become involved in one another’s expropriation disputes.20 
 
This is an important consideration for two reasons.  First, the question arises whether two 
regimes still exist almost 30 year later.  Second, if two different regimes do exist, then a choice 
must be made between studying the “debt” regime, the “equity” regime or both.  In this study, 
the emphasis is on the foreign direct investment regime (equity) in the international oil and 
natural gas exploration industry. This includes an analysis of the recent record of expropriation, 
major deals and alliances between IOCs, NOCs and host country governments; recent disputes 
between IOCs, NOCs and host governments; recent adjudications of disputes; and the recent 
record of compliance with such arbitration rulings and court decisions. 
 
1.6 Plan of the Dissertation 
Chapter 2 outlines the central research question and subsidiary research questions to be answered 
in this study.  Chapter 3 reviews previous research on the development and role of institutions 
and organizations in theory and practice.  Chapter 4 describes the research design used in the 
study.  Chapter 5 describes the research methods.  Chapter 6 describes the research findings.  
Chapter 7 presents six case studies which are compared to the observations and conclusions in 
                                                          
18
 Charles Lipson, Standing Guard – Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Los 
Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1985), p. 170 
19
 Ibid   
20
 Ibid, p. 174-175.   
15 
 
Chapter 6.  These cases are consistent with the conclusions reached in Chapter 6.  Chapter 8 
presents a summary, conclusions and proposals for future research.   
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Chapter 2 - Research Questions 
2.1 Central Research Question 
The evaluation of political and investment risk have always been a part of exploring for oil and 
natural gas, however, the role played by institutions in managing this risk, has frequently been 
subsumed in this political and investment analysis.  Second, although books have been written on 
how petroleum law 
21
 and international investment treaties 
22
 can be used in theory to manage 
risk, less attention has been given to (1) how and when these institutions developed, (2) the 
extent to which international oil companies, national oil companies, oilfield service companies 
and host governments have used these institutions and (3) how effective they have been in 
managing risk.  This study examines these questions.   
 
2.2 Subsidiary Questions 
Question #1  
What evidence, if any, exists that the frequency of expropriation of foreign direct investment has 
increased in the oil and natural gas industry; and under what circumstances is it more or less 
likely to occur?  
 
Question #2  
Not all disputes between host countries and IOCs are related to expropriation.  In fact, most 
disputes are the result of a disagreement regarding the terms and conditions of a contract or some 
unanticipated event.  This raises three questions.  (1) How frequent are investment disputes, (2) 
How are these disputes usually resolved and (3) What circumstances are more or less likely to 
lead to disputes?  
 
Question #3  
What contract provisions are most often included in a contract to limit the number of disputes 
and resolve those that occur?  
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Question #4 
What are the primary clauses in a bilateral investment treaty and how effective have they been in 
resolving disputes?  
 
Question #5  
Are countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties less likely to be 
involved in investment disputes in an international court or tribunal?  Are countries with more 
reliable legal systems as measured by government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
and control of corruption less likely to be involved in disputes in an international court or 
tribunal?  
 
Question #6 
Does a relationship exist between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of 
bilateral treaties it has signed?  Does a relationship exist between the FDI outflows from a 
country, the FDI inflows to a country and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has 
signed?  Are the rulings of most courts and tribunals fair and are they complied with? 
 
Question #7 
What sources of capital are available to finance oil and gas exploration and development?  What 
financing structures are available?  What business structures are available?  Do alliances offer 
any advantages in managing risk and how politically feasible are they?  
 
Question #8 
What financial instruments are available for managing risk after a project is in operation? 
 
Question #9 
What is financial reporting quality and transparency?  Can financial reporting quality be 
measured and if so how?  Does financial reporting quality matter from a theoretical perspective?  
Does financial reporting quality matter from a practical perspective?  Does the quality of 
financial reporting affect the amount of foreign direct investment in a country?  
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Question #10 
How important are multilateral treaties in the oil and gas industry?  How important are 
international energy forums?  Who is responsible for the quality of financial reporting in the 
international environment?  How have signature bonuses affected NOCs, IOCs and host 
governments?  What is energy diplomacy and does it matter in the competition for oil and natural 
gas?  How do countries balance foreign direct investment and national security?  These questions 
are addressed in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 3 - Previous Research 
3.1   Institutions and Organizations in Theory 
In its classical economic formulation, markets are assumed to be efficient in the absence of 
regulation.  In its neoclassical formulation, markets are thought to work most of the time, but 
may require minimal regulation to maintain an orderly market.  The basic assumptions of 
classical and neoclassical economics are: (1) people have rational preferences among outcomes 
that can be identified and assigned a value, (2) individuals maximize their utility and firms 
maximize their profits, (3) people act independently on the basis of full and relevant 
information,
23
 and (4) the classical and neoclassical economic models assume that capital is 
optimally allocated through the action of markets and prices. 
 
Another approach to economics in general and political economy in particular is the “new 
institutional economics”.   New institutional economics (NIE) has its origin in two articles by 
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm (1937) and The Problem of Social Cost (1960).  
Institutional economists work within a modified neoclassical framework, which includes 
consideration of efficiency, that is, transaction and distribution costs.
24
   
 
The NIE approach differs from neoclassical economics in several ways.  First, it rejects the 
assumption that people act independently on the basis of full and relevant information.  
Institutional economists argue that decisions are made on the basis of less than complete and 
accurate information, because the acquisition of information involves costs in time and money 
and both are constraints.  Second, engaging in transactions involves the incurrence of transaction 
costs and transaction risk, which influence the decision making process and therefore the 
decision.  Third, the two preceding points make a formal system of rules desirable because 
formal rules lower information and transaction costs, and reduce the risk associated with a 
particular transaction.  The issues addressed by institutional economics include: organizational 
arrangements, property rights,
25
 transaction costs,
26
 credible commitments, modes of governance, 
persuasive abilities, social norms, ideological values, decisive perceptions, gained control, 
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enforcement mechanisms, asset specificity, human assets, social capital, asymmetric information, 
strategic behavior, bounded rationality, opportunism, adverse selection, moral hazard, 
contractual safeguards, surrounding uncertainty, monitoring costs, incentives to collude, 
hierarchical structures, and bargaining strength.   
 
The two principal classes of participants in the institutional economic framework are institutions 
and organizations.  There are no universally accepted definitions for the terms “institution” and 
“organization”, but most scholars working within the NIE framework follow Douglass North's 
definitions.   Institutions are the "rules of the game", consisting of both the formal legal rules and 
the informal social norms that govern individual behavior and structure social interactions.   
 
Institutions are the humanly devised constraints that structure political economic and social 
interaction.  They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, and 
codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights).  Throughout history, 
institutions have been devised by human beings to create order and reduce uncertainty in exchange. 
… They evolve incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; history in 
consequence is largely a story of institutional evolution in which the historical performance of 
economies can only be understood as a part of a sequential story.
27
 
 
Organizations are those groups of people and the governance arrangements they create to 
coordinate their group action against other groups also performing as organizations, for example, 
business firms, universities, clubs, medical associations, and unions.
28
  These definitions will be 
used throughout this study.   
 
Coase, North, Williamson and others argue that the role of institutions has been underestimated 
and that institutions are not a neutral or unchanging background against which rational 
individuals and organizations make decisions.  Rather institutions “together with the standard 
constraints of economics … define the choice set and therefore determine transaction and 
production costs and hence the profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity”.29  
Institutions not only define the “choice set”, but also influence organizations, consequently 
changing both the organizations and the institutions over time.  “Incremental change comes from 
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the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do 
better by altering the existing institutional framework at some margin”.30 
 
Institutions (contracts, domestic laws, treaties, international law, formal rules and informal 
customs) and the entities that implement them (regulatory agencies, financial exchanges, non-
governmental agencies and inter-governmental agencies) are involved in virtually every stage of 
the oil and gas exploration, development and production process.  This involvement extends 
beyond the neoclassical assumptions regarding rules and regulations needed to maintain an 
orderly market and includes laws regarding capital formation, ownership structure, foreign direct 
investment, capital allocation, domestic and international product pricing, taxation, capital 
repatriation and social service expenditures.   
 
Although it might be possible to discuss institutions in this study without discussing the types of 
organizations, the influence of institutions on specific organization and the influence of these 
organizations on specific institutions will be clearer if organizations are explicitly discussed.  
The decision to include organizations in the analysis is also driven by North’s observation that 
“institutions do not emerge spontaneously to create and nurture the market, but rather reflect the 
interests of those players [organizations] in a position to put them in place”.31  Therefore, how 
energy exporting and energy importing countries define their short term and long term interests 
and how they relate those interests to other aspects of their energy, international security and 
climate agenda will determine the direction that institutional development takes.32   
 
3.2 Institutions in Practice 
The institutions employed in practice include: (1) national constitutions, domestic law, 
international law, bilateral and multilateral investment agreements (e.g. North American Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), and the International Centre for 
the Settlement of Investment Disputes), courts and tribunals, (2) contract provisions, partnership 
structures, financing structures and political risk insurance; and (3) institutions promoting 
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transparency, for example, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), the International 
Accounting Standards Board (IASB), Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the 
Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE).  A detailed discussion of the development and operation 
of the institutions used by the oil and natural gas industry is presented in Chapter 6. 
 
3.3 Organizations in Practice 
The organizations in the international oil and gas industry can be divided into three broad 
categories: (1) national governments (2) national oil companies and (3) international oil 
companies.  The next three sections examine the politics, policies, and objectives of each of these 
types of organizations.   
 
3.3.1 National Governments 
National governments are the representatives of the people and therefore, at least in theory, act to 
enhance the welfare of the people in that country.  In countries exporting oil and natural gas, this 
principally consists of the development of energy policy related to the discovery, production and 
sale of oil and natural gas.  Energy policy includes approving the organizations that will be 
granted drilling rights in the country, the rate of production allowed, and the division of revenue 
between the national government and the IOCs or foreign NOCs operating in the country.  The 
investment policy of national governments can change over time and this represents in the 
broadest sense the risk to foreign direct investment.  This section examines the politics, policies 
and objectives of some of the larger oil exporting countries and their governments.  
 
Saudi Arabia  
Saudi Arabia possesses almost one-fifth of the world's proved oil reserves and is the largest 
exporter of petroleum liquids in the world.  In 2013, Saudi Arabia produced an average of 11.592 
MBPD (million barrels per day) and exported an estimated 8.731 MBPD of petroleum liquids.  
Far East Asia received approximately 54 percent of Saudi Arabia's crude oil exports and the 
majority of its refined petroleum products and natural gas liquids (NGL) exports.  In 2013, Saudi 
Arabia exported an average of 1.326 MBPD of petroleum liquids to the United States, which 
accounted for 21.4% of total U.S. petroleum imports.  Saudi Arabia's economy remains heavily 
dependent on petroleum exports.  Petroleum exports accounted for almost 90 percent of Saudi 
23 
 
Arabia’s total export revenues in 2011, according to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries’ (OPEC) Annual Statistical Bulletin 2012. 33 
 
The state oil company, Saudi Arabian Oil Company, has exclusive rights to explore for and 
produce oil and natural gas in the country.  Saudi Arabia's Ministry of Petroleum and Mineral 
Resources and the Supreme Council for Petroleum and Minerals have oversight of the Saudi 
Arabian Oil Company and the oil and natural gas industry.  The Supreme Council, which is 
composed of members of the royal family, industry leaders and government ministers, is 
responsible for petroleum and natural gas policy, including contract review and long term 
strategic planning.  Saudi Arabian Oil Company’s financial performance is ranked in the upper 
middle classification, one level below Statoil and Petrobras, which are considered the two best 
managed NOCs and one level above Petroleos de Venezuela S.A (PDVSA) and Petroleos 
Mexicanos (Pemex).34 
 
Viewed from the outside, internal politics do not appear to be an obstacle to the formation and 
implementation of a consistent energy policy in Saudi Arabia.  In addition, Saudi Arabia’s 
policies and production level have been consistent with its public statements, that is, to provide 
enough oil to maintain the world price of oil at a level that will not lead to a global recession.  
However, the spot price of crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) has declined from $106 per barrel 
in June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of December 2014.  Given the significant reduction in 
the price of crude oil, Saudi Arabia might have been expected to reduce its production to bring 
the global supply of oil into balance with demand.  However, Saudi Arabia has continued to 
produce oil at its prior level.  There are several possible reasons why Saudi Arabia has continued 
to produce at its previous level.  First, Saudi Arabia may not want to reduce its market share of 
crude oil exports relative to other countries, particularly those countries in OPEC.  Second, Saudi 
Arabia’s marginal cost of oil production is significantly lower than other countries within and 
outside of OPEC.  They can therefore operate at a profit even at substantially lower oil prices.  
Third, they may want to discourage the production of unconventional oil and gas (shale oil and 
shale gas) in the United States and Canada.  Fourth, they may want to put economic and fiscal 
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pressure on the Shia dominated governments of Iran and Iraq who have from time to time sought 
hegemony in the Middle East.   
 
Russia  
In 2013, Russia produced an average of 10.498 MBPD of petroleum liquids and exported an 
estimated 7.201 MBPD, making it the third-largest producer of oil (after the United States and 
Saudi Arabia).  Russia was the second-largest producer of natural gas in 2012 (after the United 
States).  In 2012, the state owned company Rosneft produced 2.448 MBPD, 23.7% of Russia’s 
oil production of 10.315 MBPD and LUKoil, a private company, produced 1.670 MBPD, 16.2% 
of Russia’s oil production.   
 
The state-owned company, Gazprom dominates Russia's upstream gas industry, producing 
approximately 74% of Russia's total natural gas output.  Gazprom also controls most of Russia's 
natural gas reserves.  More than 65% of proved reserves are directly controlled by the company 
and additional reserves are controlled by Gazprom through joint ventures with other 
companies.35   
 
After the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia privatized its oil industry by selling 
state-owned companies to private investors.  Beginning in the late 1990s, a small number of 
private sector companies drove growth in the oil sector and several international oil companies 
attempted to enter the market, with varying degrees of success.  Although foreign companies can 
invest in Russia, the investment is generally made in partnership with a Russian company, 
usually Rosneft if the investment is in the oil sector and Gazprom, if the investment is in the 
natural gas sector. 36 
 
Several ministries are involved in the oil and gas sector.  The Ministry of Natural Resources 
issues field licenses, monitors compliance with license agreements, and levies fines for violations 
of environmental regulations.  The Ministry of Finance is responsible for tax policy in the energy 
sector, and the Ministry of Economic Development is responsible for regulations of tariffs and 
energy sector reforms.  The Ministry of Energy oversees energy policy formulation and 
enforcement.  Within these ministries, regulatory agencies involved in the sector include the 
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Federal Energy Commission (oil transportation tariffs), the Commission for State Policy on the 
Oil Market (formulates policy for regulating oil and oil product markets), and the Commission 
on Protective Measures in Foreign Trade and Customs and Tariff Policy (sets crude oil export 
tariffs).37 
 
Since 1999, the Russian oil and gas industry has undergone renationalization.  Russia’s tax and 
environmental regulatory agencies have been instrumental in helping to affect this 
renationalization.  This is discussed in more detail in the case study of TNK-BP in Chapter 7.  
Russia’s energy policy is directed at two objectives, (1) the use of oil and gas export revenue to 
develop the domestic economy and (2) the use of oil and gas exports to create and maintain 
political alliances with countries bordering Russia.  A combination of economic sanctions 
imposed on the Russian economy by the United States and its coalition partners in response to 
Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its incitement of and assistance to Russian separatists in 
Eastern Ukraine; the decline in the spot price of crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) from $106 
per barrel in June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of December 2014 and the country’s heavy 
reliance on oil and gas exports for foreign exchange reserves have led to a run on the ruble and 
are likely to lead to a recession in Russia in 2015.       
 
Venezuela 
In 2013, Venezuela produced an average of 2.489 MBPD and exported an estimated 1.712 
MBPD of petroleum liquids.  Petroleos de Venezuela (PDVSA) is the largest employer in 
Venezuela and accounts for a significant portion of the country's GDP, government revenue, and 
export earnings.   
 
During the 1990s, Venezuela took steps to liberalize its petroleum sector.  In 1999, Venezuela 
passed the Gas Hydrocarbons Law, which was intended to diversify the economy by promoting 
natural gas development and expanding the role of natural gas in Venezuela's energy sector.  This 
legislation allowed private operators to own 100 percent of natural gas projects, in contrast to the 
ownership rules in the oil sector which required that Venezuela own a majority interest in all new 
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oil projects.  The Gas Hydrocarbons Law also reduced royalty and income tax rates on natural 
gas projects relative to the rates applied to oil projects.38  
 
However, after the election of President Hugo Chavez in 1999, the Venezuelan government 
continuously increased its involvement in the oil industry.39  In 2002, almost half of PDVSA's 
employees went on strike in protest against the policies of President Chavez and his 
administration, essentially bringing the company's operations to a halt.  After the strike, PDVSA 
fired 18,000 employees and restructured the organization to strengthen the government’s control 
over the company and increase the loyalty of middle and upper management.  In 2006, President 
Chavez initiated the nationalization of oil exploration and production in Venezuela, by 
mandating the renegotiation of ownership of all projects and giving PDVSA a minimum of 60% 
ownership in all oil and gas projects (old and new).40 
 
In 2007, President Chavez announced a public referendum on several proposed constitutional 
amendments, one of which would have entitled the state to a controlling ownership position in all 
new natural gas projects, similar to a constitutional law governing the oil sector.  However, 
Venezuelan voters defeated the referendum in December 2007.41   Chavez successor, Nicolas 
Maduro, was elected President of Venezuela on April 15, 2013 and has continued the policies of 
his predecessor.  
 
Mexico 
In 2004, Mexico produced an average of 3.848 MBPD of petroleum liquids and exported an 
estimated 1.792 MBPD of petroleum liquids.  In 2013, Mexico produced an average of 2.908 
MBPD of petroleum liquids and exported an estimated .803 MBPD of petroleum liquids.   
 
In early December 2013, after years of state ownership and declining production, Mexico’s 
President Enrique Pena Nieto proposed significant energy reforms.  On December 12, 2013 the 
Mexican Senate passed a new law with 95 votes in favor and 28 votes against, allowing domestic 
and foreign companies to explore and develop oil fields, for the first time since 1938.  This 
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legislation was subsequently referred to the lower Mexican Chamber of Deputies where it was 
approved by a vote of 345 in favor and 134 against.  President Pena Nieto signed the energy law 
on December 20, 2013.
42
 
 
Advocates of the new law argued the status quo was unacceptable, because Mexico was facing 
depleted reserves and declining output.
43
  The law is intended to restore the efficiency of the oil 
and natural gas industry in Mexico, which is suffering from corruption, inefficiency and an 
inability to successfully implement new technologies.  The reforms also propose improving the 
transparency and effectiveness of national finance.
44
   
 
The reforms would allow exploration and production contracts that include: licenses, production-
sharing agreements, profit-sharing agreements, and service contracts.  Prior to this legislation, 
only service contracts, in which foreign companies were paid for services rendered, were 
allowed.  Under the new legislation, Petroleos Mexicanos (PEMEX), will remain a state- owned 
company, but will be given more budgetary and administrative autonomy and will have to bid 
competitively with other oil and gas companies on new projects.   
On June 19, 2014, the conservative National Action Party (PAN) said that it would only support 
the energy reforms if President Pena Nieto agreed to electoral reforms that could have the effect 
of weakening his party’s (Institutional Revolutionary Party, PRI), hold on power.45  In addition, 
Mexico's left-wing parties had previously announced that they intended to promote a 2015 
referendum to repeal the new energy laws that have already been passed.46  However, on August 
6, 2014, the Mexican Senate voted 78 to 26 in favor of a package of legislation that implements 
these changes to the Mexican oil industry and President Pena Nieto signed the laws on August 
11, 2014. 
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On October 1, 2014 Mexico's state oil company Pemex and Exxon Mobil Corp signed a non-
commercial agreement to jointly explore potential upstream and downstream business 
opportunities.47  On the same day, a new private sector Mexican oil company, named Sierra Oil 
& Gas, was announced.  Sierra Oil & Gas has secured equity investment commitments of $525 
million from U.S. private equity firms Riverstone Holdings LLC and EnCap Investments. 48 
 
Developments in Mexico illustrate several of the features of the oil and natural gas industry 
described earlier: (1) the depletion of “easy oil reserves” (2) the need to employ more advanced 
technology in oil producing regions where the “easy oil” has been depleted; (3) the uncertainty 
created by a continuing struggle between populist nationalism and resource sovereignty on the 
one hand and economic efficiency and investor protection on the other. 
 
China  
In 2013, China produced 4.459 MBPD of petroleum liquids, making it the fourth largest 
producer in the world; and consumed 10.277 MBPD, making it the second largest petroleum 
liquids consumer in the world, after the United States.  The government's energy policies are 
dominated by the country's growing demand for oil and its reliance on oil imports.   The National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), a department of China's State Council, is the 
primary policymaking, planning, and regulatory authority in the Chinese energy sector, but four 
other ministries oversee various aspects of the country's oil policy. 
  
In July 2008, the government created the National Energy Administration (NEA) to act as the 
principal energy regulator.  The NEA and the NDRC are responsible for approving new energy 
projects in China, setting domestic wholesale energy prices, and implementing the central 
government's energy policies.  In January 2010, the government formed a National Energy 
Commission for the purpose of consolidating and conforming energy policies among the various 
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agencies under the State Council.49  China's national oil companies (NOCs) also have significant 
influence in the formation of energy policy in China. 
 
Between 1994 and 1998, the Chinese government reorganized most state-owned oil and natural 
gas assets into two vertically integrated firms that own both upstream and downstream assets, the 
China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) and the China Petroleum and Chemical 
Corporation (Sinopec).  These two firms operate a range of local subsidiaries, and together 
control China's upstream and downstream oil markets.  CNPC is the largest upstream oil 
company in China and together with its publicly-listed subsidiary, PetroChina, accounts for an 
estimated 53% and 75% of China's total crude oil and natural gas production, respectively.  
Sinopec’s operations are focused on refining and distribution, which account for 76% of 
Sinopec’s revenues.  Other state-owned oil firms have emerged over the past several years.  For 
example, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) is responsible for offshore oil 
exploration and production.50 
 
Onshore oil production in China is mostly limited to China's NOCs, but international oil 
companies (IOCs) have been granted greater access to offshore oil prospects and technically 
challenging gas fields, mainly through production-sharing contracts (PSCs) and joint ventures 
(JVs) with international oil companies.  Chinese investment laws require that China's NOCs 
must hold the majority interest in each production sharing agreement and retain the right to 
become the operator after development costs have been recovered by the partners in the 
production sharing agreement.51 
 
The Communist Party of China (CPC) is the sole governing party in China, but it coexists with 
eight other legal parties that constitute the United Front.  It is therefore more appropriate to 
discuss China’s internal politics and policy in the context of competing bureaucracies rather than 
political parties.  This competition includes disputes regarding internal pricing and subsidies, 
greater state sponsorship of one energy source over another, conflict over the priority to be given 
to environmental protection and national economic development and the extent to which state 
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owned companies (CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC) are allowed to negotiate their own deals with 
IOCs and host states.   
   
Nigeria 
In 2013, Nigeria produced 2.373 MBPD of petroleum liquids, making it the 13th largest 
producer in the world and exported 2.254 million barrels per day.  The Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) was created in 1977 to provide oversight of the oil and natural 
gas industry and promote oil and natural gas development.  In 1988, the NNPC was divided into 
12 subsidiary companies to more effectively regulate the sub-sectors of the industry.  The 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), a department within the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources, is also an important regulator of the Nigerian oil and gas industry.   
 
Most of Nigeria's major oil and natural gas projects are funded through joint ventures (JVs) 
between international oil companies (IOCs) and NNPC, in which NNPC is the majority 
shareholder.  Production Sharing Agreements (PSAs) are usually employed on deep water 
projects and generally include more attractive terms for the IOC than those projects onshore or in 
shallow water, to provide an incentive to the IOCs to invest in deep water projects. 52 
 
The Petroleum Industry Bill (PIB), which was initially proposed in 2008, is expected to change 
the structure and fiscal terms governing the oil and natural gas sectors in Nigeria, if it becomes 
law.  The bill is intended to ensure that the management and allocation of petroleum resources in 
Nigeria are conducted in accordance with the principles of good governance, transparency and 
sustainable development.  The most recent version of the PIB was submitted to the Nigerian 
National Assembly on July 18, 2012, but has not yet been passed.53  If the PIB is passed in its 
current form, it will impose changes to new and existing contracts that could make some projects 
commercially unviable, particularly deep water projects.  Some of the most contentious 
provisions of the PIB are the potential renegotiation of existing contracts with IOCs, changes in 
tax and royalty structures, deregulation of the downstream sector, restructuring of NNPC, a 
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concentration of oversight authority in the Ministry of Petroleum Resources, and a mandatory 
contribution by IOCs of 10% of monthly net profits to the Petroleum Host Communities Fund.54 
 
Because of the regulatory uncertainty created by the delay in passing the PIB, there has not been 
a licensing round for oil exploration in Nigeria since 2007.  This regulatory uncertainty extends 
to the natural gas industry as well.  The result is that less investment has been made in new 
projects than might otherwise have been made.   Developments in Nigeria illustrate several of the 
features of the oil and natural gas industry described earlier: (1) the depletion of “easy oil 
reserves”, (2) the need to employ more advanced technology, and (3) the uncertainty created by a 
continuing debate over changes in national energy laws.  
 
Iraq 
Iraq’s oil production has increased from 2.399 MBPD in 2009 to 3.058 MBPD in 2013.  
Approximately 75% of Iraq's crude oil production comes from the oil fields in southern Iraq and 
the rest comes from the northern oil fields near Kirkuk.  The majority of Iraqi oil production 
comes from just three very large oil fields: (1) Kirkuk, (2) the North Rumaila field in southern 
Iraq, and the South Rumaila field also in southern Iraq. 
 
The Iraqi Ministry of Oil oversees oil and natural gas exploration and production in all areas of 
Iraq, except the Kurdish territory, through its operating entities the North Oil Company (NOC) 
and the Midland Oil Company (MDOC) in the north and central regions of Iraq; and the South 
Oil Company (SOC) and the Missan Oil Company (MOC) in the southern region of Iraq.  Oil 
production in the northern region is controlled by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG).  
Production in this region varies because of disputes between the KRG and the central Iraqi 
government in Baghdad.  Independent assessments by FACTS Global Energy and the Middle 
East Economic Survey suggest that crude oil production capacity under the control of the 
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) may have reached 400,000 BPD (barrels per day) at the 
end of 2013.55 
 
In addition, political disputes between the Sunni, Shia and Kurdish sects within Iraq and the 
absence of a law governing the development of Iraq's oil and natural gas, have slowed the pace at 
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which Iraq’s oil production has increased.  The proposed Hydrocarbon Law, which would govern 
Iraq’s contracts with and regulation of oil and gas companies, has been under review in the 
Council of Ministers since October 26, 2008, but has not received final passage.56  The violence 
created by I.S.I.S. (The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) or I.S.I.L. (The Islamic State in Iraq and 
the Levant) in Iraq’s Northern and Western provinces have brought some Iraqi oil fields under 
the control of I.S.I.S making the passage of this bill even less likely.   
 
Furthermore, the ruling party’s (Dawa Party) insistence on centralizing policy making in the Shia 
dominated government in Baghdad under the leadership of former Prime Minister, Nouri al-
Maliki exacerbated these conflicts.  The election of Haider al-Abadi, who is thought to be a more 
inclusive leader, may help bring Sunnis, Shias and Kurds closer together, making cooperation on 
oil production and oil policy easier, but I.S.I.L.’s control of oil fields and refineries in Northern 
and Western Iraq could reduce oil production in the long term.  The next section examines the 
motivation, behavior and policy of national oil companies. 
 
3.3.2 National Oil Companies 
National oil companies control a substantial part of world oil production and world oil reserves.  
Consequently, they play a critical role in the balance between supply and demand.  Understanding the 
policies and behavior of national oil companies is therefore important for understanding the operation 
of the international oil and gas industry.   
 
Victor identified four main approaches to understanding NOCs in the literature: (1) Theoretical and 
historical efforts to explain why NOCs exist  (2) Assessments of economic efficiency that have 
demonstrated considerable variation in the financial performance of NOCs  (3) NOC’s political 
behavior, a topic of particular interest to political scientists, who have tried to explain the abnormal 
politics in resource-rich countries and (4) Reform, a continuing topic in resource-rich countries, 
especially those in which NOCs have performed poorly or engaged in perverse political behavior (or 
both).57  This section focuses on 1 and 3.   
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Why NOCs Exist 
A World Bank study prepared by Tordo et al. examined why NOC’s exist.58  From that study 
Victor identified four principal reasons why governments have created and maintained NOCs 
rather than rely on private sector companies and simply impose taxes on them.59   
 
(1) Weakness of Public Institutions.  Governments must perform many functions, including the 
regulation of a complex oil and natural gas industry.  The institutions needed to regulate the 
industry are often weak or non-existent in developing countries.  Governments may create an 
NOC to facilitate the collection of information and the regulation of the industry by giving 
themselves direct access to the country’s oil and gas operations.60 61  A central NOC can track 
and allocate rents and provide fiscal oversight of the industry.   For example, in Angola one of 
the main functions of its NOC, Sonangol, is to regulate the sector and oversee the behavior of the 
large number of IOCs active in the country.62 
 
(2) Inadequacy of the Domestic Private Sector.  Maximizing the value of oil and gas resources 
requires coordination among many firms and often few if any of these firms exist in a country with 
previously unknown hydrocarbon resources.  Governments often create an NOC to help encourage the 
orderly development of the oil and gas industry.63  In addition, many NOCs are given the 
responsibility for developing domestic industry suppliers (e.g. drill pipe, drilling fluids, seismic 
exploration and waste water treatment) and customers (utilities, industrial and automotive).  In Saudi 
Arabia, for example, the Saudi national oil company led the development of the nation’s 
petrochemical industry.64 65 
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(3) Desire for Internal Control over the Revenue Created by Oil and Gas Production.  Control 
over the cash inflow from production and sale of oil is of major importance to a host 
government, whether it intends to use the revenue for public purposes or is intent on diverting it 
for private gain.66 67  (This is a separate issue from the more general concern about industry 
regulation.)  In countries that are primarily dependent on oil and gas exports for government 
revenue and in which rentier politics predominate, the key to controlling the rents is to control 
the NOC.  This explanation is usually reformulated in public statements as a matter of national 
pride and the people’s desire for the state to exercise sovereignty over the country’s oil 
resources.68 
 
(4) The Desire to Project Economic and Political Power Abroad.  An NOC can be used to exert 
political influence abroad as well as at home, for example Russia has used the threat of 
termination of gas delivery to Western Europe and countries that were previously a part of the 
Soviet Union to retain influence in these countries.69  These four explanations are related to each 
other and more than one is usually operating in a country at any given time.   
 
Political Behavior of NOCs 
The creation of an NOC is itself a political act; and given their size and importance to the 
national economy, they inevitably become involved in national politics.  The studies of political 
behavior of NOCs can be divided into two categories.  One category emphasizes the principal-
agent relationship between the host government and the NOC, in which the principal (the state 
and its people) try to encourage an agent (the NOC) to align its behavior with the principal’s 
interests.70   
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A second group of studies demonstrate how NOCs become political actors to advance their own 
agenda and increase their power.   For example, Mommer 71 demonstrated how NOCs that began 
as rent collectors for the state (e.g. PDVSA) acquired a larger range of functions over time, 
including oil production and refining operations abroad.72  A large number of case studies have 
shown how NOCs have become states within a state; insulating themselves from external review 
and so increasing their freedom to pursue their own self-interest.  Russia’s Gazprom is one of the 
more obvious examples.73  Some of the literature on Saudi Aramco points to similar 
conclusions.74  The next section examines the politics, policies and objectives of international oil 
companies. 
 
3.3.3 International Oil Companies 
Between 1970 and 1980, a substantial portion of the world’s oil reserves were nationalized by the 
governments of the oil producing countries.  For example, in 1976 the nationalization of the 
Kuwait Oil Company was completed and was 100% owned by the government of Kuwait.75  In 
1979, during the Islamic Revolution the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was nationalized 
and was 100% owned by the government of Iran.76  In 1974, Saudi-Aramco was 60 % owned by 
the Saudi government, but by 1980 it was 100% owned by the Saudi government.77  The 
immediate effect of these nationalizations was to substantially reduce the oil and gas reserves 
under the control of the IOCs.   The secondary effect was the consolidation of oil and gas 
companies in the private sector.  For example, Exxon and Mobil merged in 1999 and Conoco and 
Phillips Petroleum merged in 2002.   
 
The expropriation of the IOCs’ oil and gas reserves called into question the future of the IOC’s.  
In addition, the IOCs’ rationale for merging and their long term future depended on their ability 
to successfully develop very large oil and natural gas projects in difficult environments, often 
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involving complex geology and significant technical risk.78  Consequently, much of the research 
on international oil companies between 1985 and 2005 focused on their future role in the 
industry.   
 
However, the IOCs have succeeded in making this transition and are still among the largest oil 
and natural gas companies in the world.79  In 2012, ExxonMobil, Royal Dutch Shell, Chevron 
Corp, BP Plc and ConocoPhillips, had combined net income of $121.2 billion (30.1% of all oil 
and gas companies reporting profits in that year. (These figures do not include the countries of 
the Middle East and Africa which do not report net income).  These five companies produced 
7.47 MBPD of oil or 8.4% of the 89.8 million barrels per day produced worldwide in 2012.  
They also produced 31.7 billion cubic feet per day of natural gas or 7.8% of 404.0 billion cubic 
feet produced per day worldwide in 2012.  (These numbers include the countries of the Middle 
East and Africa).80  In 2012, the next 20 largest U.S. oil companies reported $20.2 billion in net 
income on 2.9 MBPD of oil production.81  The IOCs therefore still control substantial capital 
inflows that can be invested in future exploration and production projects.   
 
In 2008, these five firms accounted for $125.1 billion (23.4%) of total capital expenditures and 
exploration expense (CAPEX) of the $534.7 billion spent on oil and gas exploration worldwide.  
(These figures do not include the NOCs of the Middle East and Africa which do not report 
capital expenditures and exploration expense).  In 2012, these five firms accounted for 23.6% of 
the $579.5 billion spent on CAPEX for oil and natural gas exploration worldwide.82 83 84 85 (This 
$579.5 billion does not include the capital expenditures and exploration expense made by the 
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NOCs in the countries of the Middle East and Africa and is therefore lower than the $617.2 
billion estimated by Barclays Bank for 2012.  Barclays estimated the CAPEX made by the NOCs 
of the Middle East and Africa at $26.3 billion and $23.8 billion, respectively in 2012.  Adding 
these two figures to $579.5 billion gives $$629.6 billion ($579.5 + $26.3 + $23.8 = $629.6), 
which is close to the $617.2 billion Barclays estimated for global CAPEX, in 2012.) 86  
 
However, these five firms accounted for only 29.8 billion barrels and 33.0 billion barrels of 
proved liquid reserves (oil and LPG) in 2008 and 2012, respectively, or 2.0% of liquid reserves 
worldwide (conventional and unconventional) of 1,687.3 billion barrels. 87 88 89   
 
Changing Role of the IOCs 
Between 1995 and 2005, the role of the IOCs evolved from technically integrated and self-
sufficient exploration and development companies, to general contractors, coordinating the 
operations of a large number of suppliers and subcontractors who perform specific tasks 
(producing and analyzing seismic data, provide drilling rigs and crews, and providing a wide 
range of oil field services).  The IOCs provide the project management and organizational skills 
these large projects require.  The largest IOCs also function as bankers by providing or arranging 
the financing needed to explore and develop large fields in difficult environments.90  For this 
reason, IOCs have substantial bargaining leverage at the beginning of negotiations with a host 
country.91 
 
The Politics of International Oil Companies 
IOCs are not primarily political actors but rather economic actors.  They tend to be involved in 
political issues only to the extent that the actions of government affect the economics of their 
operations and their future profitability.  However, the price and the availability of oil and natural 
gas industry are of intense interest to constituents and governments in developed and developing 
countries.  Oil and natural gas is therefore the object of considerable government legislation.   
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Bradley characterizes the political behavior of private sector oil companies as either defensive or 
offensive.  Defensive behavior refers to oil companies trying to influence legislation initiated by 
others that it believes will increase its costs or reduce its revenues.  Offensive behavior refers to 
oil companies initiating legislation that they believe will reduce their costs and increase their 
revenues.  This latter example is the kind of political behavior that North had in mind when he 
said “Incremental change [in institutions] comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in 
political and economic organizations, that they could do better by altering the existing 
institutional framework at some margin”.92   
 
Gourevitch proposed a more nuanced explanations for policy formation and institutional 
development.  These explanations are the production profile, intermediate associations, state 
structure, economic ideology and the international system.  All five explanations have been 
dominant at some point in the political history of the oil and gas industry.93 
Whether the oil and gas industry’s political behavior is driven by offensive or defensive 
considerations, or by one of the explanations given by Gourevitch, the fact remains that the oil 
and gas industry has a considerable presence in capitols around the world.  For example, in 2013, 
the oil and gas industry, including refining, transportation and distribution, spent $145 million on 
behalf of 190 clients and employed 765 lobbyists in Washington, DC.94  
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Chapter 4 Research Design  
4.1 Overall Design 
The research design for this study has several components.  The first is an analysis of the record 
of expropriations in the oil and gas industry (Question #1).  The second is an examination of 
those disputes that were brought before an international court or tribunal (Question #2).  The 
third and fourth review the provisions most often included in contracts (Question #3); and 
bilateral treaties (Question#4) to minimize risk and uncertainty.  The fifth and sixth analyze the 
relationship between bilateral treaties, the frequency of disputes, and the reliability of legal 
systems (Question #5); and the relationship between the amount of oil a country consumes, 
foreign direct investment outflows and inflows and the number of bilateral treaties a country has 
signed (Questions #6).  The seventh examines the sources of capital; and the risk characteristics 
of various financing structures, business structures, and alliances (Question #7).  The eighth 
reviews the financial instruments available for managing risk after a project has commenced 
operation.  The ninth examines the origins and relevance of financial and operational 
transparency (Question #9).  The tenth evaluates the scope and relevance of multilateral 
investment treaties, international energy forums and energy diplomacy (Question #10).  The 
research design also includes interviews with government and non-government officials and six 
case studies which test the conclusions drawn in Chapter 6.  
 
4.2 Unit of Analysis 
The unit of analysis used in Question #1 is the individual instances of a country expropriating oil 
and gas assets.  The unit of analysis used in Question #2 is the individual disputes brought before 
an international court or tribunal.  The unit of analysis used in Questions #3 and #4 are the 
specific provisions included in contracts and bilateral treaties.  The unit of analysis used in 
Questions #5 and #6 are individual countries.  The unit of analysis used in Question #7 is the 
types of transactions and transaction structures.  The unit of analysis used in Question #8 is the 
specific financial instruments available for managing risk.  The unit of analysis used in Question 
#9 is the specific governmental and non-governmental institutions responsible for financial and 
operational transparency.  The unit of analysis used in Question #10 is specific multilateral 
treaties, international energy forums and individual acts of energy diplomacy.  The unit of 
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analysis in the case studies is the individual events that comprise six major developments in the 
oil and natural gas industry.   
 
4.3 Time Period Covered by Events  
Question #1 includes expropriations between 1990 and 2014.  Question #2 includes the cases 
brought before the ICSID or some other tribunal between 1996 and 2014.  Question #3 includes 
provisions that have been used for several decades; and Question #4 draws on examples from 
1948 to 1999.  Question #5 uses the number of bilateral treaties signed by each country as of July 
2014; the frequency of disputes between 1996 and 2014; and the ranking of country legal 
systems by the World Bank in 2012.  Question #6 uses the number of bilateral treaties in each 
country as of July 2014, the amount of oil it consumed in 2012, and foreign direct investment 
(FDI) inflows and outflows in 2012.  Question #7 references examples related to sources of 
financing from 1944 through 2012; financing structures between 1960 and 2010; business 
structures between 1966 and 2014; and alliances between 2010 and 2014.  Question #8 uses 
examples from 1969 to the present.  Question #9 references events and sources between 2004 
and 2012.  Question #9 references events related to multilateral treaties between 2002 and 2013; 
international energy forums between 1991 and 2013; financial reporting between 2000 and 2013; 
signature bonuses between 2002 and 2011; and energy diplomacy between 2010 and 2011.  The 
events included in case #1 cover the period from 2011 to 2014; case #2 from 2009 to 2014; case 
#3 from 1992 to 2005; case #4 from 2010 to 2014; case #5 from 1998 to 2014; and case #6 from 
2003 to 2013.   
 
4.4 Kinds of Evidence Already Available 
The review of expropriations in the oil and natural gas industry includes 12 expropriations 
between 2003 and 2012 (Question #1).  The review of disputes includes 68 cases brought before 
the ICSID or other international tribunals (Question #2). The review of contracts includes nine 
specific examples of common contract provisions and five general examples (Question #3).  The 
review of bilateral treaties includes five specific examples of common bilateral treaty provisions 
and three general examples (Question #4).  The review of bilateral treaties, the frequency of 
disputes and the reliability of legal systems includes the 24 largest oil importing and exporting 
countries (Question #5).  The analysis of bilateral treaties vs. oil consumption includes 66 
countries; bilateral treaties vs. foreign direct investment outflows (191 countries); bilateral 
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treaties vs. foreign direct investment inflows (213 countries); and the impartiality of decisions 
(16 cases) (Question #6).  The review of sources of capital, financing structures, business 
structures and alliances includes six sources of capital, seven financing structures, three business 
structures, and two types of alliances (Question #7). The review of the financial instruments for 
managing risk is divided into two broad categories, commercial risk and non-commercial risk 
(Question #8).  The review of methods for measuring financial reporting quality describes two 
approaches.  The evaluation of the theoretical and practical importance of financial reporting 
quality is based primarily on the existing literature.  The relationship between the quality of 
financial reporting and foreign direct investment was evaluated using a sample of 38 countries.  
The reserve estimates made by producing countries and reported by various publications are 
compared to estimates made by independent analysts.  The practical implications of reserve 
estimates were based on prior experience and general economic theory (Question #9).  The 
evaluation of the scope and relevance of multilateral investment treaties and international energy 
forums was based on the number of these institutions and their ability to influence policy and 
practice in the oil and natural gas industry.   The effectiveness of energy diplomacy was 
evaluated using media reports and the analysis of industry specialists (Question #10).   
 
The interviews were conducted by telephone with government and non-government officials in 
Washington, DC.   Efforts to obtain interviews with executives working in private-sector oil 
companies, oil service companies and national oil companies were unsuccessful.  The six case 
studies in Chapter 7 were developed from more than 100 media reports of the individual actions 
comprising six major projects in the oil and gas industry.   
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Chapter 5 – Research Methods  
The general method used in this study is to compare theory to practice.  This requires a 
simultaneous explanation of why particular institutions exist and how they operate.  To do this, 
this study employs several research methods, including qualitative analysis (literature search, 
historical events, interviews and case studies) and quantitative methods (industry statistics and 
statistical methods).   
 
5.1 The Process and Adequacy of the Evidence 
5.1.1 History of Expropriations in the Oil and Gas Industry (Question #1) 
The history of expropriations was developed by searching for online accounts of these events.   
Examining the history of expropriations between 1990 and 2014 provided sufficient historical 
perspective on expropriation to evaluate how frequently they occur and under what conditions 
they are more or less likely to occur.   
 
5.1.2 Disputes and Dispute Resolution (Question #2)  
The list of disputes brought before a court or tribunal between 1996 and 2014 were obtained 
from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website.  This 
database includes 597 cases brought before an international court or tribunal over 20 years.  
 
5.1.3 Common Contract Provisions (Question #3) 
The provisions most often included in oil and gas contracts were compiled from law books, 
journal articles and specific contracts.  These sources provided summaries and examples of these 
provisions, the purpose they serve and the specific language used; and are representative of the 
provisions included in most contracts. 
 
5.1.4 Bilateral Treaty Provisions (Question #4) 
The provisions found in most bilateral treaties were developed by reference to law books and the 
text of specific bilateral agreements.  These examples were taken from 1948 to 1999.  They 
illustrate the evolution of these agreements and are representative of the types of clauses in most 
bilateral treaties.     
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5.1.5 Frequency of Disputes and Legal Systems (Question #5) 
The number of bilateral treaties signed by each country as of July 2014 and the number of 
disputes to which each country was a party, between 1996 and 2014, were obtained from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website.  The ranking of the 
legal systems of each country in 2012 was obtained from the World Bank website.  This data is 
sufficient to test whether a relationship exists between the number of disputes and two specific 
types of institutions (bilateral treaties and national legal systems).  
 
5.1.6 Oil Consumption and Foreign Direct Investment (Question #6) 
The number of bilateral treaties signed by each country as of July 2014 and the foreign direct 
investment (FDI) outflows and inflows in 2012, were obtained from the United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) website.  The oil consumed in 2012, in each 
country, was obtained from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) website.  These 
data only compare these variables at one point in time, 2014 in the case of bilateral treaties and 
2012 in the case of oil consumption and FDI inflows and outflows however, they are adequate to 
make a preliminary judgment whether these variables are related to one another. 
 
5.1.7 Capital Sources, Financing and Business Structures and Alliance (Question #7) 
A general description of the sources of financing, financing structures, business structures, and 
alliances were developed from recent books and journal articles.  Specific examples of each were 
developed by conducting an online search of recent transactions.  These general descriptions and 
specific examples are representative of the available sources of financing and choice of 
commercial structures.  
 
5.1.8 Financial Instruments for Managing Risk (Question #8) 
A general description of the financial instruments available for managing risk was developed 
from books and journal articles.  The size and scope of the market for political risk insurance was 
obtained from the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency and the Berne Union websites.   
 
5.1.9 Transparency, Financial Reporting and Reserve Estimation (Question #9) 
The methods devised for measuring the quality of financial reporting were obtained from the 
accounting literature.  The evaluation of the theoretical importance of the quality of financial 
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reporting was derived from the theoretical literature by North, Coase, Williamson and others.  
The evaluation of the practical importance of the quality of financial reporting was derived from 
recent journal articles and general economic theory.   The analysis of the relationship between 
the quality of financial reporting and direct foreign investment was developed using the existing 
literature and the statistics compiled by UNCTAD.  This study compares the quality of financial 
reporting and foreign direct investment in only one year, but includes 38 countries. 
 
A description of the methods used in the United States for estimating reserves was obtained from 
the Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
websites and several journal articles.  An evaluation of actual estimates of oil and gas reserves, 
were developed by comparing several sources including the Oil & Gas Journal (O&GJ), the U.S. 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) and the BP Statistical Review of World Energy.   
 
The method prescribed by the SPE and the SEC for estimating the quantity and value of reserves 
is applied by all U.S. oil and gas companies and is widely accepted in other countries as well. 
These institutions are therefore adequate to demonstrate the process by which these rules are 
developed and the manner in which they are applied.  The actual estimates made by the O&GJ, 
EIA and BP are all derived from numbers published by individual countries.  These estimates are 
in some cases higher than would be justified if the SPE procedures and SEC rules were applied.  
 
5.1.10 Multilateral Treaties, International Forums and Energy Diplomacy (Question #9)  
The scope and relevance of multilateral investment treaties and international energy forums was 
evaluated based on their number and their ability to affect energy policy and industry practice in 
the international oil and gas industry.   The effectiveness of these institutions and the 
effectiveness of energy diplomacy were evaluated using media reports and the analysis of 
industry specialists.   
 
5.1.11 Interviews 
Thirty one (31) letters were mailed to specific oil and gas executives on August 18, 2014.  These 
letters included eight to private sector oil companies, nine to national oil companies, five to oil 
service companies, seven to U.S. government departments and agencies and two to international 
agencies.  Five responses agreeing to an interview were received.  The remaining 26 potential 
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interviewees either declined the interview or did not respond at all.  The five interviews were 
conducted between September 22 and September 30, 2014. 
 
Two interviews were conducted with officials at the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), one with 
an official at the Overseas Private Investment Coporation (OPIC), one with an official at the 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and one with an official at the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  The interview questions were 
designed to better understand how decisions are made in private and public sector organizations 
and institutions, an aspect of decision making that is often not available in published media 
reports or press releases.   
 
5.1.12 Case Studies 
The case studies were compiled from an extensive search of online sources (media reports, 
journal articles, and NGO reports).  The events included in case #1 cover the period from 2011 to 
2014; case #2 from 2009 to 2014; case #3 from 1992 to 2005; case #4 from 2010 to 2014; case 
#5 from 1998 to 2014; and case #6 from 2003 to 2013.  Every account of an event was verified 
by reference to another source reporting on the same event.   
 
5.2 Analytical Techniques for Evaluating the Evidence 
5.2.1 History of Expropriations in the Oil and Gas Industry (Question #1) 
The analysis of the evidence related to expropriations is based on a comparison of the number of 
expropriations per year and their relationship to the change in the price of oil. 
 
5.2.2 Disputes and Dispute Resolution (Question #2)  
The analysis of the evidence related to disputes and dispute resolution begins with a comparison 
of the number of disputes in the oil and gas sector and the number of disputes in other industry 
sectors.  Next, it compares (1) the frequency of disputes and the changes in the price of oil; (2) 
the number of disputes and the number of major transactions in the industry each year; (3) the 
number of disputes and institutional effectiveness; and (4) the number of disputes and the choice 
of rules and venues. 
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5.2.3 Common Contract Provisions (Question #3) 
This section begins with a description of the general contract provisions included in all contracts 
and then describes more specialized clauses related to economic stabilization, the use of 
domestic and foreign courts, and arbitration rules.  This section also provides specific examples 
from recent contracts.   
 
5.2.4 Bilateral Treaty Provisions (Question #4) 
This section begins with a description of choice of law clauses; then describes clauses intended 
to promote, admit and protect the investment of foreign investors; and clauses prescribing 
various standards of treatment (national, most favored nation, international, and minimum).  This 
section concludes with a description of the procedures to be followed by the expropriating 
government; an analysis of the legal instruments most often referenced in these proceedings and 
the time needed to resolve disputes in an international court or tribunal.   
 
5.2.5 Frequency of Disputes and Legal Systems (Question #5) 
This section uses scatter plots, measures of R
2
 and qualitative interpretations to (1) compare the 
number of bilateral treaties and the number of disputes; and (2) the quality of the national legal 
system and the number of disputes.   
 
5.2.6 Oil Consumption, Production, and Foreign Direct Investment (Question #6) 
This section uses scatter plots and qualitative interpretation to compare (1) the amount of oil a 
country consumes versus the number of bilateral treaties it has signed, and (2) the FDI outflows 
from a country versus the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed, (3) the FDI 
inflows to a country versus the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed, and (4) 
analyzes the effectiveness and the efficiency of international courts and tribunals using simple 
frequency and count models.   
 
5.2.7 Capital Sources, Financing and Business Structures and Alliances (Question #7) 
This section describes the sources of financing and uses a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative information to evaluate the relative importance of various sources of capital.  
Second, it explains the financing structures used in the oil and gas industry.  Third, it illustrates 
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the business structures used in the oil and gas industry, using generic examples.  Fourth, it 
examines the feasibility of alliances between NOCs and IOCs and between two NOCs.   
 
5.2.8 Financial Instruments for Managing Risk (Question #8) 
This section is primarily descriptive, but includes some quantitative analysis of the size of the 
market for political risk insurance. 
 
5.2.9 Transparency, Financial Reporting and Reserve Reporting (Question #9) 
This section begins with a definition of transparency and reporting quality.  It then examines 
several methods for measuring reporting quality.  Third, it briefly reviews the theoretical 
importance of transparency by restating the observations and analysis of the institutional 
economists.  Fourth, it examines the practical importance of the quality of financial reporting by 
summarizing some of the literature published on this subject.  Fifth, it uses scatter diagrams and 
a qualitative assessment of the results to evaluate whether the quality of financial reporting 
influences direct foreign investment.  Sixth, it compares the methods used to estimate oil and 
natural gas reserves and identifies some of the technical and political problems in evaluating 
these estimates.  Finally, it evaluates the practical importance of these estimates.   
 
5.2.10 Multilateral Treaties, International Forums and Energy Diplomacy (Question #10)  
This section describes the current state of multilateral treaties, particularly as they relate to direct 
foreign investment.  Next it provides a brief history of the development of international energy 
forums.  Third, it summarizes the convergence observed in the practice of financial reporting.  
Fourth, it explains the practice of signature bonuses and cites two specific examples.  Fifth, it 
defines energy diplomacy; explains its intended purpose, and presents several arguments for and 
against energy diplomacy.   
 
5.2.11 Interviews 
The length of the interviews was between 30 minutes and one hour.  Only one interview was 
conducted with each respondent. The questions were designed specifically for each respondent, 
consequently there was relatively little overlap between questions and answers and therefore 
only occasional opportunity for consensus. The interviews provided useful background 
information and insight into the operation of the political risk insurance market and the 
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international lending process in developing countries.   However, the international oil companies, 
national oil companies and oilfield service companies that were contacted all declined to be 
interviewed, precluding the insight that might have been possible if even a few of these private 
sector companies had agreed to be interviewed.  The explanations and observation made by the 
respondents are compared to the conclusions drawn from the quantitative and qualitative analysis 
in Chapter 6.  
 
5.2.12 Case Studies 
The events in each case study are presented in chronological order.  At the end of each case those 
events are compared to the theory presented in Chapter 3 and the findings in Chapter 6.   
 
5.3 Objectivity, Reliability, Completeness and Validity 
5.3.1 History of Expropriations in the Oil and Gas Industry (Question #1) 
The history of expropriation in the oil and gas industry was developed through a search of online 
media accounts of these events.  Two or more sources were used to ensure objectivity and 
reliability.  The search was continued until the events that had already been identified dominated 
the search results.  The validity of the accounts of these events was ensured by using respected 
sources of journalism. 
 
5.3.2 Disputes and Dispute Resolution (Question #2)  
The objectivity and reliability of this data was ensured by relying on the UNCTAD database as a 
primary source for disputes brought before various international courts and tribunals and 
comparing this database with reports in the news media.  No reports of cases were found in the 
media that were not also reported in the UNCTAD database.  The validity of the data is 
supported by the extensive documentation and annotation of these cases in the database and the 
reputation of UNCTAD itself.   However, the UNCTAD database includes the following 
disclaimer “The data included in this database are based on extensive research and interviews, 
but represent only those claims which were disclosed by the parties or arbitral institutions”.95   
 
 
                                                          
95
 UNCTAD, http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show (This site is no longer active, site is being 
redesigned, a reduced database is available at http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/ISDS.aspx )   
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5.3.3 Common Contract Provisions (Question #3) 
The objectivity and reliability of these contract provisions were insured by consulting several 
scholarly sources.  The provisions derived from these sources are complete in the sense that they 
are representative of the most common provisions in oil and gas contracts.  The validity of these 
provisions is supported by the inclusion of the text from several recent oil and gas contracts.    
 
5.3.4 Bilateral Investment Treaty Provisions (Question #4) 
The objectivity and reliability of these bilateral provisions were insured by consulting several 
scholarly sources.  This list of bilateral treaty provisions is not meant to be comprehensive but is 
representative of the most important and most common provision in bilateral investment treaties.  
The validity of these provisions is supported by the inclusion of the text from several recent 
bilateral investment agreements.   
 
5.3.5 Frequency of Disputes and Legal Systems (Question #5) 
The number of bilateral treaties signed by each country was obtained from the UNCTAD 
database and should therefore be reliable.  However, UNCTAD relies on self-reporting by 
member countries regarding the treaties they have signed and those that are in force.  The 
accuracy and completeness of the data therefore depends on the timeliness and accuracy with 
which member states provide updates to UNCTAD.   
 
5.3.6 Oil Consumption and Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Inflows (Question #6) 
The oil consumed in 2012 in each country was obtained from the United States Energy 
Administration (EIA) website.  The EIA relies on the International Energy Agency (IEA), the Oil 
& Gas Journal (O&GJ) and U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for this data.  
The foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from each country and inflows to each country in 
2012, was obtained from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
which depends on the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund for this information.  
The accuracy of this information is dependent on self-reporting by the member countries. 
 
5.3.7 Capital Sources, Financing and Business Structures and Alliances (Question #7) 
Descriptions of capital sources, financing structures, business structures and alliances were 
developed from a review of articles published in trade journals, conference papers and industry 
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reports.  There is broad agreement in the literature on the meaning of these terms, the choices 
within each category, and the advantages and disadvantages of each. The completeness of the 
search was ensured by continuing the search until options that had already been identified 
dominated the search results.  The validity of the options was supported by identifying actual 
examples of their use.   
 
5.3.8 Financial Instruments for Managing Risk (Question #8) 
Descriptions of the financial instruments available for managing risk were developed from a 
review of books and articles published in academic and trade journals.  The completeness of the 
search was ensured by continuing the search until options that had already been identified 
dominated the search results.  The validity of the options was supported by identifying actual 
examples of their use. 
 
5.3.9 Transparency, Financial Reporting and Reserve Reporting (Question #9) 
The objectivity and the reliability of the methods used to measure reporting quality and its 
influence on investment decisions was based on an evaluation of the methods used by each 
author and the statistical and substantive significance of their results.  This literature review is 
not complete, but is representative of the literature in this field.  The estimates of world oil and 
gas reserves have been criticized by some analysts as too optimistic.  The limitations on the 
objectivity and reliability of these estimates are discussed in Chapter 6.  Finally, the practical 
importance of these estimates was evaluated using a combination of theory and practice.  
 
5.3.10 Multilateral Treaties, International Forums, NGOs and Energy Diplomacy (Question #10)  
The purpose of specific multilateral treaties, international energy forums and NGO’s is a matter 
of record, but evaluations of how effective these institutions have been has varied.  The 
effectiveness of these institutions is evaluated taking into account the political reality that each 
faces.  Energy diplomacy includes a wide range of strategies.  This study includes a 
representative list of the methods that have been employed in the practice of energy diplomacy. 
 
5.3.11 Interviews 
The interviews did not present as significant a challenge to objectivity and reliability as 
expected.  This is in part because many of the questions the interviewees were asked were 
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procedural and could be answered by statements of fact rather than opinion or conjecture.  
Second, the number of questions aimed at assessing motivation, were much smaller and the 
answers were conditioned to some extent by the premise or fact situations described by the 
interviewer.  The inability to obtain interviews from private-sector oil companies, national oil 
companies and oil field services companies limits the perspective on certain issues.  Those 
interviews that ran for an hour can be said to be complete, but the interviews that ran for 30 
minutes were not complete, but addressed the most important issues.  The correctness of the 
interviewer’s understanding of the interviewees’ responses was verified by the interviewer 
summarizing the interviewee’s responses at various points during the interview.   
 
5.3.12 Case Studies 
The objectivity and reliability of the events included in the timeline of each case were ensured by 
using two or more sources to verify each event in the sequence.  These cases are complete in the 
sense that they report all of the major developments in each case and provide sufficient 
continuity in the narrative for the reader to understand how each event is related to the one that 
preceded it and the one that followed it.   
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Chapter 6 – Research Findings 
6.0 Central Research Question 
The central research question in this study has four parts.  What institutions and strategies are 
available for managing political and investment risk in the international oil and gas industry?  
How and when did they develop?  How are they used by organizations in the oil and gas 
industry?  How effective have they been?   
 
The institutions that facilitate the management of risk include oil and gas exploration 
contracts, domestic courts, national constitutions, bilateral investment treaties, 
multilateral investment treaties, governmental and non-governmental regulatory agencies 
and international energy forums.  The strategies for managing risk include corporate 
finance, joint ventures, project finance, alliances and energy diplomacy.  The 
organizations that manage risk include international oil companies, oil service companies, 
national oil companies, and public and private providers of financial capital and political 
risk insurance.   
 
The evidence in this study is consistent with North’s conclusion that “incremental change 
[in institutions] comes from the perceptions of the entrepreneurs in political and 
economic organizations that they [the entrepreneurs] could do better by altering the 
existing institutional framework at some margin” 96 and that “institutions do not emerge 
spontaneously to create and nurture the market, but rather reflect the interests of those 
players in a position to put them in place”.97  However, the process by which these 
institutions are created and evolve is easier to describe in theory than it is to explain in 
practice, because institutional development takes place in steps; and involves several 
organizations, some trying to change the institutional environment and others trying to 
preserve the existing institutional structure. 
The institutions in the international oil and gas industry can be arranged in a hierarchy 
based on their relative importance.  The most important institutional mechanisms used by 
international oil and natural gas companies are contracts, informal relationships and 
                                                          
96
 Douglass C. North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1990), p. 8 
97
 Ibid, p. 89-90 
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transparency.  The second most important institutions include domestic law, bilateral 
treaties, and international courts and tribunals.  A third line of defense includes 
multilateral treaties and international forums.  Only a small number of these institutions 
are the direct result of developments in the oil and gas industry, most have developed in 
response to the needs of foreign investors in general and have then been adapted for use 
in the oil and gas industry.  The next section presents the finding related to the ten 
subsidiary research questions formulated in Chapter 2.   
 
6.1 Frequency and Causes of Expropriation (Question #1) 
Some analysts have argued that the risk of investing in international markets has increased in the 
last ten years.  The evidence usually cited for this conclusion includes: (1) the Arab Spring and 
its aftermath; and the wars in Syria and Iraq; (2) resource nationalism and expropriations in the 
mining, oil and natural gas sector, particularly in Russia and Latin America; and (3) recurring 
financial crises.  However, these three types of events create different types of risk.  Military 
conflicts like those in Syria and Iraq present a risk to the continued operation and potential 
destruction of energy infrastructure in these countries (i.e. producing wells, pipelines, refineries 
and export terminals) but not necessarily a risk of expropriation.  Resource nationalism creates 
the risk of contract renegotiation and expropriation, but not necessarily the disruption of 
operations.  (3) Excessive financial leverage and insufficient transparency create the risk of 
financial crises in the capital markets (commercial banks, investment banks and “non-bank” or 
“shadow banks”). Question #1 addresses the risk of forced contract renegotiation or 
expropriation as result of resource nationalism. 
 
Q1 
What evidence exists, if any, that the frequency of expropriation of foreign direct investment has 
increased in the oil and gas industry; and under what circumstances is it more or less likely to 
occur?  
 
H1 
The frequency with which oil and natural gas assets have been expropriated has varied over the 
last 54 years; and is related to the rate of change in oil prices. 
 
Table 1 below demonstrates that the expropriation of oil and gas assets was already underway in 
the 1960s (20), but increased substantially between 1971 and 1979 (69).  Expropriations nearly 
ceased between 1980 and 2003 and increased again between 2004 and 2011.  The average global 
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price of crude oil decreased from $1.90 per barrel in 1960 to $1.80 per barrel in 1970; increased 
from $2.24 per barrel in 1971 to $31.61 per barrel in 1979; then decreased from $36.83 per barrel 
in 1980 to $28.83 per barrel in 2003; and increased from $38.27 per barrel in 2004 to $111.26 
per barrel in 2011.  (See Table A.4, in Appendix I for a year-by-year presentation of the number 
of expropriations and the change in the price of crude oil.) 
 
Table 1 - Comparison of the Number of Expropriations and the Price of Oil 
(Dollars per Barrel and Percent Change)  
     
Year  
Number of 
Expropriations 
Annual 
Average 
United 
States 
Crude Oil 
Price 
Change 
in the 
Price of 
United 
States  
Crude 
Oil in 
Dollars 
Change 
in the 
Price of 
United 
States 
Crude 
Oil in 
Percent 
 
Annual 
Average 
Global 
Crude 
Oil Price 
Change 
in the 
Global 
Price of 
Crude 
Oil in 
Dollars 
Change in 
the 
Global 
Price of 
Crude Oil 
in 
Percent 
1960 - 1970 20 
$2.91 – 
$3.39 $.48 16.5% 
 
$1.90 - 
$1.80  
($0.10) -5.3% 
1971 - 1979 69 
$3.60 - 
$25.10 $21.50  597.2%   
$2.24 - 
$31.61  $29.37  1311.16% 
1980 - 2003 3 
$37.42 -
$27.69 ($9.73) -26.0% 
 
$36.83 - 
$28.83  ($7.80) -21.7% 
2004 - 2011 12 
$37.66 - 
$87.04 $49.38  131.1%   
$38.27 - 
$111.26  $72.99  190.7% 
2012 1 $86.46 ($0.58) -0.67% 
 
$111.67  $0.41  0.37% 
2013 0 $91.17 $4.71  5.17% 
 
$108.66  ($3.01) -2.77% 
2014 0 $93.44 $2.27  2.43% 
 
$104.73  ($3.93) -3.75% 
 
Sources:  
1. Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin and Konstantin Sonin, “Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory 
and Evidence from Panel Data, Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, 27 (2) (2011) p. 301 
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp 
2. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show 
 
Table 1 supports the hypothesis that the number of expropriations increases when the rate of 
change in the price of oil increases; and decreases when the rate of change in the price of oil 
decreases.  However, in the period from 1960 to 1970, there were 20 expropriations even though 
the average world oil price declined.  One possible explanation for this anomaly is that the 
governments of the oil producing countries had begun to exert more control over the posted price 
of oil, but may have been reluctant to raise prices more rapidly because they were uncertain 
about the consequences of higher oil prices on the world economy and the demand for oil.  (The 
posted price refers to the price at which a company or country is willing to buy or sell a 
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particular commodity.  In markets where an official exchange does not operate, traders will often 
refer to the posted price(s) of the major companies or countries trading that commodity.  The 
posted price is therefore similar to a company’s bid and ask price.)  Therefore they chose to 
expropriate the oil and gas fields, which was a more definitive expression of national sovereignty 
and at the same time less risky.  The section below presents a brief history of expropriation and 
privatization in the oil and natural gas industry.   
 
First Attempt at Nationalization - 1950 to 1964 
In May 1951, after months of unsuccessful negotiations, Iranian Premier Mossadegh and his 
National Front government nationalized the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AOIC).  The British 
government responded by blocking Iran’s bank accounts in London and the Royal Air Force 
compelled at least one Panamanian ship to surrender its Iranian oil at Aden.98  In addition, the 
seven major oil companies, acting as an oligopoly remained united in their opposition to 
nationalization.99  The boycott of Iran’s oil was effective because Iran did not have the 
technicians needed to operate the nationalized facilities; the refineries needed to refine the crude 
oil; the tankers to transport it, and the distribution system to sell it.  Consequently, in 1952 and 
1953, Iran sold only 3% of the oil it had sold in the years prior to the attempted 
nationalization.100  The nationalization of Iran’s oil and gas industry was ultimately unsuccessful 
during this period. 
 
The Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was founded in 1960, but it did not 
emerge as a force in establishing oil prices until ten years later, during the Tripoli-Tehran crises 
of 1970 - 1971 (discussed below).  However, taking control of the determination of the posted 
prices in 1960, added an important new structural element to the international oil industry and 
the power of the oil exporting countries in particular.101 
 
 
 
                                                          
98
 Charles Lipson, Standing Guard – Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1985) p. 111 
99
 Ibid 111 
100
 Ibid 112 
101
 Theodore Moran, “Managing an Oligopoly of Would-Be Sovereigns: Dynamics of Joint Control and Self-Control 
in the International Oil Industry,” International Organization, Volume 41, No. 4 (Autumn, 1987): 575-607 
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The Beginning of the End - 1965 to 1971 
In 1968, after a successful military coup in Libya, Colonel Qaddafi’s Revolutionary Command 
Council shut down the British and American military bases in Libya.  In January 1970, the 
Revolutionary Command Council demanded a $.43 per barrel increase in the posted price of oil 
at a time when the posted price of West Texas Intermediate (WTI) was $3.35 per barrel.  After, 
nine months of negotiation an agreement was reached between the Libyan government and the 
international oil companies.  The Libyan government would instead receive a 20% increase in 
royalties and taxes.102 
 
In November 1970, The Shah of Iran, surpassed the fifty-fifty profit-sharing terms first 
established by Venezuela in 1943, by demanding and receiving a tax rate of 55% of the profits 
from the consortium companies in Iran.103  In 1971, Saddam Hussein nationalized the oil 
industry in Iraq, increasing its ownership to 100%.104  The period from 1965 to 1971, therefore 
was a transitional period during which the posted price of crude oil remained essentially 
unchanged, but the political power of the oil producing countries increased and the power of the 
IOCs decreased. 
 
The First Oil Crisis – 1972 to 1974 
At a meeting in Vienna in mid-September 1973, the OPEC countries demanded a new deal with 
the oil companies.  The Tehran and Tripoli agreements were terminated just two years after they 
were signed (see above).  On October 5, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack against 
Israel.105  On October 17, 1973, the Arab Oil Ministers agreed to an embargo, cutting production 
5% from the September level, and agreed to continue cutting production by 5% each month until 
their objective was met, that is, the United States’ withdrawal of its support for Israel.106  
Ultimately, the Saudis cut production by 25%.  OPEC producers had publicly declared solidarity, 
but some OPEC governments and the Soviet Union increased production.  Consequently, the 
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overall reduction in world oil production was just 7%,107 but that was enough to increase the 
average world oil price from $2.48 per barrel in 1972 to $11.53 per barrel in 1975; and to 
increase the average U.S. price from $3.60 per barrel in 1972 to $12.21 per barrel in 1975.  
 
The Second Oil Crisis and Nationalization - 1975 to 1979 
In 1974, Saudi-Aramco was owned 60 % by the Saudi government, but by 1980 it was owned 
100% by the Saudi government.
108
  In 1976, the nationalization of the Kuwait Oil Company was 
completed and was owned 100% by the government of Kuwait.
109
  In 1979, during the Islamic 
Revolution, the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) was nationalized and was owned 100% 
by the government of Iran.
110
  The average world oil price increased from $11.53 per barrel in 
1975 to $36.83 per barrel in 1980 and the average U.S. price increased from $12.21 per barrel in 
1975 to $37.42 per barrel in 1980.  
 
The Era of Privatization - 1994 to 2003 
The period from1994 to 2003 was dominated by partial or complete privatization of national oil 
companies.  For example, between 1989 and 1997, Repsol (a Spanish oil company) was 
privatized by selling 100% of the company’s stock to the public.  In 1990 and 1991, no 
privatizations were reported, but in 1992, Total (a French oil company) began the process of 
privatization.  The company sold a 30% share to the public in 1992 and sold the remaining 70% 
to the public in 1998.  In 1993, Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC, the largest 
national oil company in India) sold a 16% interest to the public.  In 1994, OAO Gazprom (a 
Russian natural gas company) sold a 62% interest to the public; and Lukoil (a Russian oil 
company) became 100% privatized.   In that same year, a settlement was reached between the 
government of Peru and a German investor group regarding Peru’s expropriation of the 
undeveloped Aguaytia gas field and the producing Maquia oil field in central Peru.   
 
In 1995, Indian Oil Corporation Limited (IndianOil) sold 11% of its shares to the public.  Public 
ownership of IndianOil was subsequently increased to 21%.  In 1995, Enersis S.A. (a subsidiary 
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of ENI, an Italian oil company) sold a 15% interest in the company to the public; and in 2001 
public ownership was increased to 70%.  In 1995, Petróleo Brasileiro S.A. sold a 49% interest in 
the company to the public.  In the period from 1996 through 1999, there were no significant 
privatizations, but in 2000, two significant partial privatizations occurred.  China Petrochemical 
Corporation (SINOPEC) began the sale of a 24% interest in the company to the public; and 
PetroChina Company Limited (PetroChina) began the sale of a 14% interest in the company to 
the public.  In 2001 the Chinese National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) sold a 29% 
interest in the company to the public and Statoil (a Norwegian national oil company) sold a 38% 
interest to the public.
111
  In 2002, no significant privatizations occurred.  (For a list of 
privatizations during this period see Table A.6 in Appendix II.)  Therefore, between 1994 and 
2003 the oil industry was dominated by privatizations rather than expropriations, even though the 
average global price of crude oil increased from $15.82 in 1994 to $28.83 in 2003. 
 
Resurgence of Expropriations - 2004 to 2011 
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Beginning in 2004, the frequency of expropriation began to increase again.  In 2003, the Russian 
government presented OAO Yukos, a private sector Russian oil company, with an invoice for 
$27 billion in back taxes allegedly owed by the company.  Yukos was unable to pay the taxes 
and was subsequently declared bankrupt in a Russian court.  Yukos management valued the 
company at $20 billion.  In 2004, its assets were sold to other Russian oil companies and its 
president was convicted on fraud charges and imprisoned.   
 
In 2006, there were instances of contract renegotiation, contract termination and expropriation.  
(1) The state of Alaska’s agreement with the three oil companies operating on Alaska’s North 
Slope was modified to include an additional 20% tax on their profits in Alaska.  (2) Occidental 
Petroleum filed a claim against Ecuador in response to Ecuador’s decision to terminate 
Occidental’s exploration and development contract (3) Bolivia announced that Brazil’s state-run 
company,  Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), Royal Dutch Shell PLC, and other private firms 
would have to transfer ownership of their Bolivian retail gasoline networks to state-owned 
Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) within one month. 
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In 2007, there were two reports of contract renegotiation and one report of expropriation. (1) 
Venezuela increased the royalty and tax rates on the oil companies operating in Venezuela. 
Venezuela’s “take” increased from $33.4 billion in 2007 to $38.5 billion in 2008.  (2) The 
Russian government insisted that Gazprom be allowed to purchase a 50% plus one share interest 
in the Sakhalin – 2 Gas Field in Russia for $7.45 billion.  Shell was forced to give up majority 
control in one of its most profitable assets after having invested over $6 billion to develop the 
project.  (3) Venezuela expropriated ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips’ assets in Venezuela.  
ConocoPhillips valued it assets in Venezuela at $4.5 billion and indicated that it would take a 
charge against net income for the full amount.  The IOCs that were willing to accept Venezuela’s 
terms lost controlling interest in their operations in Venezuela. 
 
In 2010, there was one expropriation and one threat of expropriation.  (1) Venezuela nationalized 
eleven oil rigs owned by Helmerich & Payne (HP).  HP filed suit in Washington, D.C. Federal 
District Court seeking $32 million in back payments for unpaid services and several hundred 
million dollars for the value of its 11 drilling rigs.  (2) Ecuador threatened to nationalize the oil 
assets of any international oil companies that refused to replace their production sharing 
agreements with fixed-fee contracts.   
 
In 2011, Madagascar Oil of Houston halted operations in Madagascar because it believed its 
operations might be expropriated.  In 2012, YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, a subsidiary 
of Repsol, valued at $18 billion, of which Repsol owned a 57.4% interest, was expropriated by 
the government of Argentina. 
 
The preceding analysis suggests that the frequency with which oil and natural gas assets have 
been expropriated is a function of the change in the price of crude oil relative to the long term 
price trend and not the price of oil at a particular point in time.  (For a more mathematically 
rigorous treatment of this question see the study by Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin summarized in 
Appendix II).   
 
Absolute and Relative Significance of Expropriation 
For the firms whose assets are expropriated, the impact can be substantial and therefore must 
always be a consideration for oil and gas companies.  One measure of the relative impact of 
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expropriations on the industry is to compare the value of the properties expropriated in recent 
years to the total amount of capital spending and exploration expenditures (CAPEX) in the same 
years.  As already noted, in 2010, there was one expropriation and one threat of expropriation.  
Venezuela nationalized eleven oil rigs owned by Helmerich & Payne (HP).  Helmerich & Payne 
filed suit in Washington, D.C. Federal District Court for $32 million in back payments for unpaid 
services and several hundred million dollars for the value of its 11 drilling rigs.  Assuming that 
the 11 rigs were worth $400 million, the total value of the lawsuit is approximately $432 million.  
This is a relatively small number compared to the $457.6 billion in CAPEX made by the oil and 
gas industry in 2010.  In 2011, Madagascar Oil of Houston halted operations in Madagascar 
because it believed its operations might be expropriated.  In 2011, CAPEX made by the oil and 
gas industry was $556.1 billion.  
 
In 2012, YPF (Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales, a subsidiary of Repsol, valued at $18 billion, 
of which Repsol owned a 57.4% interest, was expropriated by the government of Argentina.  In 
2012, the CAPEX made by the oil and gas industry was $617.2 billion.  The value of the 
expropriation $10.3 billion ($18 billion x .574) was relatively small compared to the value of 
CAPEX in 2012.  
 
6.2 Origins and Resolution of Contract Disputes (Question #2) 
Most disputes are not the result of expropriation, but rather the result of a disagreement over the 
interpretation of specific terms and conditions in a contract; developments that were not foreseen 
when the contract was prepared; or changes in the host government’s policies.  This section 
examines three questions: 
Q2  
(1) How frequent are investment disputes?  
(2) How are disputes, usually resolved? 
(3) What circumstances are more or less likely to lead to disputes?  
 
H2 
(1) It is not clear how many disputes arise between IOCs and host governments because, 
(2) Most disputes are resolved by the parties on their own without outside assistance. 
(3) Disputes are more likely to arise when the quality of governance and the rule of law are low. 
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Comparison of the Number of Disputes within and outside the Oil and Gas Industry 
The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) lists 597 cases that have 
been brought before various international courts or tribunals including the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID) established in 1966, United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) established in 1964, International 
Chamber of Commerce (ICC) established 1919, Stockholm Chamber of Commerce Arbitration 
(SCC) established 1917,  International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
Additional Facilities (ICSID/AF) established 1978, Cairo Centre Rules (CRCICA) established 
1979 and the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA, established 1899).  Of these 597 cases, 68 
are related to the oil and gas industry or approximately 11%.
113
   
 
Comparison of Disputes and Crude Oil Prices 
There were no expropriations between 1996 and 2002 and 13 expropriations between 2003 and 
2012.  Between 1996 and 2002, 10 cases were brought before an international court or tribunal; 
and between 2003 and 2012, 58 cases were brought before an international court or tribunal.  The 
frequency of these cases therefore, exhibit the same pattern observed regarding expropriations, 
that is, forced renegotiations by host countries and the number of disputes brought before an 
international court or tribunal increased when crude oil prices were rising rapidly relative to the 
long term trend in crude oil prices. 
 
Comparison of Transactions and Disputes 
In 2012 and 2013, the total number of new deals (royalty/tax agreements, production sharing 
agreements, service contracts, joint ventures, acquisitions and divestitures) in the oil and natural 
gas industry, was 1,800 and 1,400, respectively.114  However, no cases were brought before an 
international court or tribunal in 2013, 3 cases were brought before an international court or 
tribunal in 2012, 4 in 2011, 5 in 2010, 2 in 2009 and 8 in 2008.  This suggests that most IOCs 
and host countries comply with the terms and conditions of the contracts they sign and resolve 
most disputes on their own. 
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Comparison of Disputes and Institutional Effectiveness 
Table 2 below summarizes the 68 cases reported by UNCTAD and compares them to the ratings 
for the quality of governance given to the host country defendants by the World Governance 
Project.
115
  This rating system includes six measures of governance: Voice and Accountability, 
Political Stability/Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of 
Law, and Control of Corruption.  This rating system uses a scale from 0 to 100, in which 0 is the 
worst possible governance rating and 100 is the best possible rating.  These six measures are 
described below.   
 
Voice and Accountability “captures the extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate 
in selecting their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and a 
free media”.  Political Stability and Absence of Violence/Terrorism “measures the likelihood of 
political instability and/or politically-motivated violence, including terrorism”.  Government 
Effectiveness “reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil 
service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies”.  Regulatory Quality “reflects perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development”.  Rule of Law “reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence 
in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, 
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence”.   
Control of Corruption “reflects perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for 
private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state 
by elites and private interests”.116   
 
Voice and Accountability and Political Stability/Absence of Violence are not included in the 
analysis below because these two measures are related to individual citizens’ rights and personal 
safety whereas the other four measures are directly related to the credibility of the government’s 
commitment to policies affecting investors,  regulatory fairness and consistency, administration 
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of impartial justice affecting investment disputes and control of corruption influencing 
investment and investor rights.    
 
Table 2 - Oil and Gas Disputes Reported by UNCTAD and Governance/Rule of Law 
(N = 68) 
       
        
Defendant Country 
Number 
of Cases 
Number of 
Bilateral 
Treaties 
Government 
Effectiveness 
Regulatory 
Quality 
Rule of 
Law 
Control of 
Corruption 
Average 
Albania 1 43 45 56 35 27 41 
Algeria 1 47 34 9 26 36 26 
Argentina 15 58 45 19 29 39 33 
Azerbaijan 1 35 24 34 25 13 24 
Bangladesh 2 30 22 20 19 21 21 
Bolivia 3 19 43 22 16 27 27 
 Bulgaria 1 68 60 69 51 52 58 
Canada 2 34 95 96 95 95 95 
Ecuador 9 18 37 15 12 28 23 
Egypt 2 101 25 33 40 34 33 
Georgia 4 31 70 73 55 64 66 
 Grenada 1 2 62 62 59 69 63 
Jordan 1 52 54 57 63 61 59 
Kazakhstan 6 42 40 38 31 21 33 
Kyrgyzstan 1 29 29 40 12 13 24 
Nigeria 1 21 16 25 10 11 16 
Romania 1 82 44 69 56 51 55 
Russian Federation 5 72 41 39 24 16 30 
Slovak Republic 1 54 74 80 64 60 70 
South American Govt 1 NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF NMF 
Tajikistan 1 32 18 18 11 10 14 
Trinidad & Tobago 1 12 65 57 50 50 56 
Ukraine 1 67 32 29 26 16 26 
United States 1 46 90 88 91 89 90 
Venezuela 5 28 13 5 1 7 7 
Total 68 1023 
    
 Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)  
   http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show 
     
Table 2 shows that the countries in which the largest number of disputes arose have relatively 
low ratings on these measures (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Georgia, Kazakhstan, the Russian 
Federation and Venezuela).  However, there are countries with low ratings, but a small number 
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of disputes.  This could be partly the result of a smaller number of projects in these countries 
(Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Ukraine).   
 
Comparison of Rules/Venues 
Of the 68 cases in the oil and gas sector, 47 were brought before the International Centre for the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), 9 before the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), 7 before the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
Arbitration (SCC) and the remaining 5 before the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce; ICSID Additional Facilities Rules; and the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration.   
 
Possible reasons for bringing a dispute before an international court or tribunal include: (1) the 
failure of the contract to provide for the specific contingency that has arisen; (2) repudiation of a 
contract by the host state; (3) a lack of confidence in the fairness of the domestic courts in the 
host country; or (4) the inclusion of a provision in the contract that specifies that an international 
court or tribunal is to be used if a dispute cannot be resolved by the parties on their own.  The 
relationship between contracts, domestic courts and bilateral investment treaties, will be 
discussed in more detail in the section on legal systems and investment and again in the case 
studies.  The next section reviews the most common provisions in oil and gas exploration and 
production contracts. 
 
6.3 - Contract Provisions in Oil and Gas Contracts (Question #3)   
It is almost inevitable that at some point in the life of a contract, the parties will disagree about 
something.  This is made more likely because oil and gas contracts may be in operation for 10 to 
20 years.  The disagreement may be about whether one of the parties has done what they said 
they would do; in the way they promised to do it; and within the time­frame they agreed to do it.  
In addition, it is common for oil and gas contracts to include provisions specifying that some 
issues are to be negotiated at a later date.  This section summarizes the contract provisions that 
are most often included in oil and gas contracts to minimize disputes and resolve conflicts. 
Q3 
What contract provisions are most often included in an oil and gas contract to limit the number 
of disputes and resolve those that occur?   
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H3 
Most contracts include references to “good faith”, “use reasonable efforts”, and “a timely 
manner”.  Specific provisions in contracts include provisions for: dispute resolution, 
stabilization or equilibrium, choice of law, domestic or foreign courts, arbitration and 
arbitration rules.   
  
Good Faith 
“Good faith” is a term that is often used in connection with issues regarding whether the parties 
to a contract have done what they said they would do, in the way they promised to do it and 
within the time­frame they agreed to do it.  For example:117 
 
Excerpt from a Libyan Exploration and Production Sharing Agreements (EPSA) 
 
13.5.2.   "…..shall proceed in good faith to negotiate a gas sales agreement incorporating the 
principles set forth in Article 13.4"”. 
 
(This provision is relevant when natural gas is produced from a project that was undertaken with the 
expectation that it would produce oil.)  
 
Excerpt from Azerbaijan Agreement 
 
15.2. (cd) - "  SOCAR [State Oil Company of Azerbaijan Republic]and Contractor shall diligently 
negotiate each, such Supplemental Agreement (and the relevant Sales Agreement) in good faith”. 
 
Accounting Procedures 
In an appendix to the contract there is usually a section titled Accounting Procedures which is 
referred to in the main contract. 
Excerpt from an Appendix on Accounting Procedures 
 
"….if any of such methods[of accounting] prove to be unfair or inequitable to the Contractor then the 
Parties will meet and in good faith endeavor to agree on such changes as are necessary to correct 
any unfairness or inequity”. 
 
Excerpt from Iraq’s Technical Service Agreement 
 
2.3 - "  Discovered but undeveloped reservoirs, as defined in Annex D, may be developed and 
produced under this Contract but shall be subject to a separately agreed remuneration fee which the 
Parties undertake, in good faith, to agree"”. 
 
                                                          
117
 Tim Boykett, Marta Peirano, Simone Boria, Heather Kelley, Elisabeth Schimana, Andreas Dekrout, Rachel OReilly, 
“Oil Contracts - How to Read and Understand a Petroleum Contract,” Times Up Press Industriezeile 33b 4020 Linz 
Austria 2012.  http://openoil.net/contracts-booksprint/ 
66 
 
Two other phrases frequently used in oil and gas contracts are the obligation to "use reasonable 
efforts" or to do something or deliver something “in a timely manner".  Although domestic law 
may provide some guidance on what "reasonable efforts" or "deliver in a timely manner" require 
of the parties, there will occasionally be disputes whether what has been done constitutes 
"reasonable efforts" or "timely manner".  To reduce the ambiguity of such provisions the contract 
may include a reference to "generally accepted international standards or practices".118  However, 
there can be disputes over the interpretation of terms like "generally accepted international 
standards or practices” or “good petroleum practice”.  (See section on environmental provisions 
below for a definition and example of these terms.) 
 
Most disputes arise when one party's interpretation of a provision results in the other party 
having to spend more money or receive less money than it believes it should under the terms of 
the contract.  An oil or gas contract always has a section that specifies the procedures the parties 
will use to resolve disagreements.  This is frequently referred to as the "Dispute Resolution" 
section or the "Arbitration" section and is frequently arranged in a hierarchy.    
 
Excerpt from the Iraqi Model Form Technical Services Contract in Article 37.
119
 
 
“The Parties shall endeavor to settle amicably any dispute (the "Dispute”) arising out of or in 
connection with or in relation to this Contract or any provision or agreement related thereto”. 
 
"”Where no such settlement is reached within thirty (30) days of the date when one Party notifies the 
other Party of the Dispute, then the matter may, as appropriate, be referred by the Parties to their 
senior management for resolution”. 
 
“Where no such settlement is reached within thirty (30) days of such referral to management, any 
Party to the Dispute may refer the matter, as appropriate to an independent expert or, by giving sixty 
(60) days-notice to the other Party, refer the matter to arbitration as stipulated hereunder". 
 
“If any Dispute arises between the Parties with respect to technical matters, such Dispute may, at the 
election of either Party, be referred to an independent expert (“Expert”) for determination". 
 
“All Disputes arising out of or in connection with this Contract, other than those Disputes that have 
been finally settled by reference to either senior management or an Expert, shall be finally settled 
under the Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce by three arbitrators 
appointed in accordance with said Rules." 
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In most cases, the parties will first try to resolve disputes themselves, whether or not the contract 
requires them to do so.  Doing so is less expensive and less prejudicial to the relationship, than 
bringing in outside experts or arbitrators.  Only when resolution of the dispute on their own 
appears impossible, will the parties resort to other dispute resolution mechanisms.  The contract 
may specify the appointment of an expert for technical issues for which there is objective market 
or accounting data.  Disputes that involve more subjective issues of contract interpretation will 
most likely be referred to a mediator or arbitration tribunal.120 
 
Stabilization Contract Provisions 
Many things can change during the life of a project in which billions of dollars may be invested 
and which may extend over 25 years or more.  Government policy, a country’s economic 
development priorities or legal environment can all change as a result of elections or revolutions.  
Stabilization contract provisions have been used to secure guarantees against changes in the 
economic policies or legal environment within which a contract was originally negotiated. 
 
Specific changes that a company might seek protection against include: (1) changes in the fiscal 
regime, for example, increases in existing taxes or royalties, or the imposition of new ones (2) 
changes to laws that affect the conduct of petroleum operations, for example labor laws imposing 
more stringent or additional requirements on worker safety.
121
  
 
Excerpt from a Ghanaian Production Sharing Contract 
 
26.2 - "......As of the Effective Date of this Agreement and throughout its Term, the State guarantees the 
Contractor the stability of the terms and conditions of this Agreement as well as the fiscal and 
contractual framework hereof, specifically including those terms and conditions and that framework 
that are based upon or subject to the provisions of the laws and regulations of Ghana (and any 
interpretations thereof) including without limitation the Petroleum Income Tax Law, the Petroleum 
Law, the GNPC Law and those other laws, regulations and decrees that are applicable hereto. This 
Agreement and the rights and obligations specified herein may not be modified, amended, altered or 
supplemented except upon the execution and delivery of a written agreement executed by the Parties. 
Any legislative or administrative act of the State or any of its agencies or subdivisions which purports 
to vary any such right or obligation shall, to the extent sought to be applied to this Agreement, 
constitute a breach of this Agreement by the State." 
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However, most national governments perceive such stabilization provisions to be an 
infringement on their national sovereignty.122  Although stabilization clauses exist in older 
petroleum contracts, they are becoming increasingly rare.  These clauses are often referred to as 
"freezing clauses" because they attempt to freeze the host country’s law in place, at least as it 
applies to a particular contract. 
 
A more recent alternative to a stabilization provision is the “equilibrium provision.”  The purpose 
of an equilibrium provision is similar to a stabilization provision, that is, it is intended to 
preserve the overall economic position of the oil company without appearing to infringe the 
national sovereignty of the host country.  If one of the parties is adversely affected by a change in 
the country’s law, both parties agree to pursue changes to the contract that will restore the 
adversely affected party to the financial position they enjoyed before the law was changed.  For 
example, if the country modifies its tax law and as a consequence the taxes imposed on the 
profits of the oil company are increased by 10%, the parties would seek to agree an amendment 
to some other terms of the petroleum contract to compensate the oil company for the increased 
tax it must pay.123  For example: 
Excerpts from Typical Petroleum Contract 
 
Example 1 
“Without prejudice to other rights and obligations of the Parties under the Agreement, in the event 
that any change in the provisions of any Law, decree or regulation in force in [name of country] 
occurs subsequent to the signing of this Agreement which adversely affects the obligations, rights and 
benefits hereunder, then the Parties shall agree on amendments to the Agreement to be submitted to 
the competent authorities for approval, so as to restore such rights, obligations and forecasted 
benefits.”  
 
Example 2 
“....if after the Effective Date, the financial interests of Contractor are adversely and substantially 
affected by a change to the Law which was in force on the Effective Date, or by revocation, 
modification or non-renewal of any approvals, consents or exemptions granted to Contractor 
pursuant to this Contract (other than as a result of Gross Negligence or Willful Misconduct of 
Contractor or Operator) the Parties shall, within ninety (90) days, agree on necessary adjustments to 
the relevant provisions of this Contract in order to maintain Contractor's financial interests under this 
Contract reasonably unchanged." 
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Domestic and Foreign Courts 
When direct negotiations, mediation and the employment of experts do not lead to a resolution of 
the dispute, the next step is a domestic court proceeding or international arbitration.   Unless a 
contract includes provisions requiring the parties to use an arbitration process, the first step 
would be to bring the dispute before a domestic court of the relevant country or countries.  
However, the reality is that in many jurisdictions the court process may not be independent, or 
may be slow and international investors generally (not just oil companies) prefer not to take that 
risk.  Although citizens in the host country may find the suggestion that their courts are not 
impartial or fair insulting, most contracts include a provision specifying arbitration in a court or 
tribunal outside the host country.  
 
Arbitration and Arbitration Rules 
Arbitration is a process for resolving disputes that could not be resolved by some other means.   
For the parties involved, particularly oil companies, arbitration has two main advantages over a 
domestic court proceeding.  First, the arbitration is not carried out in the country with which the 
oil company has the dispute, increasing the probability that the outcome will be fair and 
impartial.  Second, arbitration procedures and awards are, at least in theory, confidential and 
could therefore be an advantage to an oil company because it allows the company to keep the 
terms and conditions of its original agreements and subsequent settlements private, thereby 
protecting its proprietary information and its competitive position.  The host government may 
also perceive the confidentiality of arbitration to be an advantage for competitive reasons or 
when signing bonuses or other controversial payments are involved (see discussion of signing 
bonuses in Section 6.10.4). 
 
Although the arbitration takes place outside the host country, this is a separate issue from the 
question of which country's law will be used in adjudicating the dispute.  For example, if a 
dispute arises under a petroleum contract in Ghana, then Ghanaian law applies to the contract, 
and an arbitration process would decide the dispute applying Ghanaian law even if the arbitration 
process takes place in the investor’s country or a third country.   
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Typical features of an arbitration provision in a contract include: 
 
 A clause specifying that the arbitration is to be conducted in accordance with the rules of 
a particular arbitration institution.  There are a several recognized international arbitration 
institutions each of which has a set of rules that will apply to the arbitration process.  It was 
observed previously, that the rules most often used are the rules of the International Centre 
for Settlement of Investment Disputes ("ICSID"), UNCITRAL rules, and International 
Chamber of Commerce Rules (ICC). 
 
 A clause specifying where the arbitration is to take place.  Often, a "neutral" venue is 
chosen, that is, one that is not in the country with which the contract is made and not in the 
country in which the oil company or its parent organization is domiciled.  Choices of 
independent venues might include, Paris, London or Stockholm, but as previously stated the 
law to be applied is the relevant governing law of the contract, not the law of the venue. 
 
Excerpt from Azerbaijan Joint Development and Production Sharing Contract  
 
 “….shall be governed and interpreted in accordance with the principles of law common to the law 
of the Azerbaijan Republic and English law, and to the extent that no common principles exist in 
relation to any matter, then in accordance with the principles of the common law of Alberta, 
Canada..." 
  
Other provisions include: 
 
 A clause specifying the number of arbitrators that will determine the dispute.  Frequently 
there are three.  This allows each party to select one arbitrator and then to jointly appoint a 
third or for the third to be appointed pursuant to the relevant arbitration rules.   
 
 A clause specifying the language in which the arbitration is to be conducted, usually a 
major international language that has some (historical) relationship to the country to which 
the dispute relates such as English, French, Spanish or Portuguese. 
 
 A clause specifying who is responsible for paying the cost of the arbitration.  Usually, the 
expense of arbitration is shared equally among the Parties.
124
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Environmental Provisions 
The Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 was a reminder of the 
environmental risk associated with the exploration and production of oil and natural gas. 
Although accidents on this scale are rare, all oil and gas projects involve environmental risk.   
For this reason, most oil and gas contracts contain clauses related to nine major environmental 
issues: (1) environmental standards; (2) stabilization; (3) environmental impact assessment; (4) 
access to protected areas; (5) access to water and other natural resources; (6) gas flaring; (7) 
responding to emergencies and accidents; (8) decommissioning and remediation; (9) liability, 
indemnity and insurance.125  Examples of (1), (3), (7) and (9) are presented below: 
 
Environmental Standards 
A Cambodian contract defines “good petroleum practice” as: 
“Good Petroleum Industry Practices means the standards and practices, and exercise of that degree 
of skill, prudence and foresight that would reasonably be expected of persons carrying out 
international petroleum operations, and adherence to generally accepted standards of the 
international petroleum industry, including sound environmental provisions”.126 
 
Environmental Impact Assessment 
Excerpt from the Agreement for the Azeri and Chirac Fields in Azerbaijan 
26.4 - "... an environmental baseline study ....to be carried out by a recognized international 
environmental consulting firm selected by Contractor, and acceptable to SOCAR [State Oil Company 
of Azerbaijan Republic].  SOCAR shall nominate representatives to participate in preparation of the 
study in collaboration with such firm and Contractor representatives." 
 
Responding to Emergencies and Accidents 
Excerpt from a PSC (Production Sharing Agreement) in Ghana 
 
“If Contractor does not act promptly so as to control, clean up or repair any pollution or damage, 
GNPC [Ghana National Petroleum Corporation] may, after giving Contractor reasonable notice in 
the circumstances, take any actions which are necessary, in accordance with accepted petroleum 
industry practice and the reasonable costs and expenses of such actions shall be borne by Contractor 
and shall, subject to Article 17.5 be included as Petroleum Costs”.127 
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Liability and Indemnity 
An example of an indemnity clause appears at 19.1 in the LOGIC Standard Offshore Service 
Contract: 
 
“19.1 The CONTRACTOR shall be responsible for and shall save, indemnify, defend and hold 
harmless the COMPANY GROUP from and against all claims, losses, damages, costs (including  
legal costs) expenses and liabilities in respect of: (a) loss of or damage to property ….”128 
 
In a contract between Slessor and Vecto Gray, clause B13 states that: 
 
 “…the parties mutually and irrevocably undertake to release, defend and indemnify each other for 
damage to any property, and/or injury to/or death of the personnel of the others, arising out of or in 
connection with the Work, howsoever caused”. 
 
Clause 2 in a standard Deeds of Adherence, states that the signatories are obligated to:  
 
“…. be solely responsible for and shall defend, indemnify and hold harmless the other Signatories 
and the other members of their respective Groups against all Claims arising from, out of, or relating 
to the Services in connection with: 
(i) personal injury to or sickness……; and 
(ii) loss of, recovery of, or damage to any Property ……; and 
(iii) Consequential loss ……...129 
 
This section presented the contract provisions most often included in oil and gas contracts for the 
purpose of minimizing and resolving disputes and explained how these provisions are applied in 
the resolution of disputes when the arbitration or court proceeding take place outside the host 
country.  It also demonstrated that there is a well-defined set of procedural rules for resolving 
disputes when the contracting parties cannot resolve them on their own.  The next section 
reviews the most common provisions contained in bilateral investment treaties and evaluates 
their effectiveness in resolving disputes in the international oil and gas industry.     
 
6.4 – Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties (Question #4)  
Contracts are the principal means of documenting the rights and obligations of the parties 
participating in a specific project.  Bilateral investment treaties are the means of 
documenting more broadly the rights and obligations of host countries and foreign 
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investors.  This section examines the content and the effectiveness of bilateral investment 
treaties.   
Q4 
(1) What are the primary provisions in a bilateral investment treaty and how often are they used 
in dispute resolution? 
(2) How effective have they been in resolving disputes?  
 
H4 
(1)Most oil and gas contracts reference a bilateral investment treaty as a mechanism for 
resolving disputes, but a relatively small number of disputes actually require the application of a 
bilateral investment treaty. 
(2) Obtaining compensation in an international court or tribunal is often a slow process. 
  
Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are agreements between governments in which both 
governments agree to provide certain protections to investments by nationals of the other country 
in their country.  The most common and important clauses included in bilateral treaties are 
presented below. 
 
Choice of Law Clauses 
It was previously observed, that oil and gas contracts usually include a clause specifying the use 
of host country law in the resolution of disputes.   Bilateral investment treaties also include a 
provision specifying the use of the law of the host state in international court proceedings and 
arbitration tribunals, but they also refer to other sources of law.  Most bilateral treaties refer to 
four sources of law: (1) the bilateral investment agreement itself (the treaty); (2) the municipal 
(domestic law) of the host state; (3) the provisions of the contract relating to the investment 
between the parties; and (4) general principles of international law.  An example of this choice of 
law clause is contained in the bilateral investment treaty between Argentina and the United 
Kingdom (1990), which provides at Article 8(4): 
 
“The arbitral tribunal shall decide the dispute in accordance with the provisions of this 
Agreement,[bilateral treaty], the laws of the Contracting Party [host country government]involved in 
the dispute, including its rules on conflict of laws, the terms of any specific agreement concluded in 
relation to such an investment and the applicable principles of international law.  The arbitration 
decision shall be final and binding on both Parties”. 
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Bilateral investment treaties usually include an arbitration clause identifying the arbitral body to 
which disputes may be submitted.  Often the parties name the International Centre for Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). 
 
Treaty Titles and Preambles 
Most bilateral investment treaties are formally called “agreements for the promotion and 
protection of investment”.  In some agreements, the title refers to reciprocal or mutual protection.  
Treaty titles are usually followed by short preambles, which focus on the objective of promoting 
and protecting investment, and providing favorable conditions for foreign investment.130  China-
Germany (2003) is a recent example of a typical preamble: 
 
“Intending to create favorable conditions for investment by investors of one Contracting Party in the 
territory of the other Contracting Party,  
 Recognizing that the encouragement, promotion and protection of such investments will be 
conducive to stimulating business initiative of the investors and will increase prosperity in both 
States,  
 Desiring to intensify the economic co-operation of both States…..”  
 
National Treatment and Most Favored Nation Treatment 
One of the main objectives of international trade and investment law is to limit state actions that 
discriminate based on the nationality of the foreign individual, entity, good, service or type of 
investment.131  In most bilateral investment agreements national and most favored nation 
treatment are combined into one provision.   
Article 4(2), Chile-Egypt (1999), is an example of this: 
“Each Contracting Party shall accord investments of the investors of [the] other Contracting Party in 
its territory a treatment which is not less favorable than that accorded to investments made by its own 
investors or by investors of any third country, whichever is more favorable”.   
 
International Standards of Treatment 
Standards of treatment based on fairness and equity existed before the development of modern 
international investment agreements (IIAs).  Fair and Equitable treatment clauses (FETs) used in 
bilateral investment treaties (BITs)  and other international investment agreements appeared in 
early international economic agreements such as the Havana Charter for an International Trade 
Organization (1948) and the Economic Agreement of Bogota (1948), as well as in the United 
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States Friendship, Commerce and Navigation (FCN) treaties.  The first use of the Fair and 
Equitable treatment clause in an international investment agreement can be found in Article I of 
the Draft Convention on Investments Abroad proposed by Hermann Abs and Lord Shawcross in 
1959:
132
 
“Each Party shall at all times ensure fair and equitable treatment to the property of the nationals of 
the other Parties.  Such property shall be accorded the most constant protection and security within 
the territories of the other Parties and the management, use and enjoyment thereof shall not in any 
way be impaired by unreasonable or discriminatory measures”. 133 
 
The Organizations for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD, created in 1961), 
subsequently produced its own draft convention on the protection of foreign property in 1967, 
entitled the Convention on the Protection of Foreign Property, which includes a fair and 
equitable treatment clause along similar lines.
134
  However, this treaty has not yet come into 
force. 
 
In its notes and comments to Article 1, of the OECD Convention a clear reference was made to 
the source of the standard: “the standard conforms to the ‘minimum standard’ which forms part 
of customary international law”.135  Although the 1967 Draft OECD Convention failed to gain 
sufficient support among OECD countries for adoption as a multilateral convention, its 
substantive provisions have served as an important model for bilateral investment treaties.
136
  By 
referring to the OECD model and using it systematically, bilateral investment treaties are 
effectively referring to this standard as defined by the OECD Draft Convention of 1967.
137
 
 
Because most treaties do not define the substantive content of the standard to be applied, but 
only refer to an unqualified formulation of the standard, or to one qualified by references to 
(customary) international law, the contemporary meaning of the “fair and equitable treatment” 
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standard still depends on interpretations by individual arbitral tribunals, which are not subject to 
any effective appellate review.  This makes the standard vulnerable to inconsistent interpretation, 
resulting in uncertainty regarding its meaning. 
138
 
 
Minimum Standard of Treatment 
Unlike the national and most favored nation (MFN) treatment standard discussed in the previous 
section, in which the standard of treatment is contingent on the treatment of some other party or 
parties, the substantive content of a minimum standard is not determined by reference to the 
treatment of other investors or investments.  Minimum standards of treatment therefore provide a 
treaty defined baseline or, in the words of one international investment tribunal “a floor below 
which treatment of foreign investors must not fall, even if a government were not acting in a 
discriminatory manner”.139  In practice this is still problematic, because there is often 
disagreement about what constitutes a “minimum standard” of treatment.   
 
Laws Related to Expropriation 
International expropriation law is intended to mediate and to the extent possible, reconcile two 
general principles of international law: (1) that states exercise permanent sovereignty over their 
territories and natural resources; and (2) that states must respect the acquired rights of foreigners.  
The exercise of permanent sovereignty means that private property is not inviolable.  Unless the 
state has made specific commitments not to nationalize a specific investor’s assets, states have a 
right to tax, regulate or expropriate an investor’s assets provided the state and the expropriation 
meet four conditions. (1) The expropriation must be for a public purpose, (2) must be done in 
accordance with due process, (3) requires that it be done in a non-discriminatory manner, and (4) 
that it be accompanied by prompt and equitable compensation.140 
 
The expropriation and compensation provision of Article IV.2.1 of the draft Multilateral 
Agreement on Investment (MAI) provides: 
“2.1. A Contracting Party shall not expropriate or nationalize directly or indirectly an investment in 
its territory of an investor of another Contracting Party or take any measure or measures having 
equivalent effect (hereinafter referred to as “expropriation”) except: 
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a.) for a purpose which is in the public interest 
b.) on a non-discriminatory basis, 
c.) in accordance with due process of law, and 
d.) accompanied by payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation in accordance with 
Articles 2.2 to 2.5 below:” 
 
Three issues in international expropriation law have been particularly contentious.  First, what 
economic interests can be expropriated?  Second, what government measures amount to 
expropriation?  Third, what is the standard of compensation payable upon expropriation?  
International investment agreements (IIAs) address each of these issues, but are still open to 
interpretation.141  Each is examined below.  
 
The range of economic interests that international investment agreements protect depends on the 
definition of ‘investment,’ which most IIAs define broadly.  Under customary international law, 
both tangible property (i.e. land, equipment and inventory) and intangible property (i.e. company 
shares, dividends, bank accounts, contract rights, intellectual property and goodwill) can be 
expropriated. 
 
Bilateral investment treaties typically contain a provision prohibiting either country from 
expropriating the investments of nationals of the other country without due process or just 
compensation or in violation of international law.  The majority of expropriation cases in 
international law have involved a deprivation of a foreign investor’s acquired rights and a 
corresponding acquisition, or appropriation, of those acquired rights by the state or a third party 
designated by the state, for example, an NOC.142  This is usually referred to as direct 
expropriation.    
 
A deprivation (expropriation) may also occur as a result of a state’s interference in the use of the 
property or the receipt of its benefits by the investor, even though legal title to the property has 
not been affected.  The assumption of control over property by a government does not 
automatically constitute expropriation requiring compensation under international law, however, 
a claim of expropriation is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner has been 
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation is not temporary.  
This is usually referred to as indirect expropriation and is often described as “equivalent”, 
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“tantamount”, “de facto”, “creeping”, “constructive”, “disguised”, “consequential”, “regulatory” 
or “virtual expropriation”.143 
 
What is ‘prompt, adequate and effective compensation’ for expropriation in customary 
international law is usually the issue most hotly disputed by the claimant and the respondent.  
The country expropriating the assets would prefer to pay an amount equivalent to the book value 
of the investment, that is, the difference between the project’s total assets and its total liabilities 
(total assets – total liabilities = book value) based on historical cost.  The company being 
expropriated, however, usually seeks compensation measured by the market value of the 
investment prior to expropriation.  The market value of the property is usually the higher of the 
two values and the difference between them is frequently substantial.  This is particularly true in 
the oil and gas industry in which the value of successful wells exceeds their cost; and the market 
value of reserves tends to increase, because oil and natural gas prices have tended to increase. 
 
The decisions of most international courts and tribunals and scholarly writing support the 
position that under customary international law the country expropriating the assets is required to 
pay full compensation measured by the fair market value of the property that has been taken”.144  
Even those bilateral investment treaties which expressly define equitable compensation as the 
fair market value, the specific language used in the agreement can have a significant effect on the 
amount of the compensation.   
 
For example, in an arbitration case between the Airport Development Co. and the Republic of 
Hungary, the bilateral investment treaty stated that “the amount of compensation must 
correspond to the market value of the expropriated investments at the moment of the 
expropriation” and that “the amount of this compensation may be estimated according to the 
laws and regulations of the country where the expropriation is made”.  A provision written in this 
manner would be particularly unfavorable to a company whose asset values have been driven 
down by acts of the host government prior to the announcement of the expropriation, for 
example, raising tax or royalty rates, denying license renewals or right of transit.145 
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Legal Instruments Referenced in a Dispute 
Fifty-one of the 68 oil and gas cases discussed previously and brought before an international 
court or tribunal had either been arbitrated or were being arbitrated pursuant to a bilateral 
investment treaty between the host country and the home country of the investor, nine were 
being arbitrated pursuant to the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), three pursuant to the provisions of 
the North Atlantic Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), two pursuant to both a bilateral investment 
treaty and the ECT.  The legal document to which three were pursuant was unknown.  Bilateral 
treaties are the legal instrument most often referenced in the adjudication of contract disputes 
brought before an international tribunal.   
 
Length of Time in Arbitration 
The ten cases related to oil and gas exploration and production brought before an international 
court or tribunal between 1996 and 2002, have been resolved through an arbitration decision or 
by the parties reaching an out of court settlement.  Fifteen of the 58 cases brought before an 
international court or tribunal between 2003 and 2012 were settled, but 40 were still pending.  
The status of three cases was unknown.  This again suggests that seeking compensation in an 
international court or tribunal is often a slow process.  The next section examines the relationship 
between the number of disputes, the number of bilateral treaties, and the reliability of the legal 
system in a country. 
 
6.5 – Bilateral Investment Treaties, Legal Systems and Disputes (Question #5) 
In section 6.2, it was observed that most disagreements between the parties to a contract are 
resolved by the parties themselves, but in section 6.4 it was observed that when a disagreement 
cannot be resolved by the parties, the legal instrument most often referenced in the legal 
proceedings is the bilateral investment treaty between the country of the claimant and the country 
of the respondent.  
  
Are countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties less likely to be 
involved in disputes in an international court or tribunal?  The rationale for this proposition is 
that countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment agreements may have a 
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greater respect for the agreements they sign and the rule of law in general.  Another way to 
evaluate this relationship is to directly compare the quality and reliability of a country’s legal 
system and the number of claims that have been brought against it an international court or 
tribunal.  The rationale for this proposition is that a country with a fairer and more reliable legal 
system is less likely to be involved in disputes before an international court or tribunal because 
both parties to the contract are likely to have confidence in the domestic court system.    
 
Q5 
(1) Are countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties less likely to be 
involved in disputes in an international court or tribunal?  
(2) Are countries with more reliable legal systems less likely to be involved in disputes in an 
international court or tribunal?  
 
H5  
(1) Countries that have signed a large number of bilateral investment treaties are less likely to 
be involved in disputes in an international court or tribunal?  
(2) Countries with more reliable legal systems are less likely to be involved in disputes in an 
international court or tribunal?  
 
Number of Bilateral Treaties and the Number of Disputes 
In Figure 1 below, Argentina (far right) has signed 58 bilateral investment treaties and had 15 
cases brought against it by companies in the oil and gas industry.  The Russian Federation has 
signed 72 bilateral investment treaties and had 5 cases brought against it; Ecuador has signed 18 
bilateral investment treaties and had 9 cases brought against it; and Venezuela has signed 28 
bilateral treaties and had 5 cases brought against it.  In addition, there are 14 countries that were 
involved in one case, yet the number of bilateral treaties they had signed ranged from 2 to 82.   
Figure 1 indicates that the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed is not a reliable 
predictor of how many cases will be brought against it in an international court or tribunal.  (R
2 
is 
.0003 and adjusted R
2
 is -.0452)  Possible explanations for this include: (1) in a particular 
country, one regime may sign a large number of bilateral investment treaties to attract direct 
foreign investment and a subsequent regime may place more emphasis on wealth redistribution 
and resource nationalism.  So that the large number of treaties a country has signed becomes an 
institutional artifact of the previous regime, but have no connection to the policy of the current 
regime, for example, Venezuela (28 BITs), Argentina (58), Chile (51), Cuba (59), Iran (61) and 
the Russian Federation (72); and (2) in some countries the decision to sign a large number of 
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bilateral investment treaties may be based more on political considerations than economic 
considerations, that is, signing treaties expands a country’s political network and in the case of 
larger countries its “sphere of influence”, for example China (130 BITs), Egypt (101), France 
(102), Germany (134), India (84), Italy (92), South Korea (90), Netherlands (93), Spain (82), 
Switzerland (118), Turkey (88), United Kingdom (104). 
 
 
 
Quality of Legal Systems and the Number of Disputes 
Figure 2 below, compares the number of cases brought against a country in an international court 
or tribunal and the composite rating (average) a country received on the quality and reliability of 
its legal system based on government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and the 
control of corruption.  Zero is the worst possible rating and 100 is the best possible rating.    
 
Argentina has a composite rating of 33 and had 15 cases brought against it in an international 
court or tribunal.  Ecuador has a rating of 23 and had 9 cases brought against it.  Kazakhstan has 
a rating of 33 and had 6 cases brought against it.  The Russian Federation has a rating of 30 and 
had 5 cases brought against it.  Conversely, Canada has a rating of 95 and has been involved in 
two cases; and the United States has a rating of 90 and has been involved in one case.  However, 
there are a significant number of countries in this sample with relatively low composite ratings 
and yet only one case brought against them (lower left quadrant).  These include Nigeria, 
Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Algeria and Albania.  Another way of looking at this is to note that 
Canada has a composite rating of 95 and had two cases brought against it and Venezuela has a 
composite rating of just 7, but had only four cases brought against it.  Figure 2 indicates that the 
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composite rating a country received on the quality of its governance and legal system is not a 
reliable predictor of the number of cases brought against it.  (R
2 
is .0512 and adjusted R
2
 is .008).    
 
 
 
The next section evaluates whether there is a relationship between the number of bilateral 
investment treaties a country has signed and oil consumption and foreign direct investment 
outflows and inflows.  It also evaluates the effectiveness of international courts and tribunals. 
 
6.6 - Oil Consumption, Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral Investment Treaties (Question 
#6) 
 
Q6 
(1) Does a relationship exist between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of 
bilateral treaties it has signed? 
(2) Does a relationship exist between the foreign direct investment (FDI) outflows from a 
country and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed?  
(3) Does a relationship exist between the foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows to a country 
and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed? 
(4) Are the rulings of most courts and tribunals fair and are they complied with.   
 
H6 
(1) There is no relationship between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of 
bilateral treaties it has signed. 
(2) There is a relationship between the FDI outflows from a country and the number of bilateral 
investment treaties it has signed.   
(3) There is a relationship between the FDI inflows to a country and the number of bilateral 
treaties it has signed 
(4) The rulings of most courts and tribunal are fair and are complied with.  
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Oil Consumption and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
 
Figure 3 below, suggests that there is no observable relationship between the amount of oil a 
country consumes and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed.  However, a 
statistical analysis of the data might show that a country’s oil consumption is statistically and 
substantively significant, even though it may be only one of several variables determining the 
number of bilateral treaties a country has signed. 
 
  
 
This analysis could also be refined by comparing the amount of oil a country imports from the 
countries that are its principal oil suppliers and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has 
signed with those countries.  However, if the oil imported is simply purchased, but not the result 
of direct foreign investment made by investors from the oil importing country in the oil 
exporting country, it is unlikely that there would be a strong relationship between the amount of 
oil imported and the number of bilateral investment treaties the oil importing country has signed.   
 
Foreign Direct Investment Outflows and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Figures 4 and 5 below compare the number of bilateral investment treaties a country has signed 
and the dollar amount of the foreign direct investment made by that country.  Figure 4 shows that 
the United States is an “outlier” and would therefore distort a regression line fitted to the data.   
 
0
50
100
150
0.0 4,000.0 8,000.0 12,000.0 16,000.0 20,000.0
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
b
ila
te
ra
l 
In
ve
st
m
e
n
t 
Tr
e
at
ie
s 
Oil Consumption in 000s barrels per day 
Figure 3 - Number of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties vs Oil Consumption    
n = 67 countries 
84 
 
 
 
In Figure 5, the United States is excluded.  When the United States is excluded, the existence of 
a relationship between the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed and FDI outflows 
appears more likely but the large number of countries clustered on the left side of the figure 
suggests that other factors are also affecting the amount of FDI outflow from a country.  For 
example, many countries are too small to have significant outward foreign direct investment no 
matter how many bilateral investment treaties they sign.   
 
 
 
Foreign Direct Investment Inflows and Bilateral Investment Treaties 
Figure 6 suggests the number of bilateral investment treaties a country signs is related to the 
foreign direct investment inflows a country receives, but the other factors are also involved.  
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This is consistent with the literature on this issue.  For example, Hallward – Driemeier concluded 
that bilateral investment treaties act more as complements than as substitutes for good 
institutional quality and local property rights.
146
  However, Neumayer and Spess conclude that a 
higher number of BIT’s increases the FDI inflows to a developing country.147  
 
Fairness and Effectiveness of International Courts and Tribunals 
Given the general proposition that institutions develop and are sustained because they reduce risk 
and expand the range of economic possibilities, it is reasonable to think that international courts 
and tribunals are at least marginally effective, otherwise there would be little reason for them to 
exist.  The question then is not whether they are effective, but how effective they are.   
Table A.7 in Appendix III shows that of the 68 oil and gas cases in the UNCTAD database, 16 
have been resolved by a court or tribunal, (8 in favor of the plaintiff and 8 in favor of the 
defendant.)  These sixteen cases are not sufficient to conclude that international courts and 
tribunals are mostly impartial, but the fact that court or tribunal decided in favor of the plaintiff 
as often as they decided in favor of the defendant is encouraging.  Ten cases have been settled 
out of court, thirty-eight cases are still pending and the disposition of four cases is unknown.   
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Claims Amounts versus Award Amounts 
In six of the eight cases decided in favor of the investors, the investors were awarded an amount 
less than  they requested; in one case the investors were awarded exactly what they requested; 
and in one case the amount requested is not known, but the amount awarded is known.  In six of 
the eight cases that were decided in favor of the state, the investors were awarded less than they 
requested; in one case only part of the award was made public and in one case the court ruled 
that it did not have jurisdiction.  Therefore, in 12 of the 16 cases, the claimant was awarded less 
than the amount they requested.  This is in part because claimants usually seek compensation 
equal to the market value of the assets expropriated or the market value of the breach of contract, 
not the book value, which is usually lower.  The conflict between book value and market value is 
discussed in more detail later.   
 
Efficiency of International Courts and Tribunals 
One measure of the efficiency of international courts and tribunals is the time elapsed from 
initiation of the case to the date the court or tribunal rendered its decision.  Of the 16 cases in 
which a decision has been rendered, 2 cases were in arbitration for 6 years, 3 cases for 5 years, 3 
cases for 4 years, 4 cases for 3 years,  3 cases for 2 years and 1 case for 1 year.  The average time 
for a decision from an international court or tribunal was 3.6 years.  Of the ten cases that were 
settled out of court, 1 was settled in 7 years, 1 was settled in 4 years, 3 were settled in 2 years, 
and 5 were settled in 1 year or less.  The average time to settlement was 2.2 years. 
 
Of the thirty-eight cases that are still pending resolution, 2 have been pending for 2 years, 3 cases 
have been pending for 3 years, 4 cases for 4 years, 2 cases for 5 years, 6 cases for 6 years, 4 
cases for 7 years, 5 cases for 8 years, 5 cases for 9 years, 3 cases for 10 years, 4 cases for 11 
years and the disposition of four cases is unknown.  The average time in adjudication for those 
cases still pending is 6.9 years.  A senior official at the ICSID explained this variation by noting 
that some cases are more complicated than others; some arbitrators are busier than others; and 
some parties challenge every motion and others only challenge basic and critical motions.
148
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Effectiveness of International Courts and Tribunals  
After an ICSID tribunal renders it decision, the ICSID gives the claimant an official copy of the 
tribunal’s findings and award in writing.  The claimant then presents this copy to the defendant 
and requests compliance with the award.  The timeliness and degree of compliance with court or 
tribunal’s awards is difficult to evaluate because the compliance process is less transparent than 
the arbitration process and UNCTAD’s and the ICSID’s record of the procedural details of a case 
ends with the announcement of the award.  A search of the literature did not produce any data on 
the timeliness and degree of compliance with court or tribunal awards.  The only references 
found in the news media to non-compliance were Venezuela’s rejection of the ICSID’s award in 
favor of ExxonMobil; and Venezuela’s subsequent withdrawal from the ICSID (see Case #5) and 
the Russia’s rejection of the award granted by the Permanent Court of Arbitration to the previous 
shareholders in OAO Yukos.  However, a senior official at the ICSID noted that there is an 
industry consensus that approximately 90% of awards are complied with.
149
  The next section 
describes and evaluates the sources of capital, financing structures, business structures and 
alliances.   
 
6.7 – Financing, Fiscal Regimes and Alliances (Question #7) 
Sections 3.3 (Organizations in Practice), 3.3.1 (National Governments), 3.3.2 (National Oil 
Companies) and 3.3.3 (International Oil Companies) discussed three types of organizations that 
comprise the international oil and gas industry.  This section examines the options available to 
these organizations regarding sources of capital, financing structures, fiscal regimes and 
alliances. 
Q7   
(1) What sources of capital are available to finance oil and gas exploration and development?  
(2) What financing structures are available?  
(3) What fiscal regimes are available?  
(4) Do alliances offer any advantages in managing risk; and how politically feasible are they? 
 
H7 
(1) Commercial bank debt, bonds and common stock remain the dominant forms of financing in 
the oil and natural gas industry. Master limited partnerships, venture capital and multilateral 
financing play a smaller role.   
(2) Joint ventures and project financing can redistribute risk, but they do not necessarily reduce 
overall risk. 
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(3) Fiscal regimes (tax/royalty agreements, production sharing agreements, and service 
agreements) are an important method for allocating risk and reward.  
 (4) Alliances offer some advantages, but are constrained by political uncertainty and conflict 
over the life such an alliance. 
 
6.7.1 Sources of Financing 
In 2013, capital expenditures and exploration expense (CAPEX) in the oil and gas industry were 
$682 billion and is expected to reach $723 billion in 2014.150  Figure 7 below, presents an 
estimate of the funds (financial capital), raised by oil and gas exploration companies and the 
source of those funds between 2010 and 2013.  Two observations are worth noting: (1) the 
amount of funds raised in 2013 was approximately $850 billion and the amount of CAPEX (not 
shown) was $682 billion in 2013.  This implies that the industry raised capital in 2013 in 
anticipation of even higher capital expenditures in 2014; (2) there is no explicit mention of 
internally generated cash flow from operations in this chart.  Net cash flow from operations 
would therefore need to be added to these figures to estimate the total sources of financial 
capital.  Nevertheless, Figure 7 provides a first approximation of the relative importance of 
various sources of financing. 
 
Figure 7 151 
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Equity Financing 
Public Equity Investment 
Companies can acquire capital and investors can make an equity investment in a company in two 
ways, publicly or privately.  Public companies’ shares are traded on a stock exchange and can be 
purchased by anyone, at any time.  The IOCs and many of the major NOCs are traded publicly, 
either in New York, London, Tokyo, or Hong Kong.  Many of the medium-sized companies and 
even the “juniors” in the oil and gas industry are also publicly traded. 
 
Common Stock 
Common stock gives its holders ownership in an oil and gas company that is proportional to the 
number of shares each common stockholder owns.  Common stockholders also have a 
proportional claim on the net income of the firm after the obligations to all of the firm’s suppliers 
and creditors have been met.  In this sense, the common stockholders bear the ultimate risk of 
failure or success of the enterprise.  In the United States, the net income of the company is taxed 
at the company level and any dividends that are paid to the stockholders are taxed again at the 
individual shareholder level.   
 
Master Limited Partnerships (MLPs) 
A Master Limited Partnership (MLP) is a limited partnership (or limited liability company) 
which units are publicly traded on a stock exchange.   If it meets certain qualifications under U.S. 
tax law, the MLP is a pass-through entity and does not pay tax at the entity level; taxes are only 
paid at the individual partner level.  Although not required by law, MLPs generally distribute all 
of their available net income.   In addition, each limited partner may record his share of the 
MLP’s depreciation on his tax return.152  The master limited partners bear the ultimate risk of 
failure or success of the enterprise.   
 
The first MLP was created by Apache Oil Company in 1981.  The number of MLPs in the oil, 
gas and real estate industries grew rapidly in the 1980s and the U.S. Congress and the IRS 
became concerned that large numbers of corporations would become MLPs to avoid the 
corporate income tax.  To prevent the widespread adoption of the MLP form, in 1987 Congress 
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passed legislation to define and limit publicly traded partnerships.  Congress created Section 
7704 of the Internal Revenue Service Code, limiting partnership tax treatment to publicly traded 
partnerships (PTPs) earning more than 90 percent of their income from a limited number of 
specific sources.
153
   
 
The popularity of MLPs continued to increase as investors searched for higher yield and energy 
companies sought to monetize the value of their assets and still maintain control.  As of February 
2013, there were approximately ninety-six energy MLPs, and market capitalization for all MLPs 
was approximately $403 billion.  Approximately 70% are midstream energy MLPs (pipelines 
and oil storage), 7% are upstream energy MLPs (exploration and production) and the remaining 
23% are in other industry sectors.154 
 
Private Equity Investment 
Private equity firms have existed since 1946, but they increased in size and number beginning in 
the early 1980s.  Investors can make an investment in a privately owned company only if the 
existing owners agree to expand the ownership of the firm.  The potential investors must reach an 
agreement with the current owners regarding the amount of capital they will contribute and the 
proportional ownership the new investors will have in the expanded firm.  Private equity capital 
can come from individual private investors, institutional investors, mutual funds and sovereign 
wealth funds.  Private equity investors frequently hold the investment until it has attained 
significant value and then sell the company to another investor group or take it public in an 
initial public offering (IPO). 
 
Hundreds of small oil and gas firms rely on private equity capital to fund their operations.  These 
firms often have significant potential, but have limited access to other forms of capital because 
they have little operating cash flow and few assets in the beginning, to present to a commercial 
bank as collateral for a loan.  And although, advances in technology have improved the odds of 
finding oil and gas, success is still elusive; three-quarters of all exploration wells are “dry holes”, 
either because there is no oil there or because geologists have been unable to accurately identify 
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the location of the oil or natural gas.155  However, ninety percent of the petroleum produced in 
North America is produced by independent producers, not IOCs.  Many of them are private 
companies that rely on private equity investment to finance their operations.156  Private equity 
groups made significant investments in the oil and gas industry in 2012 (1,590 private-equity 
backed deals valued at $152.3 billion).157   
 
Venture Capital 
Venture capital financing primarily supports the development of private sector company 
“startups” that have significant growth potential.  The global oil and gas industry includes 
thousands of startup companies, but their access to venture capital has been limited.  In the early 
1980s, venture capital investments in the energy and industrial-energy field accounted for more 
than 20% of all venture capital financing, however by 2000, this percentage had declined to 1%.  
Between 2002 and 2008, interest in the energy sector among venture capital firms increased 
slightly to 3% of all venture capital investment in 2007.  However, most of this investment was 
and still is, focused on clean technologies (biomass, algae, and CO2 capture), not oil and gas 
exploration and development.158 
 
The oil and gas industry does not attract venture capital for two reasons.  First, most new oil and 
gas technologies (e.g. hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling, and three dimensional seismic 
imaging) require large amounts of capital, often averaging more than $100 million and ten or 
more years to reach commercialization and profitability.159  Second, oil and gas industry 
technology is perceived as mature and therefore unlikely to produce significant technological 
innovation.160   
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Debt Financing 
Debt financing is available in two forms, commercial bank loans and the issuance of bonds. The 
most common form of oil and gas financing is senior debt obtained from a bank, or a syndicate 
of banks, (see Figure 7 above) through a revolving credit facility or a term loan credit facility.  (A 
revolving credit facility is a line of credit for which the customer pays a commitment fee and is 
then allowed to borrow money from the lender up to the agreed limit.  It is usually used to fund 
ongoing operations; and the amount of the borrowing changes each month depending on the 
customer's current cash flow needs).  If the loan is made to provide an oil and gas producer with 
working capital or funds to develop existing oil and gas properties, a revolving credit facility is 
used.  However, if the loan is made for the purpose of purchasing oil and gas properties, a term 
loan facility is typically used.   
 
Banks usually secure the loans with a mortgage or deed of trust on the oil and gas properties that 
are being acquired or developed using the proceeds of the loan.  These mortgages or deeds of 
trust permit the bank to foreclose on the oil and gas properties in the event of a default by the 
borrower under the credit agreement.  If it becomes necessary for the bank to foreclose on the 
borrower, the bank can sell the oil and gas properties and recover part of the funds it loaned.161 
 
Most small and medium-sized firms in the oil and gas industry rely on commercial banks for 
short-term and medium-term loans to finance their operations, but the availability of long-term 
commercial bank loans and access to the bond market has historically been limited if these firms 
specialize exclusively in the exploration and production segment of the industry.  In that case, 
these firms must rely on public and private equity for capital.  In contrast, the super-majors 
(Chevron, ExxonMobil, ConocoPhillips, BP and Royal Dutch Shell) and other IOCs have 
continuous access to commercial bank loans and the bond market, because of their vertical 
integration; more diverse lines of business; diversity of their exploration and production projects; 
longer history of operation; and their overall size. 
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Multilateral Financing 
Commercial banks (loans) and investment banks (bonds) are the most common sources of debt 
financing however, there are other sources of debt financing that are particularly important to 
developing countries.  Multilateral lending organizations include the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF), International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), International 
Development Association (IDA), International Finance Corporation (IFC), Multilateral 
Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA), Energy Sector Management Assistance Program 
(ESMAP), Global Environment Facility (GEF) and the Carbon Finance Facility (CFF).   
 
The World Bank has separated the agencies under its control (Table 3) that lend to public 
enterprises (government and semi-government organizations) from those that lend to private 
enterprises (for-profit enterprises).  The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) and the International Development Agency (IDA) provide loans to public enterprises, 
and the International Financing Corporation (IFC) lends to private enterprises.  There are also 
regional banks that support investment in the energy industry.  These include the Inter-American 
Development Bank, the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the African 
Development Bank. 
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Table 3 - Multilateral Lending Organizations for the Oil and Natural Gas industry162 
 
International Bank 
Facilities 
 
Founded 
 
Primary Lending and Funding Activities 
 
International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) 
1944 Provides financial assistance to national governments to help them 
through serious periods of economic adjustment 
International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) 
1944 Also referred to as the World Bank, it was founded to reconstruct post-
War Europe, and now lends to 
governments worldwide to support economic and social development 
International Development 
Association (IDA) 
1960 Interest-free loans, credits to finance projects that reduce poverty 
International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) 
1956 Lends directly to private companies without governmental guarantees to 
promote private enterprise 
Multilateral Investment 
Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
1988 Provides investment guarantees (currency, war, expropriation, breach of 
contract) to private companies investing in developing countries 
Energy Sector Management 
Assistance Program 
(ESMAP) 
1974 Provides advice and analysis but not funds for shaping energy sector 
development and policy (a JV of the United Nations and World Bank) 
Global Environment Facility 
(GEF) 
1991 Provides grants for studies and projects involving national and regional 
environmental benefits 
Carbon Finance Facility 2004 Supports carbon reduction policies and programs in OECD 
and non-OECD countries which are aligned, using the World Bank 
Carbon Finance Unit (CFU) as structure and manager 
 
Regional Development Bank Facilities 
Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)   Asian Development Bank (ADB) 
African Development Bank (AIDB)   European Union (EU) 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) European Investment Bank (EIB) 
Nordic Finance Group   Islamic Development Bank 
OPEC Fund for International Development   Arab Fund for Economic & Social  
Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) Development 
 
Critics have argued that multilateral lending organizations are no longer necessary because of the 
depth and liquidity of the international financial markets.  They also argue that they are highly 
politicized in their lending policies.   Proponents of multilateral lending agencies argue that these 
institutions provide affordable capital for high value projects in high risk countries, projects that 
would not be financed at affordable interest rates by commercial banks.   
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6.7.2 – Financing Structures 
Centralized Finance System 
The centralized finance system is the most common form of financing and ownership structure. 
It relies on a combination of equity (stock) and debt (commercial bank loans and bonds).  In this 
approach, there is no separation of funds between general operations and the specific projects the 
company undertakes.  When done correctly, it combines a strong central credit rating with a 
sophisticated intercompany financing system (and the occasional use of project financing) and 
provides large oil companies with several competitive advantages.   These advantages include: 
low-cost debt and equity, efficient use of the company’s cash flow, global tax optimization, and 
facilitates remittance of its foreign affiliate’s cash.  
 
Figure 8 - Typical Centralized Finance System 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Adapted from Stephen Arbogast and Praveen Kumar, Financing Large Energy Projects, Chapter 13, in Betty 
J. Simkins and Russell E. Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and 
the Future of Energy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) 
 
However, financing a project entirely using one company’s financial resources is not always 
feasible or prudent, because an individual project may require more capital than one company 
can afford to risk on a single project.  In that case, another financing structure is needed to 
allocate the risk.  These structures include joint ventures and project finance. 
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Joint Ventures 
A joint venture (JV) is a financing arrangement in which two or more parties agree to pool their 
financial resources for the purpose of accomplishing a specific objective.  In a joint venture, both 
of the participants are responsible for the costs incurred and the profits and losses associated with 
it.  The joint venture is a separate legal entity from the parent companies that are funding the 
venture.  A separate operating agreement is prepared which specifies which company or 
companies are responsible for actual project development and operation.  By jointly funding the 
enterprise, two or more companies can share the risk associated with a specific project and 
achieve greater diversification of risk by investing in a larger number of projects. 
 
Project Finance 
IOCs are attracted to large projects, located in difficult environments for two principal reasons.  
First, large projects provide IOCs the opportunity to use their advanced technology and project 
management skills as a source of competitive advantage.  Second, most NOCs have exclusive 
access to drilling prospects in their country, particularly onshore.  Consequently, the IOCs are 
forced to operate large projects in difficult environments.   
 
Because of the large size and technical complexity of these projects, IOCs have often chosen to 
finance these projects using project financing.  In this type of financing structure, the project is 
financed primarily with commercial bank debt, usually 60% or more.  Project financing legally 
separates the project and it’s funding from the rest of the corporation or corporations that are 
sponsoring the project.  In a project finance arrangement the lenders rely solely on the assets and 
cash flow of the project for the repayment of principal and interest.  This is significantly different 
from the centralized corporate finance model, in which lenders rely on the cash flow and 
financial strength of the entire corporate enterprise for repayment of principal and interest. 
 
Many project finance arrangements in the petroleum industry are structured through a special 
purpose entity (SPE), an off-balance-sheet partnership set up by the company to separate the 
financial risk of the project from the rest of the corporation.  However, it was this type of off-
balance sheet financing structure that contributed to the collapse of Enron Corporation.  As a 
consequence, internal and external auditors (compliance institutions) are examining these SPEs 
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in more detail and asking for evidence that they serve some business purpose other than to keep 
debt off the parent company’s balance sheet.  
 
Debt levels of 60% or higher place a considerable burden on the cash flow from the project for 
the payment of principal and interest.  For the commercial bank or syndicate of banks that 
provide this capital to be comfortable with the risk they are assuming, the project financing 
agreement usually contains the following provisions.163   
 
 The project is established as a new legal entity, separate from the legal and financial 
responsibilities of its sponsors.  This creates a defined environment within which lenders 
(commercial banks) can evaluate the risks associated with a specific project and 
guarantees that the project's cash flow will be used exclusively to repay the principal and 
interest on the debt of that particular project.  Project financing also protects the sponsor’s 
other assets which are not a part of the project. 
 
 Projects should be long-lived and capital intensive; and they should have a unique 
purpose.  Oil and natural gas pipelines are particularly well suited to this type of 
financing.   
 
 The project should include cash flow from third-party commitments (customers) that are 
predictable and reliable.  This is usually accomplished through the establishment of 
commitments by third parties to “take or pay” for the output from the project.  These third 
party agreements are usually long term sales contracts that include price adjustment 
clauses based on inflation.   
 
 The project should have a finite life, at the end of which, all debt and equity will have 
been repaid.   
 
The use of project financing for high-risk infrastructure construction began with the development 
of the North Sea oil fields in the 1970s and 1980s.  Projects of this type and size were previously 
financed by issuing utility or government bonds; and within the framework of a centralized 
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finance system.  Examples of project finance include major LNG projects such as the Qatar Gas 
II project (2009), as well as many of the largest individual pipeline investments undertaken in the 
past three decades, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline (1977), Chad ­ Cameroon Pipeline (2003), 
and the Baku - Tbilisi - Ceyhan Pipeline (2005).  These projects often combine project financing 
and equity joint ventures.   For example, the Trans-Alaska Pipeline was a project finance joint 
venture between Standard Oil of Ohio, Atlantic Richfield, Exxon, British Petroleum, Mobil Oil, 
Phillips Petroleum, Union Oil, and Amerada Hess. 164  
 
Structured Project Financing 
Structured financing is a more refined approach to project financing.  Structured finance involves 
raising capital and managing risk through the issuance of securities designed to meet the specific 
risk and reward requirements of a particular type of investor.  Structured project finance 
combines specific securities and derivatives with standard project financing.165 
 
Structured project financing reduces the transaction costs created by information asymmetries, 
by limiting the risks a particular group of investors assumes to those that the investors feel 
comfortable evaluating.  (Information asymmetries exist when investors in a firm’s securities do 
not have the same information or the same level of understanding of the project’s risk as the 
firm’s managers, which, is usually the case.)  Structured project finance also helps the project 
sponsors and investors ensure that the various types of project risk are allocated to those 
participants most able and willing to bear them, which increases transaction efficiency and 
reduces the cost of capital.
166
 
 
Project finance structures can also solve remittance problems.  This is particularly relevant to oil 
and gas export projects located in countries with unpredictable monetary policy.   Loans for these 
ventures typically establish offshore accounts and cash waterfalls.  Offshore accounts refer to 
bank accounts set up in a secure banking center (e.g., New York or London) to which all export 
customers are instructed to direct their payments.  Cash waterfalls refer to written, irrevocable 
instructions to the bank describing how cash that has been received, is to be paid out to suppliers, 
short term creditors, long term creditors and others.  Payments are usually made to suppliers first, 
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then taxing authorities, short term lenders and long term lenders.  What matters for sponsors, 
however, is that the project’s revenues are kept in a hard currency and in a country with a stable 
monetary policy, reducing the risk of inconvertibility or devaluation.167  Figure 9 below shows a 
typical project finance structure. 
Figure 9 - Typical Project Finance Structure
 
Source: Christopher L. Culp and  Paul Forrester, Structured Financing Techniques in Oil and Gas Project Finance, 
Chapter 21, in Energy and Environmental Finance Law and Taxation: New Investment Techniques, editors Andrea S. 
Kramer and Peter C. Fusaro (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
 
This section examined financing sources and financing structures.  The next section examines the 
evolution of fiscal regimes and their effect on the distribution of risk.  
 
6.7.3 Fiscal Regimes 
There are three fiscal regimes for controlling assets and the distribution of revenue in the oil and 
natural gas exploration and production sector: (1) concession or lease agreement (sometimes 
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referred to as royalty/tax agreement); (2) a production sharing agreement or production sharing 
contract; and (3) a service contract.    When a host country proposes a fiscal regime it must 
balance two competing objectives.  First, if the host country wants to encourage investment by 
international oil and gas exploration companies (IOCs), it must provide sufficient incentives for 
oil companies to invest in the country and sufficient opportunity for the companies to recover 
their costs and earn an appropriate return on investment.  Second, the state must balance the 
interests of the oil companies with the interests of its own citizens and its export customers.168  
 
Overview of Fiscal Regimes 
Figure 10 below, summarizes the principal features of the three fiscal regimes mentioned above. 
Figure 10 
 
 
Source: Yi, Junseog, Merits and the Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts, 
https://www.google.com/#q=merits+and+demerits+of+the+different+types+of+petroleum+contracts 
                                                          
168
 Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance. 
Chapter 6 (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2011) page 217 
 
101 
 
Concession or Lease (Royalty/Tax Agreements) 
In a concession or lease agreement the IOC takes ownership of the hydrocarbons at the wellhead. 
(The wellhead is the component at the surface of an oil or gas well that provides the structural 
and pressure-controlling interface for the drilling and production equipment.)  The IOCs’ return 
on investment is obtained from producing and selling the oil and natural gas; and the state's 
financial returns are derived from royalty payments and taxes paid by the IOC.  Royalties are 
usually calculated as a percentage of the projects revenues and is a more stable source of revenue 
for the host government than revenue based on the project’s profit or loss.  For example income 
taxes or dividend distributions will only be paid if the project or projects are operating at a profit.  
Although the royalties paid to the host government will also vary with the price of oil, royalties 
will provide income to the state every quarter, whereas as revenue derived from taxing the net 
income of the IOC on that project will vary more and could be zero if the project is not profitable 
in a particular quarter.169 (See Figure A.3 in Appendix IV for an example of the revenue split.) 
 
Contractual Systems 
The unfavorable terms received by host governments in concession agreements (royalty/tax 
agreements) in the 1920s and 1930s led host governments and NOCs to develop so called 
“contractual systems”.  The two most commonly used contractual systems are the production 
sharing agreement (PSA) and the risk service contract.  In a contractual system the state retains 
ownership of the oil and gas beyond the wellhead.  The IOC only takes ownership of oil and gas 
allocated for recovery of exploration and development costs and allocated from the profit split of 
volumes for distribution and sale.170 
 
Production Sharing Agreements/Production Sharing Contract (PSA/PSC)  
Under the terms of a PSA, the IOC is completely responsible for the development of the oil and 
natural gas. This includes all aspects of extracting the oil and gas and delivering it to a location 
for transportation and sale.  In most PSAs, the state receives revenue from three primary sources:  
(1) royalties, (2) taxes, and (3) a share of the oil and gas produced.   
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When PSAs were first introduced in Indonesia in 1960, the IOCs were not enthusiastic.  The 
prospect of investing large amounts of capital in exploration, equipment, and development, but 
not holding title to the oil and natural gas was unsettling for most IOCs.  The introduction of 
PSAs was a major change to the structure of the industry and evidence that the bargaining 
strength of host governments was increasing and the bargaining strength of IOCs was decreasing.  
The resistance of the major oil companies to PSAs was overcome when several smaller 
independent companies without established concession agreements and operations in these oil 
producing countries, began signing PSAs to gain access to oil and natural gas prospects from 
which they had previously been shut out.171  (See Figure A.4 in Appendix IV for an example of 
the revenue split in a PSA, also called a PSC.) 
 
Pure Service and Risk Service Contracts 
In a pure service contract or risk service contract the IOC provides some or all of the financial 
capital for exploration and development and is paid by the host government according to a fixed 
price contract.  In a “pure” service contract the IOC’s or service company’s revenue is based on 
the activities it performs, similar to a fixed price construction contract.172  The Argentine 
Frondizi contracts of the late 1950s are examples of “pure” service contracts, named for 
Argentina’s President, at the time, Arturo Frondizi.  IOCs were required to drill a specific 
number of wells per year per exploration block and in exchange received a fixed dollar amount 
based on a variety of metrics, including meters drilled, wells completed, and ultimately the oil 
and gas produced per hour.  
 
Under a risk service contract, if the IOC finds oil or gas, the host country government allows the 
IOC to recover its costs by selling the oil and natural gas, however the IOC explores for oil and 
gas at its own risk and expense.173  If no oil or gas is found, the IOC bears the cost.  The choice 
of the fiscal regime (concession/lease, production sharing agreement, pure service contract or 
risk service contract) determines the allocation of risk and reward between the parties. 
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6.7.4 - Alliances 
IOC – NOC Alliances 
The relationship between an IOC and an NOC is usually determined on a project-by-project 
basis, consequently neither party has any assurance of a broader or longer-term relationship.  
Some industry analysts have suggested that the interests of IOCs and NOCs would be better 
served if they formed alliances that extended beyond a single project.174  They argue that NOCs 
and IOCs each have unique strengths and that they are complimentary.  NOCs are in a position to 
manage resource and production controls in a manner that the host government perceives to be in 
the national interest.  Furthermore, NOCs are the principal organizations in many developing 
countries for acquiring new technologies and transferring those technologies to other parts of the 
domestic economy.175  Technology transfers can come from a variety of sources, including from 
other countries’ NOCs and from oil field service companies, but technology transfers have most 
often come from the IOCs.176  In addition, the IOCs possess substantial technical expertise, 
project management skills, and the ability to define and develop new products and new 
markets.177  At the 12th Ministerial of the International Energy Forum, the same observations and 
recommendations were made.178  
 
The arguments for these long term alliances are not entirely convincing for several reasons.   
First, the benefits to be derived from combining the unique capabilities of the NOCs and IOCs 
can be realized whether they work together on a single project or several successive projects.  
Second, the typical oil or gas project extends over 10 to 30 years and therefore involves a long-
term relationship in itself.  Third, NOCs, IOCs and host governments have an incentive to 
diversify their investment risk among several partners rather than just one or two.  Fourth, there 
are historical and political obstacles to a closer and longer term relationship between NOCs and 
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IOCs, including the experience of colonialism, the one-sided nature of the first concession 
agreements, the potential for resource nationalism and the possibility of sudden political change 
in the host country.  These challenges exist even in a single project and are compounded if the 
alliance includes several projects with the same partner.   
 
NOC-NOC Alliances 
An alliance between two NOCs may be a more feasible alternative to an IOC-NOC alliance if 
“consorting” with an IOC is politically unacceptable in the host country.  An alliance between 
NOCs may also make sense in circumstances in which an IOC partner is either difficult to find, 
or the potential NOC partner is willing to agree to more favorable terms than the IOC.  However, 
in an NOC-NOC alliance, some of the advantages that exist in an NOC-IOC alliance are lost, for 
example, the technical know-how and project management skills of the IOC.  In addition, NOC-
NOC alliances may be impeded by current or future political differences between the two 
countries.   
  
6.8 Managing Commercial and Non-Commercial Risk (Question #8) 
Q8 
1. What are the general classes of risk, after a project has begun operation? 
2. What instruments are available for managing commercial risk? 
3. What instruments are available for managing non-commercial risk? 
 
H8 
(1) The general classes of financial risk, after a project has begun operation are commercial and 
non-commercial risk. 
(2) The instruments for managing commercial risk are liability insurance and reinsurance.   
(3) The instruments for managing non-commercial risk include derivatives, long term purchase 
agreements and political risk insurance. Oil and gas companies use derivatives and long term 
purchase agreements, but the oil and gas industry’s use of political risk insurance has not been 
significant.  
 
Commercial and Non-Commercial Risk 
After a project is in commercial operation, it still faces several commercial and non-commercial 
risks.  The commercial risks include: (1) a decrease in revenue as a result of an unexpected 
decline in product demand or an increase in aggregate product supply; (2) an unexpected 
increase in operating cost; (3) loss of revenue from business interruption or lack of business 
continuity; (4) property damage; (5) labor disputes and local labor management problems; and 
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(6) liability (workers' compensation, product liability, environmental liability and general 
liability).  In addition, oil and gas companies operating onshore or offshore the United States are 
required to demonstrate that they have sufficient financial resources to pay for damages and the 
cost of cleanup created by an oil spill.   
 
Non-Commercial risks can be divided into two broad categories (financial risk and political risk).  
The financial risks include changes in interest rates, exchange rates, commodity prices and 
inflation.  Political risk includes: (1) asset impairment (degradation, destruction, and 
expropriation); (2) political violence and war; (3) insecure property rights (contract frustration or 
abrogation, patent violations, wrongful calling of guarantees, host country failure to honor 
guarantees and changes in host country laws) and (4) currency inconvertibility and capital flow 
restrictions.  
 
Managing Commercial Risk 
The risk of a decrease in revenue as a result of an unexpected decrease in product demand or an 
increase in aggregate product supply; and (2) unexpected increases in operating costs are 
generally not insured against.  The oil and gas company’s management is responsible for 
anticipating and adapting to changing economic conditions.   Protection against loss of revenue 
from business interruption or lack of business continuity; labor disputes and local labor 
management problems and liability (workers' compensation, product liability, and environmental 
liability) are obtained through property and casualty insurance.   
 
The purpose and operation of property and casualty insurance is generally understood but the 
purpose and operation of reinsurance is not as well understood.  Reinsurance is the process by 
which an insurance company transfers a portion of its risk portfolio to other insurers by some 
form of legal agreement in order to reduce the risk that it bears for a specific project.  The effect 
of reinsurance is to spread the risk of completion, operation and maintenance of a project across 
several insurance companies.  In addition to re-insurance for traditional risks like liability, 
project completion, errors and omissions, and business interruption, re-insurers may also provide 
guaranties and sureties for contractors performance; provide financing guaranties and sureties for 
credit risk borne by the project (e.g., the risk of nonpayment from contractually committed 
purchasers of the oil and gas); and provide liquidity support to working capital.  
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Some of the larger private sector business property and casualty insurers include American 
International Group (AIG), the Chubb Group of Insurance Companies, and Travelers Group.  
Insurance companies providing property and casualty insurance to exploration and development 
companies drilling offshore include: Munich Reinsurance Co., Swiss Reinsurance Co. Ltd., 
Hannover Rueckversicherung AG, Chartis (a subsidiary of American International Group, Inc.), 
W. R. Berkley Corporation and Lancashire Group.  In response to the Deepwater Horizon 
accident major insurance and reinsurance firms have increased the premiums they charge to 
firms operating drilling rigs in shallow water by 15% to 25% and for firms operating drilling rigs 
in deep water, as much as 50%.179   
 
Mutual Companies 
In 1972, 16 oil companies formed Oil Insurance Limited (OIL).  OIL is a mutual insurance 
company that has 50 members, all oil and gas companies.  OIL only insures companies that meet 
its definition of an energy company.  The company’s All Risk Physical Damage insurance 
provides protection against damage to cargo, construction, terrorism, and windstorm.  Its Control 
of Well Liability insurance provides protection against perils associated with drilling, for 
example blow-outs.  Its 3
rd
 Party Pollutions Liability products insure against liability (including 
punitive damages) or contractual liability of members for personal/bodily injury, loss of or 
damage to property arising from a seepage, pollution or contamination incident.  (The company 
has a per project maximum of $300 million for All Risk Physical Damage, $300 million for 
Control of Well Liability, and $300 million for 3rd Party Pollution Liability.
180
 
 
Environmental Liability Insurance 
In the early 1960s, a specialty energy insurance market emerged to offer pollution liability 
coverage for third-party property claims and cleanup and contamination risks, oil well blowouts, 
and re-drilling.
181
  Insuring the liabilities of vessels was not made compulsory until the adoption 
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of the 1969 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC).
182
   At 
the same time, the offshore oil and gas insurance industry began offering insurance coverage for 
control of blowouts.  Insurers subsequently expanded coverage to include the costs of drilling in 
deeper water and the cost of re-drilling if a blowout occurred.   
 
In 1990, the United States, in response to the Exxon Valdez oil spill in Prince William Sound, 
passed the Oil Pollution and Control Act (OPA).  The OPA liability and compensation 
framework includes a combination of elements that distribute the costs of an oil spill between the 
responsible party or parties and a trust fund, which is largely financed through a per-barrel tax on 
domestic and imported oil in the United States.  Responsible parties are liable up to their liability 
caps which range from $75 million to $350 million depending on the nature of the spill; the Oil 
Spill Liability Trust Fund covers costs above the liability limits up to a per-incident cap of $1 
billion.  However, if the cost of the spill exceeds $1.350 billion, the liability above that amount 
lies with the party responsible for the accident (usually an IOC or one of its contractors).  In the 
case of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill the responsible party was primarily BP.
183
  The final 
report prepared by the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and 
Offshore Drilling highlighted a September 2010 announcement from the insurance company, 
Munich Re advertising environmental coverage in the $10 billion to $20 billion range.
184
 
However, this is the exception rather than the rule and there is no record of insurers underwriting 
policies of that size or oil companies being willing to pay the insurance premiums for coverage of 
that magnitude.  Consequently, most exploration and production companies are self-insured for 
environmental liability, for example, BP in the Deepwater Horizon accident.   
 
Managing Financial Risk 
Financial risks include changes in interest rates, currency exchange rates, commodity prices, and 
inflation rates.  Financial risks can be managed through a combination of derivatives and long 
term purchase agreements.  Derivatives include commodity futures, forward contracts, options, 
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and swaps.  Long term purchase agreements are usually negotiated prior to the development of 
an oil or gas field to secure a market for the future output from the field.   
 
Managing Political Risk 
Political risk includes: (1) asset impairment (degradation, destruction and expropriation); (2) 
currency inconvertibility and capital flow restrictions; (3) political violence and war; and (4) 
insecure property rights (contract frustration or abrogation, patent violations, wrongful calling of 
guarantees, host country failure to honor guarantees and changes in host country laws).  Political 
risk insurance (PRI) provides one means of recovery for companies whose foreign investment 
has been expropriated or whose financial interests have been damaged by a host government or 
its citizens.185  The first political risk insurance policies were issued by the United States after 
World War II to encourage private investment in Western Europe.   
 
Private sector insurers also offer political risk insurance coverage in developing and developed 
countries and for various durations.  Some of the larger private PRI issuers are Lloyd’s of 
London; Zurich Financial Services Group; Sovereign Risk Insurance Ltd.; American 
International Group, Inc. (AIG); and Chubb Corp.  In addition, the U.S. Overseas Private 
Investment Corporation (OPIC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) also 
provide political risk insurance.  Most government sector providers of PRI are national export 
credit agencies (ECAs), which insure short-term export credit/trade transactions.  Examples 
include the U.S. Export/Import Bank (U.S.), Export Development Canada (Canada), and Eksport 
Kredit Fonde (Denmark). 
 
Coverage Limits 
OPIC and MIGA offer maximum coverage limits of $250 million and $220 million, respectively. 
The limits offered by private insurers range from $85 million at AIG to $125 million at 
Sovereign Risk Insurance Limited.  However, political risk insurers often form consortiums to 
increase the total limits available to the policyholder and to diversify their own risk.186   
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Overseas Private Investment Corporation 
In 1971, the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), a wholly owned U.S. government 
corporation, was established to provide direct financing and political risk insurance for projects 
in developing countries.187 At the end of 2013, OPIC had a $18 billion portfolio of which 71% 
was related to financing (i.e. loans), 12% to political risk insurance, and 17% to investment funds 
(i.e. equity investments).
188  The “loan limit” is $250 million per project and the “house limit” 
for lending and insurance combined is $400 million.  OPIC provides protection against (1) war, 
civil strife, coups and other acts of politically-motivated violence; (2) terrorism; (3) 
expropriation, and (4) abrogation, repudiation and/or impairment of a contract or other improper 
host government interference.  Companies can purchase protection against whatever risks they 
choose, that is, the insurance menu is “a la carte”.  In addition, a company can purchase 
protection against “attenuated losses” or “trade related losses”, that is, losses created by a supply 
disruption between facilities on which its operations depend.  A senior official at OPIC noted 
that regulatory risk and other types of “partial takings” are becoming more common than outright 
expropriation and that this type of event is harder to put a dollar value on.
189
   
 
This OPIC official also said that OPIC considers the existence of a bilateral investment treaty 
between the host country government and the country of the investor to be very important in its 
decision to insure a project.  OPIC also places importance on a country’s signature and 
ratification of the New York Arbitration Convention (established in 1958) and a country’s 
membership in the ICSID 
 
Dispute Resolution Procedures and Awards 
The insurer usually waits until an international court or tribunal has rendered its decision and 
award, before it considers the plaintiff’s claim for compensation.  While the case is still in 
arbitration, however, the insurer will try to get the parties to reach an out of court settlement.  If 
the defendant pays the claimant after either the parties have agreed to a settlement or the court 
renders its decision and award, then the matter is ended.  If the defendant does not pay the 
claimant, then the insurance company pays the claimant and the insurance company then seeks 
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payment from the defendant.  A senior official at OPIC estimated that in the latter case OPIC 
recovers 95% of what it is owed by defendants.  This official estimated that the recovery rate in 
the private sector of the PRI industry is about 35%.  He explained the difference in recovery rates 
by noting that: (1) OPIC can use the full force of U.S. government departments and agencies 
(Department of State, Department of Commerce, Department of Justice) to enforce its claims for 
compensation from the host government.  (2) OPIC lends to and insures projects in countries 
where no lender or insurer in the private sector is willing to lend, so a defendant country is not 
likely to want to offend either OPIC or the United States government by refusing to pay what it 
owes.  If the country refuses to compensate OPIC, OPIC will most likely exit the country and not 
finance or insure any other projects in that country.
190
    
 
OPIC plays a dominant role in the political risk insurance market and its standard policy is 
publicly available.  For these reasons its expropriation coverage is used to illustrate the issues 
likely to arise for companies affected by nationalization and expropriation.  OPIC policies 
provide coverage for “total expropriation” and cover an act or series of acts by the host 
government that violate international law or materially breach local law and directly deprive the 
insured of fundamental rights in the insured investment.  However, the standard OPIC policy 
does not further define when an expropriation constitutes a violation of international law 
therefore OPIC applies general principles of international law (previously discussed).191  That is, 
an expropriation violates international law when it is not for a public purpose, is discriminatory, 
is not accomplished by due process and is not followed by just compensation. 
 
Use of Political Risk Insurance in the Oil and Gas Industry 
At the end of 2013, the total amount of political risk insurance in force, related to foreign direct 
investment (not trade) was $234.7 billion.
192
  The Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
(MIGA) accounted for $10.8 billion of that $234.7 billion and within the MIGA insurance 
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portfolio, the political risk insurance in force related to oil and gas investments was $918.4 
million or 8.5% of the $10.8 billion.
193
 (See Figure 11) 
 
Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency 
Figure 11 - Insurance Portfolio - Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) 
Outstanding investment guarantees portfolio, Total $10.8 billion 
(December 2012) 
 
If other political risk insurers (OPIC, etc.) insure in roughly the same proportions then the total 
PRI insurance in force in the oil and gas sector is approximately $20 billion ($234.7 billion x 
.085 = $19.95 billion).  In 2014, the estimated total value of all global oil and gas assets was 
$4.65 trillion.
194
  These figures indicate that the use of PRI insurance by the oil and gas industry 
is relatively small compared to the oil and gas assets in place.  This may be explained in part by 
the fact that many oil and gas assets are located in countries in which political risk is either 
insignificant or non-existent and in part by the fact that most oil companies choose to self-insure.  
 
A senior official at MIGA suggested that the amount of PRI in the oil and gas sector is small for 
the following reasons (1) international oil companies have their own captive insurance 
companies and therefore self-insure (2) Oil companies place high value and trust in the quality of 
the relationship they have with the host government’s leaders (3) infrastructure projects 
(electrical power generation plants, railroads, and dams) usually require more capital than all but 
the largest oil projects  (4) Developing countries usually need help with infrastructure projects 
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more often than with oil and gas projects and (5) foreign investors usually own only a small part 
of a given exploration block, thereby limiting their risk.
195
 
 
This same official observed that although the existence of a bilateral treaty between the parties is 
a consideration in deciding to insure a project, MIGA does not consider it critical, because 
MIGA will only insure projects in which the contract between the parties includes a provision for 
mediation and arbitration in the event of a dispute.  In addition, MIGA only insures projects in 
countries that are members of MIGA and all members of MIGA sign a “Legal Protection 
Agreement” which guarantees MIGA the same rights as the country’s best treated “most 
favored” partners. 
 
This official also noted that the basis of compensation varies depending on the nature of the loss.  
In the case of (1) expropriation, the compensation is based on net book value, (2) in the case of 
breach of contract MIGA requires mediation by a panel of three experts and if that fails then 
arbitration by an international court or tribunal (3) in the case of inconvertibility or transfer 
restrictions the amount of money is known, (4) in the case of property damage, the compensation 
is based on the cost of restoring the property to its prior condition.  MIGA deposits the money in 
an offshore account for the claimant and the claimant receives compensation in a currency that is 
convertible. 
  
6.9 Financial Reporting and Operational Transparency (Question #9)  
The theoretical literature summarized in Chapter 3 argued financial reporting and operational 
transparency can reduce risk and increase economic feasibility because they reduce information 
asymmetry, bounded rationality, monitoring costs, and transaction costs.  Financial reporting 
includes financial statements showing (1) revenue, expenses, net income, cash flow, assets, and 
liabilities; (2) the financial terms and conditions of specific transactions (purchase price, sales 
price, and due dates) and (3) legal disputes and potential liability.  Operational transparency 
includes disclosure of the countries in which a company operates, its choice of partners, 
environmental compliance, wells drilled, new discoveries, reserve depletion rates, and total oil 
and gas reserves.  This section addresses the following questions.   
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Q9 
(1) What is financial reporting quality and transparency? 
(2) Can financial reporting quality be measured and if so how? 
(3) Does financial reporting quality matter from a theoretical perspective? 
(4) Does financial reporting quality matter from a practical perspective? 
(5) Does the quality of financial reporting affect the amount of direct foreign investment in a 
country?  
(6) How are oil and gas reserves measured? How accurate are these measurements? 
(7) Does reserve reporting matter from a practical perspective? 
 
H9 
(1) Financial reporting quality can be defined. 
(2) Financial reporting quality can be measured.  
(3) The quality of financial reporting does matter from a theoretical perspective. 
(4) The quality of financial reporting does matter from a practical perspective. 
(5) Financial reporting quality does affect the direct foreign investment in a country. 
(6) Oil and gas reserves can be estimated but these estimates are frequently contested. 
(7) Reserve reporting does matter from a practical perspective.   
 
6.9.1 Financial Reporting Quality  
Financial reporting quality refers to the extent to which the financial statements of a firm 
provide accurate and complete information about the firm’s financial and economic 
performance.  Various measurement criteria have been developed to evaluate the quality of 
financial reporting.  Table 4 below provides a summary of the methods most often used in the 
literature.  They include: accrual models, value relevance models, research focusing on specific 
elements in the annual report, and methods that operationalize the qualitative characteristics of 
the information.196 
 
 
 
(THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK) 
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Table 4 – Methods Used for Measuring the Quality of Financial Reporting 
 
 
  
Source: Ferdy van Beest, Geert Braam and Suzanne Boelens, Quality of Financial Reporting: Measuring Qualitative 
Characteristics, NiCE Working Paper 09-108 April 2009, Nijmegen Center for Economics (NiCE) Institute for 
Management Research Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands  http://www.ru.nl/nice/workingpapers 
 
In theory, high quality financial reporting and operational transparency should increase the 
efficiency of markets by reducing transaction costs, monitoring costs and surrounding 
uncertainty; and reducing the costs of asymmetric information, thereby expanding the limits of 
bounded rationality, and limiting the adverse effects of opportunism.  Several empirical studies 
have concluded that higher quality financial reporting does increase market efficiency (Bushman 
and Smith, 2001; Healy and Palepu, 2001; Lambert, Leuz and Verecchia, 2007; Biddle and 
Hilary, 2006).197  Market efficiency can be defined in two ways.  (1) It can be defined in terms of 
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Accrual Models
Value Relevance 
Literature
Specific clements in 
Annual Report
Qualitative 
Characteristics
Method Examines the level of 
earnings management 
as a proxy for earnings 
quality
Examines the 
relationship between 
stock returns and 
earnings figures in 
order to measure the 
relevance and 
reliability of financial 
reporting information
Examines specific 
elements in the annual 
report in depth, by 
conducting an 
experiment.
Examines the level of 
decision usefulness of 
financial reporting 
information by 
operationalizing the 
qualitative 
characteristics
Advantages Relatively easy to 
colledct data in order to 
measure earnings 
management
Relatively easyto  
measure
Focus on financial 
reporting quality
Focus on financial 
reporting quality
Disadvanages Focus on earnings 
quality
Focus on earnings 
quality
Focus only on selected 
elements
In general difficult to 
operationalize, causing 
measurement 
difficulties
Indirect measure of 
financial reporting 
quality
Indirect measure of 
financial reporting 
quality
Difficult to measure
Difficult to estimate 
discretionary accruals
No insight is provided 
in the tradeoff between 
relevance and 
reliability
Authors e.g. Jones, 1999; Healy 
& Wahlen, 1999; 
Dechow et al., 1995
e.g. Barth et al., 2001; 
Choi et al., 1997; 
Nichols & Wahlen, 
2004; Nelson, 1996
e.g. Hirst et al., 
2004;Beretta & 
Bozzolan, 2004; 2004; 
Cohen et al., 2004
e.g. Schipper & Vincent, 
2003; Van der Meulen, 
et al., 2007; Barth et al., 
2006
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transaction costs, monitoring costs and surrounding uncertainty, that is, the lower these costs are 
for a given transaction the more efficient the market is said to be.  Market efficiency can also be 
defined it terms of the cost and consequences of asymmetric information, bounded rationality, 
and the adverse effects of opportunism.  Understood in these terms, the higher the rate of return 
to investors for a given level of risk and the lower the cost of capital to borrowers for given level 
of risk, the more efficient the market is said to be.   
 
The studies referenced above all evaluated market efficiency and the quality of financial 
reporting in the context of buying and selling of financial securities on an organized exchange.  
They did not relate market efficiency and the quality of financial reporting to foreign direct 
investment.  However, the largest part of investment in the upstream sector of the oil and gas 
industry is made in the form of domestic or foreign direct investment.  The question therefore 
arises, whether the quality of financial reporting in a country affects foreign direct investment 
inflows to that country in general and oil and gas exploration and development in particular.  To 
study this question data on the capital spending and exploration expenditures (CAPEX) made by 
oil and gas companies in each country are needed, but this information is considered proprietary 
by oil and gas companies and therefore not publicly disclosed.   
 
However, the World Bank does report the total foreign direct investment in each country based 
on figures provided by the member countries.  Figure 12 below, compares total foreign direct 
investment as reported by the World Bank and the quality of financial reporting calculated by 
Tang, Chen and Lin.
198
  Figure 12 suggests that there is no observable relationship between 
foreign direct investment inflows and the quality of the financial reporting in a country.  The 
absence of a relationship, however, could be attributable to the size of each country, that is, 
countries with larger economies might attract more foreign direct investment than countries with 
smaller economies, no matter what the quality of financial reporting in the country.  
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Figure 13 addresses this possibility by comparing the ratio of foreign direct investment inflows 
to GDP and the quality of financial reporting.   The results, however, are similar.  There is no 
observable relationship between the ratio of foreign direct investment inflows to GDP and the 
quality of financial reporting of public companies. 
 
 
 
These results are somewhat disturbing because they imply that higher quality financial reporting 
does not increase the amount of direct foreign investment as theory suggests and the empirical 
work on the market for publicly traded securities indicates.   
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There are at least two possible explanations for this result.  First, the quality of financial 
reporting by public companies, which is what the financial reporting index is based on, is not 
necessarily indicative of the quality of financial reporting related to foreign direct investment, 
because a contract between a foreign direct investor and a host country will always include a 
project accounting team comprised of personnel from the investor’s organization and the host 
country’s government or NOC.  In addition, the project is likely to be audited by external 
auditors.  In this environment, the project accounting team is likely to apply rigorous accounting 
methods to the project, no matter what the quality of financial reporting elsewhere in the country.  
Second, IOCs are compelled to invest in countries where oil and gas have been found or are 
likely to be found and are therefore forced to mitigate financial reporting risk in other ways, as 
noted above.   If the quality of financial reporting could be measured in the context of direct 
foreign investment  with the same accuracy as it has been measured in studies of the securities of 
public companies, there might an observable relationship between the quality of financial 
reporting and foreign direct investment.   
 
6.9.2 – Estimating and Valuing Reserves  
Estimating and valuing reserves is the most difficult reporting challenge, because future 
production can only be approximated given the technical, geologic and pricing uncertainty 
surrounding oil and natural gas.  The Society of Petroleum Engineers (SPE) and World 
Petroleum Council (WPC) jointly developed a reserve assessment methodology to address the 
technical uncertainty of estimating oil and gas reserves.  The methodology uses a system that 
classifies oil and gas reserves into three categories (1) prospective (undiscovered reserves), (2) 
contingent (sub-commercial reserves), and (3) commercial reserves.  This system includes both 
conventional and unconventional deposits (shale oil, shale gas and tar sands).  As oil prices rise 
and extraction technology improves, conventional and unconventional oil resources are 
reclassified from sub-commercial to commercial reserves.199 
 
Reporting Oil and Gas Reserves 
The first tier of reporting is performed by individual oil and gas companies (NOCs, IOCs and 
domestic oil companies).  A second tier of reporting is carried out by public information agencies 
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(the International Energy Agency, the U.S. Energy Information Administration, and the OPEC 
Secretariat) and private companies (BP and the Oil & Gas Journal).  Owen et al concluded that in 
some cases, these organizations acknowledge sources of reporting error, but in general they 
reproduce the data obtained from the first tier reporting organizations with only small 
adjustments to account for differences in oil grades.200  They suggested that second tier sources 
make more optimistic estimates than independent analysts, because the second tier reporting 
organizations do not question the estimates made by the first tier, possibly because they consider 
such questions politically sensitive and diplomatically offensive.201  In 2010, Owen et al 
concluded that that on average, conventional world proved oil reserves should have been revised 
down from 1,184 billion barrels and 1,241 billion barrels estimated by World Oil (WO) and the 
International Energy Agency (IEA) respectively, to approximately 903 billion barrels.202  This 
represents a 24% to 27% reduction in the estimate of conventional world proved reserves. 
However, a senior official at the Department of Energy believes that the International Energy 
Agency (IEA) and the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) make a diligent effort to 
evaluate first tier estimates and where necessary, reduce them.
203
  
 
In 2010, the Oil & Gas Journal (O&GJ) estimated that conventional and unconventional world 
proved oil reserves were 1,354 billion barrels.  Suggesting that in 2010, unconventional reserves 
accounted for 113 to 170 billion barrels of oil (1,354 – 1,241 and 1,354 – 1,184).  The decision to 
include unconventional reserves complicates the estimation of world proved oil reserves because 
unconventional reserves are more expensive to recover and are therefore more sensitive to 
changes in the world price of oil.  In addition, unconventional reserves are becoming an 
increasing percentage of total reserves.  For example, at the end of 2013, BP and the Oil & Gas 
Journal estimated world proved oil reserves (conventional and unconventional) at 1,687.9 billion 
barrels204 and 1,644.5 billion barrels205, respectively.  In 2011, U.S. Energy Information 
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Administration estimated that commercially recoverable shale and tight oil worldwide was 32 
billion barrels, but in 2013, the EIA estimated that recoverable shale/tight oil worldwide was 345 
billion barrels.206  This increase in recoverable shale/tight oil was in part the result of an increase 
in the average global price of oil from $79.50 per barrel in 2010 to $108.66 per barrel in 2013. 
The decrease in the spot price of crude oil (West Texas Intermediate) from $106 per barrel in 
June 2014 to $56 per barrel at the end of December 2014 will reduce that quantity of 
conventional and unconventional oil and gas that is economically recoverable in the short term 
and will complicate the problem of estimating and valuing reserves.   
 
Practical Relevance of Reserve Estimates 
In the short term, current oil inventories, that is oil above ground, is the most important 
determinant of current (spot) oil prices and the level of capital investment (CAPEX) expended in 
the search for new oil and gas reserves.  In the long term, however, estimates of proved and 
probable reserves below ground play the most important role in determining CAPEX and the 
supply and price of oil.  If the actual proved and probable reserves turn out to be less than those 
estimated, the current price of oil may be lower than is justified by long term supply and 
demand.  This problem could be made worse because it takes more time and more evidence to 
convince oil and gas company executives that an oil price increase will persist, than it does to 
convince them that an oil price decrease will persist.  That is, an increase in oil price does not 
stimulate exploration drilling in the short run, but a decrease in oil price will cause an almost 
instantaneous reduction in exploration expenditures.207  This could result in under-investment in 
exploration and development and could set the stage for another rapid increase in the price of oil 
when it is discovered that reserves are overstated and capital spending has been too low. 
 
6.10 Geopolitics and Global Governance (Question #10) 
The previous sections have focused on the interaction between individual organizations and 
institutions.  The first three questions in this section examine the interaction between 
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organizations and institutions acting together.  The last three questions examine some unique 
relationships between oil companies and host governments. 
Q10  
(1) How important are multilateral treaties in the oil and gas industry? 
(2) How important are international energy forums? 
(3) Who is responsible for the quality of financial reporting in the international environment? 
(4) How have signature bonuses affected NOCs, IOCs and host governments? 
(5) What is energy diplomacy and does it really matter? 
(6) Who is responsible for coordinating Foreign Direct Investment and National Security in the 
United States? 
 
H10 
(1) There are a relatively small number of multilateral investment treaties and no global 
investment treaties.   
(2) The impact of international energy forums has been limited in the oil and gas industry. 
(3) The International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Accounting 
Standards Board (FASB) are the dominant rulemaking bodies for financial reporting. 
(4) Signature bonuses have increased in size and create an obstacle to good national 
governance. 
(5) The successes of energy diplomacy have been limited. 
(6) There is a formal network of agencies and departments that are authorized to review foreign 
direct investment in the United States. 
 
6.10.1 Multilateral Treaties 
In 2010, Goldthau observed that during the previous twenty-five years, the political and 
economic mainstream promoted the liberalization of energy trading, for example, the World 
Trade Organization (WTO), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and bi-regional forums 
such as the EU-Gulf Cooperation Council and the EU-Russian Dialogue, but direct foreign 
investments in energy were still managed through  a “patchwork of national laws and bilateral 
treaties”.208  The Permanent Court of Arbitration only lists two multilateral investment treaties, 
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other 
States (1966) and the Energy Charter Treaty (1994).  There are still no internationally agreed 
upon set of rules for trading energy resources and energy investment.  The absence of an 
international agreement or even a substantial number of multilateral agreements is reflected in 
the small number of cases that have been brought before the ICSID and other tribunals, in which 
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the legal instrument being referenced was a multilateral treaty.  For example, of the 68 
investment cases related to oil and natural gas reported by UNCTAD, 51 were brought with 
reference to a bilateral investment treaty, 9 were brought with reference to the Energy Charter 
Treaty, 3 with reference to NAFTA, 2 with reference to a combination of a bilateral investment 
treaty and the Energy Charter Treaty.  In 3 cases, the legal instrument being referenced was 
either ambiguous or unknown.   
 
Does the absence of an international energy investment agreement or even a substantial number 
of multilateral agreements matter?  In section 6.2 it was noted that in 2012 and 2013, the total 
number of deals (lease/concession agreement, production sharing agreements, technical service 
contracts, joint ventures, acquisitions and divestitures) in the oil and gas industry, was 1,800 and 
1,400, respectively.209  However, only 3 cases were brought before a court or tribunal in 2012, 4 
in 2011, 5 in 2010, 2 in 2009 and 8 in 2008.  Therefore a relatively small number of transactions 
result in a dispute that must be adjudicated with reference to a bilateral treaty or multilateral 
treaty.  It was also noted that the outcome of an international court proceeding or tribunal is 
dependent on the standard of treatment applied by the court or tribunal and the definition of fair 
and equitable compensation.  Therefore, even if there was an international investment treaty or 
an extensive network of multilateral investment treaties, the problems of interpretation of 
specific provisions and standards of treatment would still exist. 
 
6.10.2 International Energy Forums 
The International Energy Forum (IEF)  
The International Energy Forum’s (IEF) mission is “to foster greater mutual understanding and 
awareness of common energy interests among its members”.210  The IEF has 76 member 
countries and all of them have signed the IEF Charter, which outlines a framework for “global 
energy dialogue through this inter-governmental arrangement”.211  The member countries of the 
IEF account for approximately 90% of world oil and natural gas supply and demand.  Its 
members include not only the consuming and producing countries of the IEA and OPEC, but also 
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countries outside of their memberships, including Argentina, China, India, Mexico, Oman, 
Russia and South Africa.  
 
The IEF met for the first time in Paris in 1991.  Its biennial Ministerial Meetings are the largest 
gathering of Energy Ministers in the world.  Through the Forum and its associated events, IEF 
Ministers, their officials, energy industry executives, and other experts exchange information 
regarding common energy interests and global energy security.  However, this inclusiveness has 
not guaranteed a successful and constructive dialogue.212   
 
For example, during a meeting of the (IEF) in London in 2008, it was suggested that planned 
capital expenditures be collected from international and national oil companies and published.  
However, persuading IOCs and NOCs to publish their planned capital expenditures ultimately 
proved to be impossible, because it demanded a high level of accuracy and required companies 
to disclose proprietary information about their current and future operations.
213
  Consequently, 
although transparency would have increased market efficiency and reduced risk, IOCs and 
NOCs still only report in the level of detail required in their home country.  Consequently, in 
the last twenty years, the main achievement of the IEF has been to raise awareness of the high 
level of energy interdependence among nations and the compilation and publication of historical 
data regarding production, consumption and capacity expansion, but not future investment 
spending (CAPEX).  Three of these IEF initiatives are discussed below. 
 
Joint Oil Data Initiative (JODI)214 
At the 7th IEF Ministerial in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia in 2000, six organizations: Asia-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC), Statistical Office of the European Union (Eurostat), 
International Energy Agency (IEA), Latin American Energy Organization 
(OLADE), Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and United Nations 
Statistical Division (UNSD) collaborated in the development of the Joint Oil Data Exercise. 
The Joint Oil Data Exercise was subsequently renamed the Joint Oil Data Initiative and was 
established as a permanent organization of the IEF.  In January 2005, following the endorsement 
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by Energy Ministers, the IEF secretariat assumed responsibility for coordinating the Joint Oil 
Data Initiative.  The Initiative's oil database (JODI Oil) provides comprehensive statistics on 
global oil production and consumption on a monthly basis.  
 
In November 2005, the JODI partners published the JODI Oil World Database 
(www.jodidata.org), a first step to improved transparency in the oil and gas markets.  The 
successful establishment of the oil data database subsequently led to an initiative to develop a 
natural gas database (JODI Gas) and annual data on upstream and downstream capacity and 
expansion plans (JODI Investment).   
 
6.10.3 Financial Reporting  
The institutions responsible for financial reporting include the International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB), the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB), the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) and its counterparts in Europe and Asia.  Beginning in the 1990s, 
the most significant developments in financial reporting have been (1) a convergence between 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) developed and updated by the IASB and 
the U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) developed and updated by the 
FASB; and (2) the increasing adoption of IFRS worldwide.  The influence of the IASB 
dominates other international institutions engaged in international accounting issues, such as the 
OECD Working Group on Accounting Standards, the UN Intergovernmental Working Group of 
Experts on International Standards of Accounting and Reporting and the European Union’s 
Accounting Advisory Forum.
215
   
 
The ascendance of IFRS since the 1990s has had a significant impact on financial reporting, 
capital markets, companies listed on public exchanges and investors.  These companies are able 
to raise financial capital in other countries without having to first restate their financial results 
using that country’s accounting standards.   In addition, investors have access to financial data 
that is more consistent and comparable.  In 2005, approximately 15,000 companies listed on 
exchanges around the world were preparing and presenting their financial results in compliance 
with the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) and at the same time, the differences 
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between IFRS, U.S. GAAP and Japanese GAAP were also diminishing. The convergence of the 
IFRS standards, U.S. GAAP and Japanese GAAP since 1990, is an example of how 
organizations, in this case investors, oil companies and financial organizations operating through 
the institutions of the IASB, FASB and SEC have reshaped the institutional environment to 
increase the efficiency of financial reporting and capital allocation.  
  
6.10.4 Signature Bonuses 
Signature bonuses are a part of the bid made by IOCs for the rights to explore and develop a 
particular block or blocks in the host country’s territory.   These payments are made by the IOC 
to the host government immediately or shortly after, a contract is signed.  As the price of crude 
oil has increased, the amount of these bonuses has also increased.  In the beginning, signature 
bonuses were between $1 million and $10 million per bid, however, recent exploration and 
development agreements have included signature bonuses exceeding $100 million.216  The size 
of these signature bonuses and the occasional diversion of these payments by government 
officials to personal bank accounts have produced an ongoing controversy about their impact on 
host country governance. 
 
For example, in July 2000, Marathon Oil made a signature bonus payment of $13.7 million to 
Sonangol, the national oil company of Angola.  It was the first in a series of three payments for 
the rights to develop a block offshore Angola.217  The payment was made to a bank in Jersey, one 
of the Channel Islands offshore the United Kingdom.  (Jersey laws permit a high level of bank 
secrecy and zero tax rates on income from foreign sources.)  Subsequently, several news stories 
reported that the funds were rewired within a matter of hours to other Sonangol accounts around 
the world.  Some of these were later proven to be the personal accounts of the Angolan president, 
Angolan government ministers and other government officials.218 
 
                                                          
216
 Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance. 
(Tulsa, OK: PenWell Corporation, 2011) p. 228 
217
 David Leigh, “Angolan Oil Millions Paid Into Jersey Accounts,” The Guardian, November 4, 2002; Henrie E. 
Cauvin, "l. M. F. Skewers Corruption in Angola,” New York Times, November 30, 2002; Justin Pearce, "IMF: Angola's 
'missing millions': The sum is three times the amount paid in aid,” BBC,  Friday October  18, 2002; “Angola  battles 
with  IMF accusation  of corruption” Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections, News and Trends Africa, Vol. 7, Issue 
#22, November 13, 2002. 
218
 Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance. 
(Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2011) p. 229 
125 
 
Alleged corruption in other countries, similar to the kind reported in Angola, led to demands by 
several international organizations for transparency in the payments made by IOCs to national 
governments.  In February 2001, in response to these demands, BP announced that it would 
begin publishing an annual statement of payments made to Sonangol.   BP had paid $111 million 
for the development rights to Angola's Block 31.219  Sonangol’s Chief Executive Officer, Manuel 
Vicente, responded with a letter to BP's Chief Executive Officer and Chairman, John Browne, 
stating that Sonangol considered BP to be "violating the conditions of legal contracts signed 
with Sonangol . . . and if confirmed, is  a sufficient reason to apply measures established in Article 
40 of the PSA [production sharing agreement] i.e., contract termination”.  220   Since that incident, 
no other major international oil company has reported financial payments made in the form of 
signature bonuses.  They have chosen instead, to conform to the host country’s demand for 
confidentiality, in order to preserve their relationship with the host government, avoid contract 
termination and maintain access to exploration blocks in future rounds of bidding. 
 
However, the lack of transparency associated with these cash payments to governments and 
NOCs is considered to be a major cause of corruption in many oil producing countries.221  To 
address this problem a public interest group, Publish What You Pay U.S. (PWYP) was formed in 
2004 to advocate for greater disclosure of payments made by IOCs to host governments, 
however, the success of this campaign has been limited for the reasons cited above.   
 
6.10.5 Energy Diplomacy 
Energy diplomacy can be defined as the use of foreign policy to secure access to energy supplies 
abroad and promote government to government cooperation in the energy sector.222  Energy 
diplomacy is motivated by the belief that importing and exporting countries can enhance the 
security of supply; and improve and protect the competitive position of other sectors of their 
economy, by giving their domestic oil and gas companies a competitive advantage in buying and 
selling oil and natural gas.   
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For example, the Chinese government, through its state-owned banks and sovereign wealth fund, 
has been particularly aggressive in its lending to developing countries in Africa and Latin 
America.  China has provided economic development assistance to these countries in exchange 
for access to natural resources.  Countries that do not have credit ratings of sufficient quality to 
borrow from international commercial banks have gained access to capital by pledging proved 
oil and natural gas reserves in their country as collateral, in exchange for loans needed to develop 
their oil and gas resources and to fund public infrastructure projects.  These agreements are 
frequently referred to as “loans for oil agreements”.   
 
Russia has until recently, relied more on subsidies, price incentives, preferential relationships 
with the states of the former Soviet Union, and occasional military cooperation or intimidation.  
This system of barter was tried in Ukraine (in-kind gas payments in exchange for political 
allegiance to Russia), and Belarus (transit and political allegiance) for oil and gas.223  In 2014, 
Russia began reducing subsidies and instead agreed to provide oil and gas under long term 
supply agreements in exchange for the loans it needs to build pipeline and transport 
infrastructure and acquire entry into the downstream markets of other countries, particularly in 
Central and East Asia (Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and China). 
 
Loans for Oil Agreements 
Pipeline projects are particularly well suited to loans for oil deals because pipelines do not have 
alternative uses, thereby reducing the risk that either party will abrogate the contract.  See for 
example the loans for oil and gas agreements between China and Russia, and China and 
Kazakhstan (Appendix VII).   In addition, in a loan for oil deal, the resource owner retains 
ownership of the oil and natural gas, precluding the risk of expropriation. 
 
Some analysts have dismissed loans for oil deals for not delivering what they promised.  For 
example, despite its aggressive use of loans for oil, the share of equity oil (the amount of crude 
oil produced by China’s foreign oil assets remains relatively small.  Equity oil accounts for only 
12% of China’s oil consumption and only 1% of global oil production.224  Other analysts have 
drawn similar conclusions, but for a different reason.  They claim that China has received 
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relatively little in the form of engineering and construction contracts from the countries to which 
it has loaned money and in some cases has received less oil and natural gas than was agreed, 
particularly from Venezuela. 225 226 
 
Energy diplomacy in the form of loans for oil have also been criticized from the perspective of 
the borrowing country, because they frequently require that 60% to 70% of the funds advanced 
by the Chinese government be spent on projects constructed by Chinese engineering and 
construction companies, which may ultimately prove to be “white elephants”, that is, an asset 
which when completed, the state cannot dispose of, but the operating and maintenance costs 
exceed its actual use or value.  In addition, it has been alleged that too little is being spent on 
developing the technical competencies of the local workforce that will be needed to operate and 
maintain these facilities after they are completed, including those that are for oil and gas 
production.227   
 
Furthermore, they note that the market for oil is global and “liquid” and argue that these 
characteristics limit the value of energy diplomacy.  For example, they argue that an increase or 
decrease in the global supply of oil will immediately translate into a change in the price of oil 
worldwide for all oil consuming countries.  Consequently, it does not matter who gets the crude 
out of the ground (China, United States or Venezuela) but how much oil is available 
worldwide.228  They also argue that energy diplomacy aimed at foreign suppliers makes no 
difference to producing countries, provided the crude oil they produce reaches the global market 
somehow.229  However, this microeconomic analysis gives little, if any weight, to the fact that 
energy diplomacy involves more than simply establishing a diplomatic relationship between an 
oil exporting country and an oil importing country.  Energy diplomacy frequently leads to legally 
binding contracts that include specific price provisions that may lock in a below-market oil or 
gas price and a dedicated source of supply for years.  These benefits are directly related to the 
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issues of organizational arrangements, gained control, asset specificity, strategic behavior, 
contractual safeguards, surrounding uncertainty and bargaining strength. 
 
In addition, the market for natural gas is still a regional market, because most natural gas is 
delivered by pipeline rather than by LNG tanker.  Even the neo-classical economists would 
acknowledge that in a regional market, energy diplomacy can be effective, because a natural gas 
pipeline connects the exporting country’s gas fields and the importing country’s markets, and 
after it is built there are no efficient alternatives to this relationship. 
  
6.10.6 Foreign Direct Investment and National Security 
The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) is an inter-agency 
committee “authorized to review transactions that could result in control of a U.S. business by a 
foreign person (‘covered transactions’) in order to determine the effect of such transactions on 
the national security of the United States”.230 
 
CFIUS was involved in the China National Offshore Oil Company’s (CNOOC) proposed 
acquisition of Unocal.  Although this acquisition was not opposed by CFIUS and the Bush 
Administration, it was criticized by several members of Congress and after a vote in the United 
States House of Representatives the bid was referred to the President on the grounds that its 
implications for national security needed to be reviewed.  While this review was still in progress, 
Unocal was acquired by Chevron. 
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Chapter 7 Case Studies 
This chapter presents six case studies.  They include the Frade Oil Field offshore Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil; the Gorgon Natural Gas project in the Indian Ocean off the northwest coast of Australia; 
the BTC Oil Pipeline through Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey; the DeepWater Horizon Oil 
Drilling Rig in the Gulf of Mexico; Expropriation of Oil and Gas Assets in Venezuela and a brief 
digression on events in Argentina; and the TNK-BP Joint Venture Oil Venture in Russia.  These 
cases were chosen because of their size and complexity and because together they illustrate the 
wide range of political risks that can be encountered during oil and gas exploration projects.  The 
events in each case study are presented in chronological order.  At the end of each case there is 
an analysis of those events as they relate to the theory presented in Chapter 3 and the findings 
presented in Chapter 6.  The cases are analyzed using an explanation building approach. 
 
7.1 Case 1 - The Frade Field 
The Frade oil field is located in the Northern Campos Basin, approximately 370 kilometers 
offshore Rio de Janeiro, Brazil at a water depth of 1,100 meters (3,609 feet).  The field was 
discovered in 1986.  The project is a joint venture in which Chevron is the project operator 
holding a 51.7% interest.  Petroleo di Brasiliero (Petrobras) has a 30% interest and Frade Japao 
Petroleo Limitada (FJPL), a Japanese consortium has an 18.3% interest.   
 
Conceptual engineering studies and the acquisition of 3-D seismic data were completed in 2000 
by Texaco.231  In June 2008, the process of installing subsea pumps and valves on the seafloor 
began.  There were several delays related to the drilling rig and the floating, production, storage 
and offloading vessel (FPSO).232  Recoverable reserves are estimated at 200 to 300 million 
barrels of oil.  The cost of developing the field was estimated at $2.8 billion.233  Oil production 
began on June 20, 2009.  The project was expected to achieve peak production of 90,000 barrels 
per day of crude oil and petroleum gas liquids in 2011.234  This project is included because of its 
size and because it demonstrates the operation of a legal system that is not entirely impartial. 
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Timeline 
11/07/2011 - Oil began to seep from cracks in the seabed above the field after a drilling accident 
in November 2011.235 
 
11/09/2011 - The wellhead was tightly sealed and the leak was stopped in four days.  About 18 
vessels were deployed to support the oil sheen remediation and the activities necessary for well 
abandonment.  The total oil spilled was estimated at 2,700 to 3,600 barrels.236 
 
11/20/2011- Development-drilling operations in the field remained suspended.  Production from 
the field was maintained at approximately 79,000 barrels of oil equivalent per day.237 
 
11/22/2011 – The Brazilian government imposed a $28 million fine on Chevron for causing an 
offshore oil spill.
238
  The ANP (Brazilian National Petroleum Agency) cited Chevron for 25 
infractions related to the spill.  Chevron agreed to pay the agency more than $17 million in fines.  
Drill-rig operator Transocean was cleared of any liability.
239
 
 
11/25/2011.  Brazilian prosecutors sought 20 billion reals (US $10.9 billion) in damages from 
Chevron and offshore drilling contractor Transocean Ltd for the 3,600 barrel leak in the Frade 
field.
240
 
 
12/02/2011 - Chevron Brazil Upstream Frade, a subsidiary of Chevron Corp., was ordered by 
Brazil's National Petroleum Agency (ANP) to shut in one of its 11 production wells and four 
“produced water” injection wells at Chevron’s offshore Frade Floating Production Storage and 
Offloading (FPSO) facility.  The production wells cited by the ANP accounted for less than 10 
percent of Frade's total production of about 79,000 barrels per day.
241
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The possible existence of a hydrogen sulfide (H2S) gas leak was the basis for ANP requesting the 
wells be closed temporarily.  Chevron said that it respected the decisions of the ANP and would 
respond appropriately to the agency's requests for additional information.  Chevron also said it 
would continue to keep the Brazilian agencies fully informed and work with them to address 
their specific concerns regarding Chevron’s activities in Brazil.  Chevron informed the ANP that 
it had conducted regular monitoring of the hydrogen sulfide leak and had safety systems and 
processes in place to ensure the safety of employees, contractors and operations at all times.  
Chevron said it was confident it would successfully respond to the ANP's concerns and be able 
to resume operation of its production and injection wells.
242
  
 
2/3/2012 – Chevron cemented a well to stop the oil and gas seep through the fissures as a first 
step toward the capping and abandonment of the appraisal well.
243
 
 
03/03/2012 - Chevron identified a new small seep in another part of the Frade field.  Chevron 
notified the Brazilian authorities and immediately placed containment devices on the source.  
The total volume of this intermittent seep was approximately one barrel of oil.  Chevron and its 
partners temporarily suspended production at the field as a precautionary measure while Chevron 
conducted a comprehensive technical analysis of the cause of this new seep and additional 
studies on the geological structure of the field.
244
 
 
03/15/2012 – Chevron’s subsidiary Chevron Brasil Upstream Frade Limitada requested 
authorization to temporarily suspend production operations at the Frade Field because of the 
new seep and subsidence in the area.  The company said it would conduct a comprehensive 
technical study and prepare a complementary study to better understand the geological features 
of the area, by working with their partners and seeking necessary approvals from the National 
Petroleum Agency (ANP).  The decision was endorsed by Chevron's partners.  The company 
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filed its request with the appropriate regulatory agencies and anticipated a response fairly 
quickly. 
245
  
 
04/04/2012 - A Brazilian federal prosecutor initiated a second 20 billion real ($10.9 billion) 
lawsuit against Chevron and driller Transocean, doubling the claim against the companies even 
though critics assailed the prosecutor as overzealous.
246
  Both companies also faced criminal and 
civil lawsuits related to the spill.  The criminal lawsuit was dismissed, but federal prosecutors 
appealed that decision.  The two civil lawsuits sought approximately $21.8 billion in damages.  
In response, Chevron offered to pay approximately $150 million to settle the case.
247
  
 
08/6/2012 - Chevron appealed against an injunction banning it and its drilling contractor 
Transocean Ltd from operating in Brazil while civil and criminal charges over the oil spills were 
being adjudicated.
248
 
 
08/29/2012 - An injunction banning Chevron and Transocean from operating in Brazil was 
upheld by a panel of three Brazilian federal judges, while charges related to the November 2011 
oil spill were being considered by the Brazilian court.
249
 
 
02/20/2013 - A Brazilian judge dismissed criminal charges against Chevron Corp., Transocean 
Ltd and 17 of their employees related to the offshore oil spill.
250
 
 
04/08/2013 - Chevron Corp was authorized to restart production at the Frade field for a period of 
12 months.  Output from an additional two wells was also approved, but only for two months.
251
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04/15/2013 - Final documents allowing a restart of production were issued.
252
 
 
04/30/2013 - Chevron was in the final stages of obtaining authorization from local oil regulators 
and was expected to begin production soon.
253
 
 
10/01/2013 - A Brazilian federal judge dismissed the two lawsuits totaling $21.8 billion against 
Chevron and approved a negotiated settlement for an undisclosed amount, a decision that closed 
a two-year legal battle over the oil spill in the Frade Field.
254
  
 
04/01/2014 - The Brazilian National Petroleum Agency (ANP) authorized Chevron to resume 
full production at the Frade field.
255
 
 
Case Analysis 
Brazil was heavily criticized for the over-zealous manner in which regulators and prosecutors 
pursued Chevron for what was regarded in the industry as a minor accident.  Estimates were that 
2,400 to 3,600 barrels of crude oil leaked into the Atlantic Ocean.
256
  (The consensus estimate of 
the oil spill in Prince William Sound in 1989 when the Exxon Valdez ran aground is 260,000 
barrels 
257
 and the U.S. Government has estimated the oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 
when BP’s Deepwater Horizon drilling platform caught fire and sank, at 4.9 million barrels of 
oil.
258
   
 
Although, Chevron and its partners were the targets of a $21.8 billion lawsuit and criminal 
charges for a relatively small oil spill, the criminal charges were ultimately dismissed by a 
Brazilian federal judge and the civil charges were settled for an undisclosed amount.  The 
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excessive charges originally brought against Chevron and its partners suggests that some 
prosecutors in Brazil were driven more by political considerations than legal or substantive 
considerations.  This may explain in part why the Rule of Law in Brazil is rated just 51.7 on a 
scale from 0 to 100.  
  
In this case, however, the Brazilian federal judge’s decision was enough to make it unnecessary 
for Chevron to take the case before an international court or tribunal, suggesting that a country’s 
legal system does not need to work perfectly, but only well enough to compensate for 
deficiencies in other parts of the country’s legal system. 
 
Second, Chevron’s decision to pay in excess of $150 million to settle the case rather than keep 
production shutdown after the panel of three federal judges upheld an injunction banning 
Chevron and Transocean from operating in Brazil, demonstrates the bargaining leverage that 
national governments and their agencies acquire after the sunk costs in exploratory drilling, 
development and production equipment have been made.  
 
Third, the defendants Chevron and Transocean, did not bring the dispute with the Brazilian 
regulatory agencies or the prosecutor before an international court or tribunal, but instead chose 
to seek a solution in the Brazilian courts and ultimately agreed to a settlement.  The reluctance to 
resort to an international court or tribunal, except in those cases in which the investor believes he 
is unlikely to receive an impartial hearing in a domestic court, is also evident in the DeepWater 
Horizon case (Case #4).  This supports the observation that oil and gas companies try to avoid 
bringing a case before an international court or tribunal, if possible. 
 
Fourth, there is no evidence that the United States government tried to intervene on Chevron’s 
behalf, at least no evidence that made its way into the public record, supporting Lipson’s 
observation that national governments seldom intervene in investment disputes on behalf of their 
citizens.  This appears to also be true of Venezuela’s expropriation of Conoco Philips’ and 
ExxonMobil’s assets in Venezuela (Case #5).  There is also no evidence that the British 
government intervened on behalf of BP in the dispute between TNK-BP and the Russian 
regulatory authorities (Case #6) or on behalf of BP regarding its environmental liability in the 
135 
 
DeepWater Horizon oil spill (Case #4). The Gorgon Field (Case #2) and the BTC Pipeline (Case 
#3) did not involve a dispute with any national government. 
 
7.2 Case 2 – The Gorgon Field 
The Gorgon project, in the Indian Ocean off the northwest coast of Australia was once 
considered stranded gas (not recoverable) but is now part of one of the most complex and 
expensive LNG projects in the world.
259
  The Gorgon project is a joint venture between Chevron 
(47%, project operator), ExxonMobil (25%), Shell (25%), Osaka Gas (1.25%), Tokyo Gas (1%) 
and Chubu Electric Power (0.417%)  When the project began in 2009, the cost was estimated at 
43 billion Australian dollars, (37 billion U.S. dollars; 3.4 trillion Japanese yen).  The field is 
estimated to contain more than 13.8 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (the equivalent of 2.25 
billion barrels of oil) and is expected to have a production life of approximately 40 years.
260
  This 
case is included because of the size of the project, the magnitude of the cost overruns, and 
because it illustrates the economic consequences of unanticipated economic events.   
 
Timeline 
04/24/2009 - Chevron requested approval from Australian authorities to expand its Gorgon LNG 
production capacity to 15 million metric tons per year to compensate for rising development and 
production costs.
261
 
 
04/30/2009 - The Western Australian EPA approved Chevron’s request for authorization to add a 
third, 5 million metric-tons-per-year LNG train (unit) to the original two-train proposal already 
approved for Barrow Island.  Chevron continued to assess the geologic and environmental 
conditions as it worked toward a final investment decision in the second half of 2009.
262
  
 
08/10/2009 - Environment Minister, Donna Faragher, gave final environmental approval for the 
proposed Gorgon gas field development on Barrow Island, but this approval also imposed new 
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environmental conditions requiring higher levels of protection for regionally significant coral 
reefs and flat-back marine turtles.
263
  
 
09/01/2009 – Minister of Mines and Petroleum, Norman Moore, offered the Gorgon joint 
venture partners, production licenses for its biggest natural gas fields.
264
  
 
09/14/2009 - Development proposals for the project were approved by the Premier of Western 
Australian State, Colin Barnett, and production licenses were granted by the Australian Minister 
for Resources and Energy, Martin Ferguson.
265
  
 
12/01/2009 - The construction of a three-train (unit) 15 million metric ton per year LNG facility 
for the Gorgon LNG Project began.
266
 
 
12/14/2009 - Chevron made another natural gas discovery in the Carnarvon Basin offshore 
Western Australia with its Satyr-1 well.
267
  
 
01/26/2010 - A third gas discovery was made in the Greater Gorgon Area in the Carnarvon Basin 
offshore Western Australia.
268
 
 
02/09/2011 - Chevron made an additional discovery in the Orthrus-2 well located in the WA-24-
R permit area in the Carnarvon Basin offshore Western Australia.
269
 
 
01/19/2012 – Chevron appraised the Satyr-3 well in the Exmouth Plateau area of the Carnarvon 
Basin, offshore Western Australia and concluded that it was commercially viable.
270
  
 
07/23/2012 - Chevron made a natural gas discovery in the Greater Gorgon area of the Carnarvon 
Basin, offshore Western Australia.
271
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09/2012 - Chevron continued a successful run in the Greater Gorgon area offshore Western 
Australia with the announcement of positive results from the Satyr-2 exploration well.
272
  
 
10/2012 - Australian energy minister, Martin Ferguson, said the carbon dioxide (CO2) capture 
and sequestration project related to Chevron’s Gorgon LNG project was on schedule and would 
begin injection of CO2 in 2015.  (The world’s largest carbon capture and sequestration project 
was designed to inject 3.5 million tons of carbon dioxide per year at a depth of about 2,300 
meters below Barrow Island off Western Australia.)
273
  
12/06/2012 - Chevron increased the estimated cost of the Gorgon project by $15 billion U.S., 
bringing the total cost of the project to $52 billion U.S.  Chevron attributed the cost increase 
primarily to labor shortages, logistics challenges and the strength of the Australian dollar.  
Despite the increase in the project’s cost, Chevron said that the increase in the price of crude oil 
would still make the project profitable, because LNG (liquefied natural gas) prices usually move 
in tandem with the price oil, which Chevron estimated had increased by 80 percent between 
December 2009 and December 2012.  However, the increased cost of the project was expected to 
significantly reduce its profitability.  Some analysts estimated that if the price of Brent crude 
dropped below $80 per barrel (U.S), the project would not be competitive with other energy 
sources and therefore be unprofitable.
274
  (The spot price of Brent crude was $112.60, $109.66 
and $90.65 per barrel during the first week of October 2012, 2013 and 2014, respectively.) 
12/12/2013 - Chevron announced that the cost of the Gorgon LNG project increased a second time, 
from $52 billion U.S. to $54 billion U.S., bringing the total cost increases to $17 billion.  
Chevron said that cost overruns and delays were the result of the high value of the Australian 
dollar, high Australian wages, low productivity, weather delays and the logistical challenges of 
building an LNG plant on Barrow Island (a Class A nature reserve).  The secretary of the 
Western Australia Maritime Union of Australia (WAMUA), Christy Cain, claimed that “red 
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tape” and waste were the reasons the cost of the project had increased.  The Maritime Union also 
disputed Chevron's claims of low productivity among workers on the project and said workers 
were being unfairly blamed for the cost overruns.  The Australian Mines and Metals Association 
(AMMA, a resources industry group) claimed that high wages in Australia were a major factor 
contributing to the cost over-runs.
275
 
02/2014 - Former Labor Resources Minister and former union leader, Martin Ferguson, blamed 
the WAMUA (Western Australia Maritime Union of Australia) for the cost overruns and delays 
to the Gorgon project.
276
  The WAMUA responded that the Australian Mines and Metals 
Association (AMMA) was unfairly blaming the WAMUA for problems on the Gorgon project, 
because the union had sought to negotiate a new Enterprise Bargaining Agreement for maritime 
workers working in the offshore oil and gas industry.  WAMUA secretary, Christy Cain, said 
maritime workers were being used as scapegoats by Chevron Australia.
277
 
 
03/12/2014 - The Associated Press and the Dow Jones Newswire reported that the Gorgon 
project was 78% complete and that two thirds of gas production was already committed to 
buyers.  However, the start-up date for “first gas production” was revised from the middle of 
2014 to the middle of 2015.
278
  
 
08/01/2014 – Chevron reported that the Gorgon Project was 83% complete and that “first gas 
production” was still expected in the middle of 2015.279  
08/25/2014 – Reuters reported that Chevron was finding it difficult to lock-in 20-year sales 
contracts for its Gorgon liquefied natural gas (LNG) export plant in Australia and commented 
that the high level of unsold LNG expected from the Gorgon field demonstrated that the shale 
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gas “boom” in the United States has significantly reduced the profitability of this project and 
other major LNG investments in Australia.
280
 
01/07/2015 - As of January 7, 2015 the spot price of Brent crude oil was trading at $49.92 per 
barrel, well below the breakeven point of $80 per barrel referenced above.
281
 
Case Analysis 
A project in which the original cost estimate was overrun by $17 billion dollars (46%) might be 
expected to give rise to considerable litigation, as each party tried to recoup its position under the 
provisions of a stabilization or equilibrium clause in one or more contracts.  For example, the 
value of the Australian dollar increased from 1.3996 Australian dollars per U.S. dollar in April 
2009 to .9328 Australian dollars per U.S. dollar in July 2011which made it more expensive for 
Chevron and its subcontractors to pay for locally sourced equipment, services and labor.  (The 
increase in the value of the Australian dollar was driven by strong demand for Australian raw 
material exports, including iron ore and coal to the rapidly growing economies of Asia.)  The 
increased value of the Australian dollars persisted through August 2014, 1.0742 Australian 
dollars per U.S. dollar.   
In addition, the approval of the third LNG unit was conditioned on the implementation of more 
costly environmental protection measures.  Despite these adverse developments neither Chevron 
nor any of the other parties to the contract have sought compensation in the Australian courts.  
This is in part because the changed economic circumstances (strong demand for Australian coal 
and iron ore and appreciation of the Australian dollar) were not the result of a change in 
government policy, but rather the consequence of natural market developments; and because the 
decision to add a third LNG unit was Chevron’s idea not the Australian Government’s.   
The only instance of apparent political manoeuvring involved the disagreement over the relative 
importance of labour costs in the project cost overruns.  Chevron provided a balanced 
explanation for the cost overruns, but the Australian Mines and Metals Association (AMMA) 
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and the Former Labour Resources Minister, Martin Ferguson blamed the WAMUA.  It is not 
surprising that the AMMA would blame the cost overruns on the WAMUA, but it is surprising 
that a former labor resources minister and former union leader, serving in the government of 
Prime Minister, Julia Gillard (a member of the Labor Party) would blame the WAMUA.   
Chevron, for the most part, has remained above the fray, because the problems encountered 
during the project could not be solved by a court or tribunal.   
7.3 Case 3 – The BTC Pipeline 
The Caspian Sea lies above one of the world's largest group of oil and natural gas fields, but the 
sea is landlocked making the transportation of oil to Western markets complicated.  During the 
Soviet era, all transportation routes from the Caspian region passed through Russia.  However, 
the dissolution of the Soviet Union made it possible to consider alternative routes.  The BTC 
pipeline follows one of those routes.
282
 
 
The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline links Baku, Azerbaijan with the Turkish Mediterranean 
port city of Ceyhan.  It is 1,100 miles long (1,768 kilometers), requires more than 100 surface 
stations, associated pumping facilities and plants to maintain the flow of oil, and can carry one 
million barrels of oil per day.  The pipeline follows a winding path from Azerbaijan through 
Georgia to Turkey.
283
  The pipeline cost approximately $3.7 billion.
284
 
 
It was constructed by a consortium of companies led by BP and was financed with a high level of 
debt using a project financing structure.  The BTC Company shareholders include BP (30.1 
percent), Azerbaijan (BTC) Limited (AzBTC, 25.0 percent), Chevron (8.9 percent), Statoil (8.71 
percent), Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim Ortaklığı (TPAO, 6.53 percent), Eni (5.0 percent), Total (5.0 
percent), Itochu (3.4 percent), Inpex (2.5 percent), ConocoPhillips (2.5 percent) and ONGC (Oil 
and Natural Gas Company Limited, 2.36 percent).
285
  The pipeline was completed in May 2005.  
This case is included because of its size, its transit route through three countries any one of 
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which could have interfered with the operation of the pipeline, and the number of partners in the 
project. 
 
Timeline 
Spring 1992 - The Turkish Prime Minister, Suleiman Demirel, proposed to Central Asian 
countries including Azerbaijan that the pipeline run through Turkey.   
 
03/09/1993 - The first document related to the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline 
was signed between Azerbaijan and Turkey on March 9, 1993 in Ankara, Turkey.
286
  The 
Turkish route necessitated that the pipeline from Azerbaijan run through Georgia or Armenia, 
but the route through Armenia was politically impossible because of the unresolved conflict 
between Armenia and Azerbaijan over the territorial status of Nagorno-Karabakh.  This left the 
circuitous Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey route, which was longer and more expensive to build than 
a route through Armenia.
287
 
 
10/29/1998 - The project gained momentum following the Ankara Declaration, signed on 
October 29, 1998 by the President of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev; President of Georgia, Eduard 
Shevardnadze; President of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev; President of Turkey, Suleiman 
Demirel and President of Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov.  The declaration was witnessed by the 
United States Secretary of Energy, Bill Richardson, who expressed strong support for the 
pipeline. 
288
  
 
11/18/1999 - The intergovernmental agreement in support of the pipeline was signed by 
Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Turkey during a meeting of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in Istanbul, Turkey. 
289
 
 
08/01/2002 - The Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan Pipeline Company (BTC Co.) was established in London 
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on August 1, 2002.   
 
04/2003 - Construction began in April 2003.  The Azerbaijan section was constructed by 
Consolidated Contractors International of Greece, and the Georgia section was constructed by a 
joint venture of France’s Spie Capag and UK Petrofac International.  The Turkish section was 
constructed by BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation.  Bechtel Corporation was the general 
contractor for engineering, procurement and construction.
290
  
 
02/2004 - Financing was agreed in February 2004, after more than two years of appraisal of the 
potential environmental and social impacts of the project.  Approximately 70% of the project 
costs were funded by a group of lenders including the International Finance Corporation (IFC), 
the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the export credit agencies of 
seven countries, and a syndicate of fifteen commercial banks. 
291
 
 
05/10/2005 - The first oil began to flow on May 10, 2005 and reached Ceyhan, Turkey on May 
28, 2006.
292
  
  
03/2009 – In March 2009, the capacity of the BTC pipeline was increased to 1.2 million barrels 
per day.
293
   
 
04/21/2014 - Since June 2006, 2,500 tankers carrying oil delivered via the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline have been shipped from the Turkish marine terminal in Ceyhan, carrying 1.9 
billion barrels of oil (256 million tons). 
294
 
 
08/11/2014 – The BTC Pipeline shipped its 2 billionth barrel of oil.295 
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Case Analysis 
The planning, design and construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline had to 
overcome many political, social and environmental issues, but the sponsors of the project and the 
lenders were committed to achieving a sustainable arrangement and ensuring that the project was 
constructed and operated in accordance with international environmental and social standards.
296
  
 
To achieve these objectives, several of the strategies discussed in Chapter 6 for managing the risk 
associated with large projects were employed.  These include project financing using a high level 
of debt and the participation of numerous public and private financial organizations; numerous 
legal agreements designed to ensure continued cooperation between the parties in the 
consortium; multilateral agreements between host governments that stipulated that the provisions 
in the principal legal agreement and other legal agreements override the domestic law of any of 
the countries involved in the project; and the inclusion of eleven equity partners.  All of this 
reduced the risk of unilateral action by one of the sponsors or host governments that could 
impede the shipment of oil or result in expropriation of the fields or the pipeline.  There has not 
been a major disruption or dispute since the project began operation in 2005, proving that 
multilateral agreements can be effective and that parties to such agreements generally honor their 
commitments. 
 
7.4 Case 4 – The Deepwater Horizon Drilling Rig 
The Deepwater Horizon was an ultra-deep-water, offshore oil drilling rig owned by Transocean.  
The rig was built in 2001 in South Korea by Hyundai Heavy Industries, was commissioned by 
R&B Falcon (which later became part of Transocean), was registered in Majuro, Marshall 
Islands, and was leased to British Petroleum (BP) from 2001 until September 2013.
 
  In 
September 2009, the rig drilled the deepest oil well in history at a vertical depth of 35,050 feet 
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(10,683 meters), approximately 250 miles (400 km) southeast of Houston, in 4,132 feet 
(1,259 meters) of water.
 297
 
 
On April 20, 2010, while drilling at the Macondo Prospect, an explosion on the rig caused by a 
blowout, killed 11 crewmen and ignited a fire which was visible from 35 miles away (56 km).  
The fire could not be extinguished and, on April 22, 2010, the Deepwater Horizon sank, leaving 
the well discharging oil and natural gas at the seafloor for 87 days, until it was successfully 
capped on July 15, 2010; making it the largest offshore oil spill in U.S. history.
298
  The U.S. 
government estimated the total discharge of oil at 4.9 million barrels (210 million 
U.S. gallons).
299
 
Civil and criminal legal actions resulting from the loss of the Deepwater Horizon and the oil spill 
began shortly after the explosion, including a large number of individual and class action claims, 
which continued into 2014.  Many claims were resolved administratively from a fund set up by 
BP for that purpose.  The civil trial brought by the U.S. government began in early 2013 and was 
split into three phases, one to assign blame for the disaster, a second to determine how much oil 
spilled, and a final phase to set penalties for BP and Anadarko Petroleum Corp., its partner in the 
failed well.
300
  This case is important because of its size and because it illustrates the operation of 
environmental liability law and the role of the courts in calculating damages and apportioning 
blame. 
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Timeline 
04/20/2010, 9:56 pm – Gas, oil and concrete from the Deepwater Horizon exploded up the 
wellbore onto the deck of the drilling platform and caught fire.  The explosion killed 11 platform 
workers and injured 17 others; another 98 survived without serious physical injury.
301
 
 
04/22/2010, 10:21 am – The Deepwater Horizon rig sank.302  
 
04/24/2010 - BP reported a leak of approximately 1,000 barrels per day (42,000 U.S. gallons per 
day).
303
  
 
04/26/2010 – An oil slick was reported 36 miles (58 km) southeast of Louisiana.  Booms were 
set up to keep the oil from washing ashore.
304
   
 
04/27/2010 - The oil slick expanded to 100 miles (160 km) across and 20 miles (32 km) from the 
Louisiana coast. 
 
04/28/2010 - the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration estimated that the leak was 
likely to be 5,000 barrels per day (210,000 U.S. gallons per day), five times larger than initially 
estimated by BP.
305
 
306
 
 
04/30/2010 – Oil washed ashore at Venice, Louisiana.   
 
05/09/2010 – Tar balls were reported on Dauphin Island in Alabama. 
 
05/13/2010 – Tony Hayward called the oil spill "relatively tiny" in comparison with the size of 
the "ocean”.307 
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05/13/2010 Transocean (a Swiss company and owner of the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig) 
filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Texas to limit its liability under the 
Limitation of Ship Owner's Liability Act to only its interest in the Deepwater Horizon which it 
valued at $26.8 million.
308
 
 
05/19/2010 – Oil washed ashore on mainland Louisiana.309 
 
05/27/2010 (1) President Obama announced a six-month moratorium on new deep water oil 
drilling permits, that is, in 500 feet (150 m) of water or more.
310
 
311
  
(2) BP Plc and Transocean Ltd. faced at least 36 lawsuits, including group cases with potentially 
thousands of plaintiffs, over environmental damage and personal injuries caused by the oil 
spill.
312
 
 
06/01/2010 – Oil washed up on the beaches of Gulf Islands National Seashore.313  
 
06/04/2010 – Tar balls arrived on beaches in Pensacola, Florida.314  
 
06/11/2010 – Flow Rate Technical Group, a consulting firm, estimated that the leak could be 
20,000 to 40,000 barrels per day (840,000 to 1,680,000 U.S. gallons per day).
315
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06/16/2010 – President Obama met with BP executives, during which BP agreed to fund a $20 
billion escrow account administered by Kenneth Feinberg.
316
 
 
 
06/23/2010 – Oil appeared on Pensacola Beach and in Gulf Islands National Seashore, and 
officials warned against swimming for 33 miles (53 km) east of the Alabama line. 
317
  
 
07/15/2010 – The well was capped on July 15, 2010. 
 
08/10/2010 – Seventy-seven cases, including those brought by state governments, individuals, 
and companies, in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana were combined 
under Multi-District Litigation docket MDL No. 2179, captioned In re: Oil Spill by the Oil Rig 
"Deepwater Horizon" in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, presided over by U.S. District 
Judge Carl Barbier.
318
 
319
    
 
09/19/2010 – BP officially declared the oil well completely and permanently sealed.320  
 
12/15/2010 –The U.S. federal government sued BP Exploration and Production, Inc., and eight 
other corporations for unlimited liability, to pay the expenses involved in the cleanup and 
environmental recovery from the spill.  It also sought civil penalties under the Clean Water Act 
(see entry for December 15, 2010 below). 
 
12/15/2010 - The U.S. Department of Justice filed a civil suit against BP and other defendants 
for violations of the Clean Water Act in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
Louisiana, this case was subsequently consolidated with the other cases 
321
 which were captioned 
United States of America v. BP Exploration & Production Inc. et al., Civ. Action No. 2:10-cv-
04536.
322
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04/21/2011 - BP filed $40 billion in lawsuits against rig owner Transocean, cement contractor 
Halliburton and blowout preventer manufacturer Cameron International Corporation.  BP alleged 
that failed safety systems and irresponsible behavior of the contractors had led to the 
explosion.
323
    
 
03/02/2012 - BP settled with most private plaintiffs in March 2012, just before its trial on 
liability for the oil spill began.  BP initially estimated the cost of the settlement at $7.8 billion.  In 
a subsequent regulatory filing, it revised the cost of the settlement to $9.2 billion.324 
 
08/13/2012 - BP asked U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier to approve the settlement, claiming its 
actions "did not constitute gross negligence or willful misconduct". 
325
 
326
  (Under the Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, a company is only liable for $75 million in economic damages, provided 
it did not exhibit "gross negligence"; the U.S. federal government is required by law to pay the 
next $1 billion in claims.) 
327
  
 
08/31/2012 - In response to BP’s filing; and in order to ensure that BP could not use its filing and 
any possible acceptance of the settlement to escape a judgment of gross negligence,
328
 the U.S. 
Department of Justice (DOJ) filed papers describing the spill as an example of "gross negligence 
and willful misconduct". 
329
 
330
  (A ruling of gross negligence would result in a four-fold increase 
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in the penalties under the Clean Water Act, which would increase the penalties to approximately 
$17.6 billion, and would increase damages in the other suits as well.) 
331
 
332
 
333
  
 
11/14/2012 - BP agreed to pay $4.5 billion in fines and other payments, the largest of its kind in 
U.S. history.  BP also agreed to plead guilty to 11 felony counts related to the deaths of the 11 
workers.
334
 
335
  The Justice Department had previously filed criminal charges against one BP 
employee in April 2012 and against three BP employees in November 2012.
336
 
337
 Two of the 
employees were indicted on manslaughter charges for acting negligently in their supervision of 
key safety tests performed on the rig prior to the explosion and failure to alert onshore engineers 
of problems with the drilling operation;
338
 and two employees were charged with obstruction of 
justice and for lying to federal investigators, one was later found guilty. 
339
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341
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01/03/2013 - The U.S. Justice of Department announced that "Transocean Deepwater, Inc. 
agreed to plead guilty to violating the Clean Water Act and to pay a total of $1.4 billion in civil 
and criminal fines and penalties".342  
 
01/13/2013 - Judge Barbier approved the medical-benefits portion of BP's proposed $7.8 billion 
partial settlement (subsequently revised to $9.2 billion).  People living at least 60 days along the 
shores affected or involved in the clean-up, who could document one or more specific health 
conditions caused by the oil or dispersants were eligible for benefits. 343 
02/25/2013 - BP and its partners (Transocean and Halliburton) went on trial in the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana in New Orleans to determine payouts and 
fines under the Clean Water Act and the Natural Resources Damage Assessment.  The trial's first 
phase was to determine the liability of BP, Transocean, Halliburton, and other companies, and to 
determine whether the companies acted with gross negligence and willful misconduct.
344
 
345
 
 
07/09/2013 - BP reported that it had spent approximately $25 billion on the Gulf Oil Spill, 
however, this did not include the $4.5 billion that was owed to the U.S. Government as the result 
of a settlement between BP and the U.S. Department of Justice for fines and penalties for 
violation of the Clean Water Act (see entry on November 14, 2012 above).346  
 
09/30/2013 - The second phase of the trial of BP and its partners focused on how much oil 
spilled into the Gulf of Mexico and who was responsible for stopping it.
347
  Claims against BP's 
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drilling fluids contractor M-I LLC were dismissed by U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier during the 
second phase of the trial, and the judge also ruled out punitive damages against Cameron 
International, the manufacturer of the blowout preventer on the Deepwater Horizon rig.
348
 
 
10/2013 – The payment of claims by BP’s claims administrator was placed on hold after BP filed 
an appeal with the 5
th
 Circuit of appeals regarding the $9.2 billion settlement BP had signed in 
March 2012.     
 
11/25/2013 - BP argued before the Texas Supreme Court that it should be covered by a $750 
million insurance policy taken out by Transocean Ltd., the Deepwater Horizon rig’s owner, prior 
to the spill.349 
12/17/2013 - By December 2013, BP had paid almost $13 billion in claims to businesses, 
individuals and federal and state governments.
350
   
02/09/2014 - As of February 9, 2014, BP had sold $38 billion in assets, including half of all its 
offshore platforms and refineries, to pay a projected total of $42 billion for the clean-up, 
compensation to businesses and individuals and other costs associated with the spill. 351  
 
03/04/2014 – BP was told by a panel of the U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that it must abide 
by the terms of a $9.2 billion settlement with victims of the Deepwater Horizon oil spill, after BP 
failed to satisfy judges that a claims administrator was misinterpreting the agreement and was 
paying claims that BP described as “fictitious” and “absurd”.352 
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04/20/2014 - BP refused to pay a $148 million bill for U.S. government studies related to the 
2010 oil spill, including research into its impact on dolphins, whales and oysters; and published 
figures indicated that BP had reduced its spending on the Natural Resource Damage Assessment 
(NRDA).  Still, at the end of 2012, BP had paid $973 million for NRDA studies, and by April 
2014 it estimated it had paid $1 billion pursuant to the NRDA.353 
 
05/19/2014 - A federal appeals court refused to reconsider its previous ruling that businesses did 
not have to prove they were directly harmed by BP's 2010 Deepwater Horizon oil spill to receive 
settlement payments.354 
 
06/09/2014 - The U.S. Supreme Court declined a request from BP to block payments to 
businesses while it appealed the district and appeals courts’ interpretation of the $9.2 billion 
settlement.  The decision upheld the ruling by the U.S. 5th Circuit Court of Appeals in New 
Orleans that under terms of the settlement, businesses claiming damages from the oil spill did not 
have to prove direct harm.355  
 
09/02/14 - Halliburton Co. announced it had reached a $1.1 billion agreement that it said would 
settle most of the class action claims asserted by plaintiffs against the company following the 
Deepwater Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.  The proposed settlement, which was still 
subject to the U.S. District Court for Eastern Louisiana’s approval and an agreed-upon 
participation level by current claimants, would be paid into a trust fund until all appeals have 
been resolved in three installments over the next two years.  The company previously had taken a 
$1.3 billion contingency loss for the Deepwater Horizon lawsuits in multiple districts.  
Halliburton said it would withdraw the proposed settlement if not enough claimants agreed to 
accept it.356 
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09/04/2014 - U.S. District Judge Barbier ruled that BP was guilty of “gross negligence and 
willful misconduct” under the Clean Water Act.  He described BP's actions as "reckless”, and 
Transocean's and Halliburton's actions as "negligent." He apportioned 67% of the blame for the 
spill to BP, 30% to Transocean, and 3% to Halliburton.  Fines would be apportioned 
commensurate with the degree of negligence of the parties and the number of barrels of oil 
spilled.  (Under the Clean Water Act fines can be based on a cost per barrel of up to $4,300 at the 
discretion of the judge.  The number of barrels was in dispute at the conclusion of the trial.  BP 
argued that 2.5 million barrels were spilled over the 87 days, but the U.S. government and the 
court contend 4.2 million barrels were spilled.
357
  This decision could potentially quadruple the 
fines and penalties for violating the Clean Water Act to $18.1 billion (4,200,000 barrels x $4,300 
per barrel = $18.1 billion).
358
  This ruling would increase BP’s total cost for the Deepwater  
Horizon oil spill well beyond the $43 billion it has already provided for.
359  BP issued a 
statement strongly disagreeing with the court’s ruling and immediately filed an appeal.  
 
10/03/2014 - BP asked Judge Carl Barbier for a new judgment or retrial in the 'gross negligence' 
suit, claiming that the verdict allegedly relied on evidence that had been excluded from court.
360
  
12/08/2014 – The U.S. Supreme Court refused to hear BP’s appeal that some businesses were 
receiving payouts despite being unable to trace their losses to the effects of the BP oil spill.  The 
U.S. Supreme court’s refusal to hear BP’s appeal meant that BP would have to make the 
payments.
361
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02/19/2015 - U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier ruled that BP could pay a maximum civil penalty 
of up to $4,300 for each barrel of oil spilled under the Clean Water Act.  He rejected BP's 
argument that the fines should be capped at $9.57 billion, approximately one-third lower than the 
$13.7 billion penalty federal prosecutors are seeking.  At the time of this writing, the court had 
not yet ruled how much BP will pay in fines and penalties for the oil spill.
362
 
Case Analysis 
This case exhibits several of the features observed in Chapter 6 related to the management of risk 
in the international oil and gas industry.  First, there is no evidence that the British government 
tried to intervene at any time on BP’s behalf, supporting the observation that national 
governments do not intervene on behalf of investors involved in a dispute arising from foreign 
direct investment.  
 
Second, international oil and gas companies are likely to use the domestic courts of the host 
country before resorting to international courts or tribunals, if the courts are thought to be 
reliable and fair (see actions initiated by BP on April 21, 2011; March 2, 2012; August 13, 2012; 
October 2013; November 25, 2013; April 20, 2014; June 9, 2014, September 4, 2014 and 
October 3, 2014 above).  BP’s decision to use the U.S. court system to protect its interests and 
minimize its liability was probably made easier by the fact that in the United States the Rule of 
Law is rated 91, indicating a high level of fairness and reliability.  (However, the ICSID does not 
require that domestic court remedies be exhausted before filing a claim with the ICSID.) 
 
Third, like most international oil and gas companies BP chose to self-insure against 
expropriation and liability rather than purchase insurance against the potential risk of either. 
BP has some insurance through Lloyd’s of London, as well as through its captive insurance 
company, Jupiter Insurance Ltd, which has already set loss reserves at its policy limit maximum 
of $700 million.363  In November 2013, BP argued that it should be covered by a $750 million 
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policy taken out by the rig owner, Transocean.364  Losses above these amounts have been borne 
by BP.  The cost to BP is reflected in its sale of $38 billion in assets to cover the cost of the spill. 
   
7.5 Case 5 – Expropriation of Oil and Gas Assets in Venezuela and Argentina 
Venezuela 
Venezuela nationalized its oil and gas industry in the 1970s, creating the country's state-owned 
oil and natural gas company, Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA).  However, during the mid-
1990s, PDVSA implemented a policy referred to as the Apertura Petrolera (oil opening), which 
was intended to mobilize the capital, technology and managerial capabilities of international oil 
companies in order to maximize the production of crude oil in Venezuela and simultaneously 
reduce the government revenue needed to finance oil and gas exploration and development in the 
country. 365 
 
The “flagship” projects of the Apertura were four large projects dedicated to the production, 
upgrading (i.e. partial refining) and marketing of extra-heavy crude oil from the Orinoco Oil Belt 
(OOB), a large reservoir with an estimated one trillion barrels of heavy (dense and highly 
viscous) crude oil.  Three of these projects (Petrozuata, Hamaca and Cerro Negro) are at the 
center of the arbitration proceedings that ConocoPhillips (COP) and ExxonMobil (XOM) 
brought against Venezuela at the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID) in late 2007 in response to Venezuela’s nationalization of ConocoPhillips and 
ExxonMobil’s assets in Venezuela.366  This case illustrates the impact of political and ideological 
change on the security of investor ownership rights, the operation of the ICSID and the options 
available to claimants and defendants involved in investment disputes. 
 
Timeline 
12/06/1998 - Hugo Chavez, the presidential candidate of the Fifth Republic Movement/United 
Socialist Party, ran on an anti-corruption and anti-poverty platform and was elected president of 
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Venezuela.    
 
11/22/2001 - President Chavez announced the enactment of 49 new economic laws, just before a 
law giving legislative power to the president of Venezuela and the executive branch expired. 
These laws included new legislation that increased royalty taxes on oil production from new oil 
ventures from 16.6% to 30% and mandated the Venezuelan government own more than 50% of 
all new oil ventures.
367
 
 
04/11/2002 - The first coup attempt against President Chavez occurred.  
  
12/2002 to 02/2003 - A general strike was organized by the political opposition to President 
Chávez to force a new presidential election.   The primary economic impact of the strike was to 
shut down the Venezuelan oil industry, in particular, state-run PDVSA, which provided a 
majority of Venezuela’s export revenue.368  The strike lasted approximately two months.  The 
Chavez government responded by firing 19,000 PDVSA employees and replacing them with 
employees loyal to the Chávez administration.
369
  
 
10/2004 - President Chavez declared that Venezuela was increasing the royalties to be paid by 
foreign oil companies operating in the Orinoco Basin from 1% of the sales price to 16.6% on 
existing oil ventures.   The President said that this decision marked “the second and true phase of 
the nationalization of the country’s oil”.   He said the purpose of the increase was to secure 
“sovereignty” over the country’s energy reserves; and that oil prices had undergone a structural 
(as opposed to a cyclical) change that justified the increase.  Political and economic observers 
outside the country suggested that the government’s growing budget deficit was an important 
factor in the decision to raise royalty rates. 
370
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04/14/2005 - Venezuelan authorities announced a unilateral revision of 32 contracts signed with 
oil companies between 1992 and 1997.  These contracts would become joint ventures in which 
the state, through PDVSA, would have at least a 51% stake in each joint venture.  The 
Hydrocarbons Law of 2001 had required new joint ventures to include the state oil company, but 
now the law was being applied retroactively (see entry for November 22, 2001 above). 
 
Venezuelan authorities also announced that they would increase income taxes in the oil industry, 
from 34 percent to 50 percent and increase royalties from 16.6% to 30% on these contracts.  This 
new tax level was applicable to all companies that drilled, produced, operated, or processed oil in 
Venezuela.  The Venezuelan government would therefore receive a minimum of 82.5% of net 
income (revenue less production costs).
371
 
 
Furthermore, the government made the tax increase from 34% to 50% retroactive to 2001 and 
demanded that 16 foreign oil companies pay back-taxes of $3 billion U.S.  These companies 
included Total (France), BP (United Kingdom), ENI (Italy), Royal/Dutch Shell (The 
Netherlands), Harvest Vinccler (U.S.), Chevron (U.S.), and Statoil (Norway).
372
  Total, Chevron, 
Statoil and BP agreed to the restructuring and still hold minority interests in their Venezuelan 
projects.
373
 
 
2007 - ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips refused to comply with the requirement that they grant 
PDVSA a 51% interest in their properties in the Orinoco Basin.
374
  Venezuela responded by 
claiming a majority stake in four oil projects with a total value of $30 billion operating in the 
Orinoco river basin (Petrozuata, Hamaca, Cerro Negro and Corocoro).375 
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09/06/2007 – ExxonMobil registered its claim with the ICSID in response to Venezuela’s 
expropriation of its assets in Venezuela, seeking compensation of 10.0 billion. 
376
  
 
12/13/2007 – ConocoPhillips registered its claim with the ICSID in response to Venezuela’s 
expropriation of its assets in Venezuela, seeking compensation of $5.5 to $6.0 billion.
377
 
 
05/08/2009 – (1) A gas injection project owned by Williams Companies was confiscated by the 
Venezuelan government.
378
  (2) Venezuela’s National Assembly passed a law allowing the 
Venezuelan government to nationalize the assets of certain domestic and foreign oil service 
companies.
379
 
 
06/2010 – The Venezuelan government seized 11oil rigs owned by Helmerich and Payne, a U.S. 
oil company.  Helmerich and Payne’s 11 oil rigs had been shut down for several months because 
Venezuela was unwilling or unable to pay H & P what it was owed.380 
 
03/2011 - Williams Companies, Inc. filed an international arbitration suit against Venezuela at 
the ICSID, seeking compensation for two natural-gas compression facilities seized by the 
Venezuelan government in 2009.
381
 
 
09/2011 - The Venezuelan government said it was willing to pay a combined sum of $2.5 billion 
to ExxonMobil and ConocoPhillips in their arbitration cases at the ICSID against Venezuela.
382
 
 
09/30/2011 - Oklahoma based services company, Helmerich & Payne Inc., filed a lawsuit against 
Venezuela in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia for expropriation of 11 drilling 
rigs in June 2010.  The lawsuit sought $32 million in back payments for unpaid services and 
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several hundred million dollars for the value of its 11 drilling rigs.  Citing increasing hostility 
toward U.S. companies by the Venezuelan government, the company argued that it could not get 
a fair trial in the Venezuelan courts, where its request for compensation had not progressed or 
even been answered.
383
 
 
01/01/2012 - The Paris based International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) awarded ExxonMobil 
$907.6 million for breach of contract, substantially less than the $10.0 billion ExxonMobil was 
seeking.  The ICC reduced the $907.6 million award by $160.6 million for liabilities owed by 
ExxonMobil to Venezuela, making the net award $747.0 million.  In addition, ExxonMobil had 
previously petitioned a New York Court to seize $305 million from a PDVSA bank account, 
which was subsequently turned over to ExxonMobil.  The actual amount Venezuela was ordered 
to pay ExxonMobil therefore was, $442 million (907.6 – 160.6 – 305.0 = 442.0), which is the 
smallest amount ExxonMobil could have expected to receive, because it represented the book 
value of its 41.7% interest in the Cerro Negro partnership.384  The arbitration in the ICC was 
intended to determine damages, if any, related to ExxonMobil’s claim that Venezuela and 
PDVSA had breached the contract when it changed its provisions unilaterally and subsequently 
expropriated the partnership.
385
 
 
However, the case was not over because ExxonMobil had sought arbitration in two separate 
courts: the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) (just discussed) and the International 
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).  This was possible under international 
law, because in the early 1990s, when ExxonMobil decided to participate in the Cerro Negro 
project it signed a contract with PDVSA and Venezuela in which ExxonMobil owned a 41.7% 
stake in Cerro Negro through a subsidiary based in the Netherlands; and Venezuela and the 
Netherlands had signed a bilateral investment treaty to promote and protect investments in both 
countries.  The ICSID arbitration panel was therefore judging whether this treaty had been 
violated by the Venezuelan government.  The tribunal’s judgment would be based on the text of 
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the treaty and any violations that may have occurred.386  The ICSID panel could award 
ExxonMobil compensation for violations of this treaty, for example, not being paid for amounts 
owed by Venezuela before the expropriation took place, modifying contracts unilaterally, not 
being treated fairly and equitably, discriminating against foreign investors in relation to local 
investors, and not providing prompt and equitable compensation for the assets expropriated.
387
 
 
01/2012 - President Chávez threatened to ignore any ICSID decision regarding a multi-billion 
claim made by ExxonMobil for its nationalized oil projects and threatened to withdraw from the 
arbitration panel.
388
 
 
01/2012 - Venezuela’s Energy Minister said an agreement could not be reached with 
ConocoPhillips over the company’s expropriated assets.389 
 
01/24/2012 - The World Bank received “written notice of denunciation of the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (the ICSID 
Convention) from the Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela.  The denunciation was to take effect 
six months after the receipt of Venezuela’s notice, that is, on July 25, 2012.390  
 
02/15/2012 - Venezuela’s state oil company, PDVSA, claimed that it had paid ExxonMobil 
Corp. approximately $255 million in compensation for nationalized assets, which was 
substantially less than the $907.6 million ordered by the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC).  President Chávez claimed that the difference reflected the debt owed by ExxonMobil to 
PDVSA.  
391
 (However, this was still less than the $442 million calculated above.) 
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03/22/2012 – The Williams Companies, Inc. and the Venezuela government reached a settlement 
in which Venezuela agreed to pay Williams Companies $420 million as compensation for its 
nationalization of the company’s assets in Venezuela in May of 2009.392   
 
09/03/2013 - The World Bank's arbitration panel, the International Centre for Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, ruled that Venezuela illegally expropriated ConocoPhillips’ Petrozuata, 
Hamaca, and Corocoro projects.393  
09/30/2013 - U.S. District Judge Robert Wilkins ruled that Helmerich & Payne International 
Drilling and its Venezuelan subsidiary have standing to pursue its expropriation claim against the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and its state-sponsored energy company, Petroleos de 
Venezuela SA and its subsidiary PDVSA Petroleo.
394
 
 
10/10/2014 - Venezuela announced that it would pay ExxonMobil more than a billion dollars for 
the nationalization of its operations in Venezuela in 2007 after the ICSID ordered the Venezuela 
government to pay $1.6 billion (1.2 billion euros) to the company.  The award was compensation 
for the expropriation of the Cerro Negro project, the La Ceiba project and "production and 
export curtailments" imposed on the Cerro Negro development in 2006 and 2007.   
 
ExxonMobil said the decision supported its view that Venezuela failed to fairly compensate it at 
the time of the expropriation.  Venezuelan Foreign Minister Rafael Ramirez said the 
compensation ordered by the ICSID in the case was within a "reasonable range".   
 
Venezuela also claimed victory in the court case.  Ramirez said the tribunal's award was a 
victory for Venezuelan sovereignty over "exaggerated" claims.  He said, however, that 
Venezuela would pay the fee, only after deducting a previous payment to ExxonMobil made by 
Petroleos de Venezuela of $908 million related to the Cerro Negro expropriation.
395
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Digression on Argentina 
Between 2001 and 2004, natural gas and electricity transmission companies brought 15 cases 
against the Argentine government at the ICSID in response to domestic energy pricing policies 
and tariffs, but not expropriations.   Nestor Kirchner served as Argentina’s President from May 
25, 2003 to December 10, 2007.  President Kirchner was considered by some as a left wing 
president 
396
 however, he did not propose left-wing policies such as socialization of production 
or the nationalization of public services that had previously been privatized during the 
presidency of Carlos Menem (July 8, 1989 to December 10, 1999).  On December 10, 2007 his 
wife, Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, succeeded him and began a second term on December 10, 
2011.   
04/16/2012 - The Argentine government announced that it would acquire a controlling interest in 
Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF) by nationalizing the Spanish oil company Repsol’s 
57.4% ownership of YPF.  The takeover followed more than two months of increasing 
government pressure on YPF after the cost of fuel imports into Argentina doubled to $9.4 billion 
in 2011.
397
  
2012 - Repsol registered a claim with the ICSID seeking compensation of $10 billion for its 
57.4% interest in YPF.   
 
07/30/2014 – Argentina defaulted on $539 million in interest payments due July 30, 2014.398 
 
09/13/2014 – Argentina neared default on $200 million in interest payments due September 30, 
2014. 
 
Case Analysis 
The developments in Venezuela and Argentina provide an opportunity to evaluate the factors 
that lead to resource nationalization.  Possible explanations include: (1) a change in the ruling 
                                                          
396
 BBC News, “Analysis: Latin America's new left axis,” (18 April 2006) 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4916270.stm 
397
 BBC News, “Argentina to expropriate Repsol oil subsidiary YPF,” (April 16, 2012) 
http://www.bbc.com/news/business-17732910 
398
 Almudena Calatrava,  “Problems with new Argentine debt payment law”, The Associated Press, September 13, 
2014, http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/markets/2014/09/13/problems-seen-with-new-argentine-debt-
payment-law/15580155/ 
163 
 
party’s economic and political ideology (2) the residual resentment left by colonialism and the 
political opportunism of politicians (3) national budget deficits and (4) political instability.  The 
discussion below examines each of these as they relate to Venezuela and Argentina.   
 
Political Ideology 
The socialist ideology of the Chavez and Maduro governments has been a major factor in the 
expropriation of oil and natural gas assets in Venezuela.  This is less true in Argentina where the 
decision to expropriate has been driven more by Argentina’s worsening budget deficit.  
 
Colonialism and Political Opportunism 
The legacy of colonialism is still evident in the degree of income inequality that exists in 
Venezuela and Argentina.  The resentment this produces among the lower classes in both 
countries allows politicians to exploit this sentiment by encouraging resource nationalism. 
 
National Budgets 
The increasing budget deficits in Venezuela and Argentina have compelled politicians in both 
countries to seek additional sources of revenue through nationalization.  Figures 14 and 15 below 
illustrate the increasing budget deficits in both countries.    
 
Figure 14 – Venezuela’s Government Budget Balance – 2005 to 2014 
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Figure 15 – Argentina’s Government Budget Balance – 2005 to 2014 
 
 
Political Instability 
In 2007, the period during which the largest number of expropriations of oil and gas assets 
occurred in Venezuela, the country’s political stability rating had fallen to 13. (0 is least stable 
and 100 most stable.)  In 2012, the period during which Repsol’s 57.4% interest in YPF was 
expropriated, Argentina’s political stability rating had declined to 39.  The expropriation of the 
oil companies operating in Venezuela may have been the ruling party’s response to its mounting 
financial problems and its increasing vulnerability to the political opposition in the voting booth. 
 
In summary, in Venezuela, the primary factors leading to expropriation were the socialist 
orientation of the Chavez government and the political instability of the country.  In Argentina, 
the primary factors leading to expropriation were the worsening budget deficit and popular 
appeal of nationalization among Argentina’s voters. 
 
7.6 Case 6 – The TNK-BP Joint Venture and Russian Politics 
Investing in the Russian oil and gas industry has been an unsettling experience for many foreign 
oil and natural gas companies, particularly for BP, which sold its 50% interest in its TNK-BP 
joint venture in March 2013.  The TNK-BP joint venture had experienced a long list of problems 
including the imposition of a billion dollar claim for back taxes by the Russian government; 
delays in the issuance of environmental permits; having its offices searched by Russian state 
police; and having its chief executive officer, a BP appointee, forced to leave Russia under the 
threat of arrest.  At the time of the sale, TNK-BP accounted for more than 25% of BP’s global oil 
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production.  This case is unique in its specific details, but representative of the sometimes 
complex interaction between a foreign investor (BP), Russian investors (AAR), state owned oil 
and gas companies (Gazprom and Rosneft) and a national government (Russia). 
 
Timeline 
06/26/2003 - The agreement establishing the TNK-BP joint venture was signed by BP Chief 
Executive Officer, John Browne and Mikhail Fridman, co-founder and Chairman of Alfa Group a 
company that was formed after the Soviet Union was dissolved and Russian state owned 
industries were privatized.  To manage their interests in TNK-BP, Fridman and his Russian 
partners (Viktor Vekselberg and Leonard Blavatnik) formed a consortium named Alfa-Access-
Renova (AAR).  BP and AAR agreed that each would hold a 50% interest in TNK-BP. 
2003 to 2005 - TNK-BP’s oil and gas production increased by 24%, after BP engineers 
introduced new drilling technology that reversed a long decline in production at TNK-BP’s most 
important oil field, the Samotlor field in western Siberia.   However, the partnership between BP 
and AAR experienced problems almost from the beginning and became more contentious over 
time.  BP and AAR repeatedly disagreed about the investment strategy the joint venture should 
pursue.  AAR wanted TNK-BP to invest in oil and gas exploration outside of Russia, for 
example, Iraq, Lithuania and Turkey, but BP considered TNK-BP to be its Russian subsidiary 
and saw no value in having TNK-BP compete with BP’s projects in other parts of the world.  In 
addition, AAR owned interests in other businesses including telecommunications, banking, 
aluminum, media, entertainment, and retailing; and wanted TNK-BP to reinvest some of the cash 
it produced, in those businesses.399 
 
07/2003 – Platon Lebedev, the fourth largest shareholder in OAO Yukos (a private sector oil 
company), was arrested on charges of illegally acquiring a stake in the state-owned fertilizer 
company, Apatit, in 1994.  The arrest was followed by investigations into tax returns filed by 
OAO Yukos, a large privately owned oil company in Russia.
400
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10/2003 – Mikhail Khodorkovsky, Chairman and CEO of OAO Yukos was arrested and charged 
with fraud and tax evasion.  His arrest and subsequent conviction on these charges were widely 
interpreted to mean the Kremlin was cracking down on the so-called oligarchs, who had become 
wealthy and powerful during the period of privatization in Russia in the 1990s.
401
  
 
10/2005 - Russian tax authorities imposed a claim for $936 million in back-taxes on TNK-BP, 
temporarily raising the prospect of expropriation by the Russian government.  However, that 
prospect diminished after BP’s CEO, John Browne, met with Russian President Vladimir Putin 
and President Putin praised BP as a “good corporate citizen”.   The claims for back-taxes were 
later substantially reduced. 402  
 
10/03/2006 - Other private sector oil companies that had invested in Russia also came under 
pressure from the Russian government.  For example, after being accused of environmental 
violations and threatened with multi-billion dollar penalties, Shell Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (a 
subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell), Mitsui Sakhalin Holdings B.V. (a subsidiary of Mitsui) and 
Diamond Gas Sakhalin (a subsidiary of Mitsubishi), agreed to give up controlling interest in the 
Sakhalin - 2 offshore oil and gas development project.  Gazprom, the state-owned gas producer, 
acquired majority ownership in Sakhalin – 2; and Royal Dutch Shell and its partners Mitsui and 
Mitsubishi had their shares in the project reduced.  (These developments made BP’s continuing 
50% ownership in TNK-BP an exception in an otherwise rapidly renationalizing Russian oil and 
gas industry.) 
403
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03/19/2008 - Officers from Russia’s Interior Ministry raided the Moscow offices of BP and 
TNK-BP in connection with several new investigations for tax evasion.   The investigations, 
which had begun in 2007, gained momentum in early 2008, and by April 2008, the ministry was 
again investigating claims for back-taxes of more than $900 million against various TNK-BP 
subsidiaries.  In addition, the Federal Security Service (known by its Russian acronym, the FSB) 
arrested an employee of TNK-BP and his brother, an independent energy consultant, and charged 
them with industrial espionage.
404
 
 
04/2008 - Tetlis, (a Moscow based brokerage firm and one of a small group of minority 
shareholders in TNK-BP Holdings), filed a lawsuit against TNK-BP.  Tetlis sued TNK-BP in a 
Siberian court over a longstanding agreement that allowed technical specialists from BP to be 
“seconded” to TNK-BP.  (When an employee is seconded, the person remains an employee of 
their current employer (BP), but a contractual agreement is entered into between the employing 
organization and a third party company (TNK-BP) pursuant to which the employee will perform 
duties for the benefit of the third party company.  At no time does the employee become 
employed by the third party company.)   However, a Siberian court issued an injunction that 
prevented 148 seconded BP employees from entering the offices of TNK-BP.   
 
At the same time, BP and AAR became engaged in a public argument regarding the salaries of 
BP employees working at TNK-BP.  AAR insisted the BP expatriates were unnecessary and 
overpaid, but BP defended them.  Furthermore, TNK-BP’s chief executive officer, Bob Dudley 
accused AAR of interfering with the Russian work-permit application process to prevent BP 
employees from renewing their Russian visas, forcing them to leave the country when their old 
visas expired.
405
 
05/2008 - The FSB conducted another raid on BP’s Moscow office.  Separately, Russia’s Natural 
Resources Ministry announced an environmental inspection of TNK-BP’s Samotlor oil field. 
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07/2008 - In a separate lawsuit, a group of Russian managers at TNK-BP accused TNK-BP Chief 
Executive Officer, Bob Dudley, of discrimination, claiming that TNK-BP’s Western employees 
were paid much more than local Russian staff.  Eventually, the 148 seconded employees were 
forced to leave Russia and dozens of other Western employees not directly employed by TNK-
BP had to leave the country because they were unable to renew their visas.  One of them was 
Dudley himself, who finally left on July 24, 2008, ending a long struggle with AAR and the 
Russian authorities.
406
 
09/2008 - BP reached an agreement with AAR, in which it ceded operating control of the TNK-
BP joint venture to the Russian shareholders (AAR).  Under the terms of the agreement, 
announced in September 2008 and finalized four months later, Dudley resigned as TNK-BP’s 
chief executive officer and AAR obtained the right to approve his replacement.  The two sides 
also agreed to increase the size of TNK-BP’s board of directors and add three independent 
directors, fulfilling another key demand of AAR.
407
 
TNK-BP’s legal problems diminished significantly after the agreement with AAR was reached.  
In September 2008, the Russian Interior Ministry announced that TNK-BP had settled most of 
the claims against it for back-taxes, and the ministry eventually ended its investigation for tax 
evasion against TNK-BP.  In addition, the two brothers arrested by the FSB for industrial 
espionage were given suspended sentences and Tetlis and the Russian managers dropped their 
discrimination lawsuits.
408
 
2009 to 2010 
In 2009, BP played a more passive role in TNK-BP, allowing AAR to run the joint venture.  
However, that changed on April 20, 2010, when an explosion on BP’s Deepwater Horizon 
drilling rig in the Gulf of Mexico produced a massive oil spill that resulted in billions of dollars 
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in fines by the U.S. government, cleanup costs and liability to individuals, businesses and states 
along the Gulf Coast.  
 
07/27/2010 - BP announced that Bob Dudley would succeed Tony Hayward as BP's Chief 
Executive Officer on October 1, 2010.  Dudley was also appointed to the board of directors of 
BP.
409
  
 
01/2011- Dudley announced a strategy that was intended to stabilize BP’s financial position and 
give the company access to significant undeveloped oil and gas reserves in Russia.  The plan 
proposed a common share swap between BP and Rosneft (a Russian state owned oil company) in 
which Rosneft would take a 5% stake in BP in exchange for BP taking a 9.5% stake in Rosneft.  
In addition, BP and Rosneft agreed to explore and develop three license blocks in the Kara Sea, a 
Russian part of the Arctic Ocean.  However, the proposal was “derailed” by AAR which was 
upset that BP had not thought to include them in the Arctic deal.  AAR cited the original BP-
AAR shareholder agreement, which required that BP pursue any Russian projects exclusively 
through TNK-BP; and sued to block the BP-Rosneft deal.  A London court and a Stockholm 
arbitration tribunal agreed that BP was violating the shareholder agreement.  Despite last-minute 
negotiations with AAR to preserve the deal with Rosneft, discussion of the proposed alliance 
ended in May 2011.
410
 
 
10/2012 - BP and AAR simultaneously announced they would sell their respective 50% interests 
in TNK-BP to Rosneft, a deal, that valued the joint venture at $55 billion.  
 
03/21/2013 – BP and AAR sold their respective 50% stakes in TNK-BP to the Russian state-
owned oil company Rosneft, in a deal that closed on March 21, 2013.  BP received compensation 
of $26.7 billion ($12.5 billion in cash and 19.75% of Rosneft common stock valued at $14.2 
billion).  AAR received $27.7 billion in cash from Rosneft.411 412   
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Case Analysis 
The role of the Russian government in the disputes between BP and AAR has been the subject of 
considerable speculation.  Those familiar with the dispute do not believe that the Russian 
government orchestrated the legal campaign against TNK-BP.  Rather, they believe that AAR 
used its connections in Russia’s government ministries and agencies to apply pressure on Dudley 
and his team, whom they disliked, as noted by Osipovich.   
 
The security services were used by AAR as one of the means of achieving their main goal.  They 
[AAR] wanted to seize operational control of the company and squeeze out Dudley, who was a very 
major irritant for them… It’s no secret that they had the ability to do this, since they had tight 
relationships with very senior individuals in the Russian leadership. 
413
  
BP was not properly prepared for the pressure.  It reacted slowly, sometimes even passively, since it 
is a huge and risk-averse bureaucratic machine that functions relatively well in normal times, but at 
the time it was not fully up to the task of outright corporate warfare in the Russian style.
414
  
However, the Russian oil and natural gas industry had been renationalizing under President Putin 
since his election.  The evidence for this includes: (1) The intentional bankruptcy and subsequent 
sale of Yukos’ assets to the state-owned company Rosneft; and (2) the allegation of threats to 
marine life and other environmental problems at the Sakhalin -2 site and a subsequent injunction 
that rescinded permits for Sakhalin -2’s second phase and paved the way for Gazprom’s eventual 
acquisition of a controlling interest in the Sakhalin -2 project.   Therefore the Russian ministries 
did not object when they were asked to put pressure on TNK-BP.   
 
In the case of Yukos the charges against Mikhail Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev and the 
intentional bankruptcy of the company were motivated primarily by Vladimir Putin’s desire to 
remove two businessmen that were a threat to his political power and re-election.  In the case of 
TNK-BP neither BP nor AAR presented a threat to Putin’s continuance in office, but TNK-BP 
was a large and successful project that had significant economic and geo-political value to the 
Russian government.  
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Chapter 8 – Summary, Conclusions and Next Steps 
8.1 Summary and Conclusions 
In Chapter 1, the nature of the bargaining relationship between host countries and international 
oil companies and the process by which this relationship changes as a project progresses were 
examined.  The evidence supports the view that while exploratory drilling is in progress, and 
production facilities and pipeline infrastructure are being built, the bargaining power of oil 
companies and host governments is roughly equal.  However, after oil or gas has been 
discovered and these facilities are operating, the host government and the transit countries 
acquire the superior bargaining position.  
 
The superior bargaining position of the host country government can manifest itself in several 
ways.  The executive branch of the host country government can unilaterally change the fiscal 
terms of an agreement; deliberately change the economic or regulatory environment in the 
country; interrupt the conduct of business by the IOC or expropriate the foreign investor’s assets.  
The judicial branch can refuse to enforce a contract or fail to award fair compensation in a 
dispute.  More generally, host governments can place national politics and geopolitical priorities, 
such as political popularity, energy security, and national security above the fulfillment of their 
commercial commitments.  
 
The vulnerability of oil and natural gas projects to politically motivated decisions, including 
expropriation is derived from: (1) the immobility of oil and gas reserves, (2) the perception in 
developing countries that foreign ownership of oil and gas reserves is a form of neo-colonialism, 
making government ownership a source of national pride; and (3) the important role that oil and 
gas revenue play in the national budget of most oil and natural gas exporting countries.   
 
In Chapter 2, ten research questions were formulated to investigate the development and 
operation of the institutions that support the oil and gas industry.  In Chapter 3, it was argued that 
(1) the commercial and non-commercial risk of oil and natural gas exploration and production 
can be reduced by the development of appropriate institutions; and (2) that these institutions 
contribute to the economic efficiency of the oil and natural gas industry and the world economy.  
In Chapters 4, the design of the research study was presented and in Chapter 5, the research 
methods were described.  
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In Chapter 6, the findings related to these 10 research questions were presented.  First, it 
evaluated the evidence for and against the assertion that the frequency of expropriation of foreign 
direct investment in the oil and gas industry has increased; and examined the circumstances in 
which expropriation is more or less likely to occur?  It was observed that the frequency of 
expropriation has varied between 1960 and the present and concluded that the risk of 
expropriation in the oil and natural gas industry increases when the price of oil rises faster than 
the long term price trend.   
 
Second, it examined the frequency of investment disputes and the efficiency with which these 
disputes have been resolved.  It found that most IOCs and host governments comply with the 
terms and conditions of the contracts they sign; and resolve most disputes on their own.   
 
Third, the study summarized the provisions most often included in an oil or gas contract to limit 
the number of disputes and resolve those that occur.  These include a general clause that requires 
both parties to act “in good faith”, “use reasonable efforts” and fulfill their obligations “in a 
timely manner”.  Other provisions include: an equilibrium clause intended to compensate for 
changes in the legal or the investment environment in which a contract was originally signed: 
and a clauses specifying, the choice of law and the court or tribunal to be used in the resolution 
of a dispute. 
 
Fourth, the study examined the most important clauses in bilateral investment treaties and how 
effective these treaties have been in resolving disputes.  The most common provisions include: a 
statement of purpose, choice of law, standards of treatment and the legal instruments to be 
applied in a dispute.  The most contentious issue in cases brought before an international court or 
tribunal is the interpretation of the phrases “fair and equitable treatment” and “fair and equitable 
compensation”.  Nevertheless, bilateral investment treaties are the legal document most often 
referenced in a dispute brought before an international court or tribunal. 
 
Fifth, this study evaluated whether countries that have signed a large number of bilateral 
investment treaties or have a higher quality of governance and a more reliable legal system are 
less likely to be involved in disputes before an international court or tribunal?  The number of 
bilateral treaties a country has signed and the quality of governance in a country are not reliable 
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predictors of the number of cases that will be brought against it in an international court or 
tribunal.   
 
Sixth, it evaluated whether a relationship exists between the amount of oil a country consumes 
and the number of bilateral investment treaties it has signed?  The evidence indicated that there is 
no observable relationship between the amount of oil a country consumes and the number of 
bilateral investment treaties it has signed.  It also evaluated whether a relationship exists between 
the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed and the amount of foreign direct investment 
outflows from that country.  The evidence indicated that if the United States is excluded from the 
data, there is a relationship between the number of bilateral investment treaties a country has 
signed and FDI outflows, but there are other factors affecting the number of bilateral investment 
treaties a country signs.  It also evaluated whether a relationship exists between the number of 
bilateral treaties a country has signed and the amount of foreign direct investment inflows to that 
country.  The evidence indicated that there is a relationship between the number of bilateral 
investment treaties a country has signed and FDI inflows, but there is disagreement over the 
degree of importance of BIT’s on FDI inflows.  The data on the decisions reached by various 
international courts and tribunals was insufficient to prove that courts and tribunals are mostly 
impartial, but it was observed that the amount awarded is frequently less than what the claimant 
was seeking.  
 
Seventh, this study described the sources of financing and found: (1) that commercial bank debt 
is the dominant source of financing, followed by bonds, project financing (also usually financed 
with bank debt) and equity.  Master limited partnerships, venture capital and multilateral 
financing play a smaller role. (2) The centralized finance system is still the most common 
financing structure.  (3) There are three types of fiscal regimes (a) concession or lease 
(royalty/tax agreements), (b) production sharing agreement, or (c) service agreement.               
(4) Although some authors have suggested that the interests of IOCs and NOCs might be better 
served if they formed longer term alliances involving several projects, this study identified 
several reasons why multi-project alliances between NOCs and IOCs are not likely to be widely 
adopted.   
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Eighth, this study examined the financial instruments available for managing commercial and 
non-commercial risk in the oil and gas industry.  The evidence indicates that there is a wide 
variety of financial instruments available for re-allocating risk.  Some of these instruments 
developed in response to the needs of the oil industry, but most developed in response to the 
needs of the business community in general. 
 
Ninth, this study examined the relationship between the quality of financial reporting and 
investment.  The theoretical and empirical literature supports the view that higher quality 
financial reporting results in higher investment efficiency in the context of financial securities 
traded on a public exchange.  However, in this study, a relationship was not found between the 
quality of financial reporting and foreign direct investment.  Some possible explanations were 
proposed to explain this finding.  
 
Arguments were presented why the estimates of proved, probable and possible reserves made by 
individual oil companies, NOCs and country ministries are thought by some analysts to be too 
optimistic.  However, estimating the quantity of reserves (conventional and un-conventional) is 
an inherently difficult process for technical reasons (geology) and economic reasons (changes in 
the price of crude oil).   
 
Tenth, there are no internationally agreed set of rules for trading energy resources and energy 
investment, but the absence of an international energy investment agreement or even a 
substantial number of multilateral agreements may not be significant, because (1) a relatively 
small number of disputes are adjudicated with reference to an investment treaty.  (2) The 
outcome of an international court proceeding or tribunal is dependent on the standard of 
treatment applied and the definition of fair and equitable compensation, by the court or tribunal.  
Therefore, even if a global investment treaty existed, the problems of interpretation would still 
exist. 
 
The formation of the International Energy Forum (IEF) has led to more cooperation among 
nations on energy issues, for example the Joint Oil Data Initiative and Joint Gas Data Initiative, 
but these organizations have been successful primarily in the compilation of historical 
information.  Obtaining data regarding future capital spending has proven more elusive. The 
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convergence of the IFRS standards, U.S. GAAP and Japanese GAAP since 1990 is an example 
of organizations (investors, banks and oil companies) reshaping the institutional environment to 
increase the efficiency of financial reporting.   
 
Signature bonuses are a part of the international oil and gas industry and a source of controversy.  
How this issue is resolved will depend on the relative economic and political power of the host 
governments, international oil companies, and the public interest groups.  
 
Critics have argued that energy diplomacy has not lived up to its promise, but these arguments 
depend in part on a classical or neoclassical view of markets.  However, organizational 
arrangements, gained control, asset specificity, human assets, strategic behavior, contractual 
safeguards and surrounding uncertainty may ultimately prove to be of greater importance than 
has been evident so far. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
This study supports North’s observation that “Incremental change comes from the perceptions of 
the entrepreneurs in political and economic organizations that they could do better by altering the 
existing institutional framework at some margin”.415 The evidence for this is the institutions that 
have been created to promote and protect foreign direct investment in general (bilateral 
investment treaties, political risk insurance and the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes (ICSID) and in the international oil and gas industry in particular (Energy 
Charter Treaty).  In addition, the large number of financing sources, financing structures, fiscal 
regimes and risk management tools demonstrate that organizations are continually experimenting 
with new techniques for mitigating and re-allocating risk.   
 
Finally, Columbia University law Professor Louis Henkin has observed “It is probably the case 
that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international law and almost all of their 
obligations almost all of the time”.416  This includes contracts, bilateral treaties and multilateral 
treaties.  The evidence in this study suggests that this observation is also valid in the oil and gas 
industry.  Of the approximately 1,500 major transactions that take place each year in the oil and 
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gas industry, only a small number result in disputes before the ICSID or some other international 
tribunal.  This is the case despite the fact, that there is no supranational organization capable of 
enforcing international contracts and bilateral treaties.  This is in part because parties to an 
agreement want the other side to comply with its obligations and one way to encourage this 
compliance is to meet one’s own obligations; and second, parties honor their commitments 
because if they do not, other parties will be reluctant to contract with them again. 
 
8.2 Next Steps 
This study has examined several research questions in considerable detail, but there is a need for 
additional research at the institutional level, the operational level and the quantitative level.   
 
Institutional Level 
First, the process by which individual institutions have been created and the role that specific 
organizations have played in the development of those institutions, need to be understood in 
greater detail.   
 
Operational Level 
Second, the process by which the parties to a transaction allocate the various types of risk 
between them, needs to be better understood.  Third, the process by which IOCs evaluate 
political risk needs to be investigated in more detail.  Fourth, the political motivations, rather 
than economic motivations, for signing bilateral treaties needs to be better understood.  Fifth, 
energy diplomacy, in all its forms, needs to be better defined and its impact on the countries that 
practice it, better understood. 
 
Quantitative Level 
Sixth, this study indicated that the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed and the 
quality of its governance are not reliable predictors of the number of cases brought against it in 
an international court or tribunal.   The variables contributing to the number of cases brought 
before an international court or tribunal should be studied in more detail.   
 
Seventh, it was observed that if the United States is excluded from the comparison of the number 
of bilateral treaties a country has signed and FDI outflows and inflows, there appears to be a 
relationship between them, but the large number of countries clustered on the left side of the 
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chart indicated that there are other factors affecting the number of bilateral investment treaties a 
country signs.  The variables influencing the number of bilateral treaties a country has signed 
need to be investigated further. 
  
Eighth, the apparent absence of a relationship between the quality of financial reporting and 
foreign direct investment needs to be analyzed further to determine whether this result is correct 
or whether reporting quality has not been operationalized correctly.   
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Appendix I - Total Petroleum Liquids Consumptions and Production 
Table A.1 below shows total petroleum liquids consumption in 66 countries, between 2008 and 
2012.   
 
Table A.1 - Total Petroleum Liquids Consumption  
(Thousand Barrels Per Day) 
     
 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
United States 19,498.0  18,771.4  19,180.1  18,882.1  18,490.2  
China 7,467.5  8,539.7  9,330.2  9,852.1  10,276.8  
Japan 4,798.2  4,389.9  4,455.5  4,470.7  4,726.3  
India 2,864.0  3,112.7  3,255.4  3,410.5  3,621.8  
Russia 2,906.0  2,950.4  2,992.1  3,115.0  3,195.5  
Saudi Arabia 1,979.9  2,194.5  2,371.4  2,816.0  2,861.0  
Brazil 2,204.6  2,481.5  2,621.8  2,721.6  2,806.9  
Germany 2,542.3  2,453.0  2,469.6  2,396.6  2,388.4  
Korea, South 2,142.3  2,188.5  2,268.5  2,257.7  2,301.0  
Canada 2,224.9  2,162.9  2,264.6  2,266.0  2,280.8  
Mexico 2,161.1  2,070.7  2,080.4  2,113.4  2,144.1  
France 1,945.4  1,868.4  1,833.4  1,792.4  1,739.8  
Iran 1,741.9  1,765.9  1,726.4  1,700.0  1,709.4  
Indonesia 1,360.9  1,405.9  1,465.5  1,534.7  1,590.0  
United Kingdom 1,726.1  1,636.8  1,621.5  1,583.8  1,502.7  
Singapore 1,006.5  1,169.6  1,380.1  1,380.0  1,380.0  
Italy 1,666.8  1,544.2  1,544.2  1,493.8  1,352.8  
Spain 1,547.0  1,467.5  1,441.0  1,385.3  1,289.0  
Australia 1,054.7  1,041.8  1,059.7  1,104.6  1,126.1  
Taiwan 888.8  933.3  972.0  1,030.0  1,079.9  
Netherlands 1,068.7  1,005.2  1,019.8  1,016.5  1,020.8  
Thailand 729.1  973.5  1,010.5  1,020.0  1,009.0  
Venezuela 862.4  674.7  718.2  750.9  776.9  
Egypt 700.7  720.7  737.6  745.0  755.0  
Iraq 585.0  643.5  662.0  720.0  751.2  
Argentina 581.9  588.6  620.3  678.0  698.8  
Turkey 655.3  678.1  649.8  655.4  694.2  
United Arab Emirates 620.0  565.9  618.3  618.0  618.0  
Belgium 716.6  630.2  655.2  622.6  617.8  
South Africa 526.9  532.6  549.4  595.0  608.8  
Malaysia 669.1  585.1  598.4  598.0  598.0  
Poland 535.9  541.1  564.2  559.5  522.0  
Pakistan 389.8  390.9  392.3  418.0  440.1  
Vietnam 292.8  294.0  320.4  365.0  387.9  
Kuwait 325.3  372.1  383.4  383.0  383.0  
Chile 369.9  367.6  322.9  333.9  356.2  
Algeria 286.3  319.1  323.3  330.0  328.1  
Ukraine 337.6  293.8  289.2  300.0  318.8  
Greece 428.9  403.4  372.5  351.0  317.9  
Sweden 336.8  318.3  335.8  324.1  310.8  
Philippines 300.2  295.1  309.2  316.0  302.3  
Hong Kong 296.0  353.3  382.5  365.0  289.6  
Colombia 259.8  257.5  267.5  282.0  287.2  
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Israel 246.1  232.8  251.3  247.6  281.5  
Nigeria 269.1  242.5  242.2  240.0  269.9  
Austria 282.7  271.5  279.3  265.3  258.8  
Syria 309.6  314.5  317.8  320.0  257.6  
Kazakhstan 247.5  210.0  206.3  216.0  250.7  
Switzerland 267.4  259.8  265.6  246.6  249.9  
Portugal 288.3  274.7  274.5  260.6  234.0  
Norway 229.3  225.3  222.3  223.9  221.9  
Romania 230.9  201.3  193.5  217.0  216.3  
Ecuador 219.8  208.1  226.4  216.0  212.7  
Morocco 215.7  235.3  243.9  240.0  206.2  
Finland 217.6  206.4  215.9  207.7  196.5  
Czech Republic 215.0  205.5  201.4  196.9  195.5  
Qatar 165.5  134.2  123.3  160.0  189.7  
Belarus 157.3  182.5  152.4  188.0  187.6  
Peru 186.5  188.2  192.5  182.0  171.7  
Cuba 141.4  169.6  163.9  184.0  170.9  
Libya 257.7  262.9  280.3  130.0  170.4  
Denmark 181.1  166.5  167.5  164.0  155.5  
Puerto Rico 175.2  155.6  176.0  152.0  152.6  
Virgin Islands,  U.S. 108.3  111.3  113.5  138.0  152.4  
New Zealand 157.4  150.6  151.6  150.9  149.8  
Oman 121.6  108.6  113.5  123.0  144.9  
All Other 4,203.7  4,247.4  4,317.7  4,421.2  4,481.0  
Total   84,696.7  84,918.2  87,528.8  88,744.0  89,432.6  
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Total Petroleum Consumption, Last accessed on July 9, 2014 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=5&aid=2 
 
Table A.2 shows total petroleum liquids production in 33 countries, between 2009 and 2013.  
Table A.2 - Total Petroleum Liquids Production  
(Thousand Barrels Per Day) 
 
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 
United States 9,133.8  9,684.5  10,136.2  11,109.6  12,316.1  
Saudi Arabia 9,819.2  10,642.3  11,264.3  11,725.7  11,591.9  
Russia 9,933.8  10,156.9  10,239.2  10,397.0  10,498.2  
China 4,067.5  4,362.7  4,347.0  4,372.4  4,459.4  
Canada 3,318.8  3,441.7  3,597.3  3,856.4  4,096.6  
Iran 4,178.3  4,243.1  4,265.0  3,589.4  3,422.0  
United Arab Emirates 2,794.6  2,813.2  3,088.3  3,213.2  3,229.6  
Iraq 2,399.2  2,402.9  2,629.0  2,986.6  3,057.7  
Mexico 3,000.8  2,978.6  2,960.0  2,936.0  2,907.8  
Kuwait 2,505.9  2,460.3  2,691.8  2,796.8  2,811.8  
Brazil 2,561.7  2,712.5  2,685.2  2,651.9  2,712.0  
Venezuela 2,509.7  2,405.0  2,489.2  2,489.2  2,489.2  
Nigeria 2,212.2  2,459.4  2,554.5  2,524.1  2,373.2  
Qatar 1,573.2  1,787.9  1,936.4  2,032.6  2,067.3  
Algeria 1,909.8  1,881.0  1,863.0  1,875.2  1,846.9  
Angola 1,908.0  1,947.8  1,799.9  1,831.6  1,838.5  
Norway 2,352.6  2,134.6  2,007.4  1,902.1  1,826.1  
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Kazakhstan 1,541.6  1,608.7  1,638.4  1,605.9  1,653.0  
Colombia 690.3  805.9  938.5  969.1  1,028.5  
Libya 1,790.1  1,789.1  501.5  1,483.0  1,000.5  
India 873.6  965.3  995.8  990.2  982.2  
Oman 818.9  869.9  890.9  923.8  945.1  
Indonesia 1,053.2  1,038.7  1,015.5  974.3  925.7  
Azerbaijan 1,015.9  1,044.9  993.2  931.9  883.3  
United Kingdom (Offshore) 1,422.1  1,318.7  1,084.1  922.4  836.3  
Egypt 728.6  717.4  725.7  720.0  709.9  
Argentina 801.7  790.5  763.7  723.2  707.9  
Malaysia 693.9  683.1  626.0  642.7  630.5  
Ecuador 485.7  487.3  500.6  504.5  527.0  
Thailand 428.7  430.3  448.8  465.3  473.4  
Australia 592.5  604.1  530.5  519.1  446.7  
Vietnam 339.8  332.3  323.6  363.5  352.0  
Equatorial Guinea 346.0  322.7  298.9  310.4  290.8  
Other 5,145.4  5,183.4  5,058.8  4,420.7  4,398.0  
Total  84,947.1  87,506.5  87,887.8  89,759.8  90,335.2  
 
Source: U.S. Energy Information Administration, Total Oil Supply, 
http://www.eia.gov/cfapps/ipdbproject/IEDIndex3.cfm?tid=5&pid=53&aid=1, Last accessed on July 9, 2014. 
 
Figure A.1 – Crude Oil Prices 1861-2013 
Figure A.1 presents crude oil prices in the money of the day and 2013 dollars 
 
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy June 2014, http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/about-
bp/energy-economics/statistical-review-of-world-energy/review-by-energy-type/oil/oil-prices.html  
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Table A.3 presents a list of risks in the oil and gas industry.  This study focuses on the risks in 
bold font. 
 
Table A.3 - Types of Risk in the Oil and Gas Industry 
Below-Ground Uncertainty  Above-Ground Uncertainty 
Resource Domestic Politics 
Technologies International Politics 
Product Quality Economics 
Technical Performance Regulation 
Supplier Performance Contracts 
Costs Corruption and Fraud 
Timing and Project Schedule Fiscal Terms 
Contractor Performance Partners 
Operations Logistics Joint Ventures 
Project Execution Alliances  
 Corporate Governance  
 Competitors 
 Human Resources 
 Community 
 Security/Terrorism/Piracy 
 Health and Safety 
 Public Relations and Reputation Risks 
 Environment 
 Natural Disasters 
 
Adapted from David Wood, Petroleum Economics, Risk and Opportunity Analysis, Chapter 10 in Betty J. Simkins and 
Russell E. Simkins, Energy Finance and Economics – Analysis and Valuation, Risk Management, and the Future of 
Energy (Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2013) p. 240 
 
Appendix II Expropriations and the Price of Oil 
Table A.4 presents a comparison of the number of expropriations, the average price of crude oil 
in the United States and the average world price of crude oil. 
 
Table A.4 - Comparison of the Number of Expropriations and the Price of Oil 
(Dollars per Barrel and Percent Change)  
     
Year  
Number of 
Expropriations 
Annual 
Average 
U.S. 
Crude 
Oil Price 
Change 
in the 
Price of 
U.S. 
Crude 
Oil in 
Dollars 
Change 
in the 
Price of 
U.S. 
Crude 
Oil in 
Percent 
 
Annual 
Average 
Global 
Crude 
Oil Price 
Change 
in the 
Global 
Price of 
Crude 
Oil in 
Dollars 
Change 
in the 
Global 
Price of 
Crude 
Oil in 
Percent 
1960 1 $2.91 
   
$1.90  
  
1961 2 $2.85 ($0.06) -2.11% 
 
$1.80  ($0.10) -5.56% 
1962 3 $2.85 $0.00  0.00% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
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1963 1 $2.91 $0.06  2.06% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1964 1 $3.00 $0.09  3.00% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1965 1 $3.01 $0.01  0.33% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1966 0 $3.10 $0.09  2.90% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1967 1 $3.12 $0.02  0.64% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1968 2 $3.18 $0.06  1.89% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1969 5 $3.32 $0.14  4.22% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1970 3 $3.39 $0.07  2.06% 
 
$1.80  $0.00  0.00% 
1971 5 $3.60 $0.21  5.83%   $2.24  $0.44  19.64% 
1972 9 $3.60 $0.00  0.00%   $2.48  $0.24  9.68% 
1973 11 $4.75 $1.15  24.21%   $3.29  $0.81  24.62% 
1974 13 $9.35 $4.60  49.20%   $11.58  $8.29  71.59% 
1975 10 $12.21 $2.86  23.42%   $11.53  ($0.05) -0.43% 
1976 9 $13.10 $0.89  6.79%   $12.80  $1.27  9.92% 
1977 6 $14.40 $1.30  9.03%   $13.92  $1.12  8.05% 
1978 1 $14.95 $0.55  3.68%   $14.02  $0.10  0.71% 
1979 5 $25.10 $10.15  40.44%   $31.61  $17.59  55.65% 
1980 1 $37.42 $12.32  32.92% 
 
$36.83  $5.22  14.17% 
1981 2 $35.75 ($1.67) -4.67% 
 
$35.93  ($0.90) -2.50% 
1982 0 $31.83 ($3.92) -12.32% 
 
$32.97  ($2.96) -8.98% 
1983 0 $29.08 ($2.75) -9.46% 
 
$29.55  ($3.42) -11.57% 
1984 0 $28.75 ($0.33) -1.15% 
 
$28.78  ($0.77) -2.68% 
1985 0 $26.92 ($1.83) -6.80% 
 
$27.56  ($1.22) -4.43% 
1986 0 $14.44 ($12.48) -86.43% 
 
$14.43  ($13.13) -90.99% 
1987 0 $17.75 $3.31  18.65% 
 
$18.44  $4.01  21.75% 
1988 0 $14.87 ($2.88) -19.37% 
 
$14.92  ($3.52) -23.59% 
1989 0 $18.33 $3.46  18.88% 
 
$18.23  $3.31  18.16% 
1990 0 $23.19 $4.86  20.96% 
 
$23.73  $5.50  23.18% 
1991 0 $20.20 ($2.99) -14.80% 
 
$20.00  ($3.73) -18.65% 
1992 0 $19.25 ($0.95) -4.94% 
 
$19.32  ($0.68) -3.52% 
1993 0 $16.75 ($2.50) -14.93% 
 
$16.97  ($2.35) -13.85% 
1994 0 $15.66 ($1.09) -6.96% 
 
$15.82  ($1.15) -7.27% 
1995 0 $16.75 $1.09  6.51% 
 
$17.02  $1.20  7.05% 
1996 0 $20.46 $3.71  18.13% 
 
$20.67  $3.65  17.66% 
1997 0 $18.64 ($1.82) -9.76% 
 
$19.09  ($1.58) -8.28% 
1998 0 $11.91 ($6.73) -56.51% 
 
$12.72  ($6.37) -50.08% 
1999 0 $16.56 $4.65  28.08% 
 
$17.97  $5.25  29.22% 
2000 0 $27.39 $10.83  39.54% 
 
$28.50  $10.53  36.95% 
2001 0 $23.00 ($4.39) -19.09% 
 
$24.44  ($4.06) -16.61% 
2002 0 $22.81 ($0.19) -0.83% 
 
$25.02  $0.58  2.32% 
2003 0 $27.69 $4.88  17.62% 
 
$28.83  $3.81  13.22% 
2004 1 $37.66 $9.97  26.47%   $38.27  $9.44  24.67% 
2005 0 $50.04 $12.38  24.74%   $54.52  $16.25  29.81% 
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2006 4 $58.30 $8.26  14.17%   $65.14  $10.62  16.30% 
2007 4 $64.20 $5.90  9.19%   $72.39  $7.25  10.02% 
2008 0 $91.48 $27.28  29.82%   $97.26  $24.87  25.57% 
2009 0 $53.48 ($38.00) -71.05%   $61.67  ($35.59) -57.71% 
2010 2 $71.21 $17.73  24.90%   $79.50  $17.83  22.43% 
2011 1 $87.04 $15.83  18.19%   $111.26  $31.76  28.55% 
2012 1 $86.46 ($0.58) -0.67% 
 
$111.67  $0.41  0.37% 
2013 0 $91.17 $4.71  5.17% 
 
$108.66  ($3.01) -2.77% 
2014 0 $53.45 ($37.72) -41.37% 
 
$55.27  ($53.39) -49.13% 
Jan 2015 0 $50.05 ($3.40) -6.36% $51.08 ($4.19) -7.58% 
 
Sources: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show 
http://inflationdata.com/Inflation/Inflation_Rate/Historical_Oil_Prices_Table.asp 
EIA, “Petroleum and Other Liquids”, Energy Information Administration, 
http://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_pri_spt_s1_d.htm 
Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin and Konstantin Sonin, “Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A Theory 
and Evidence from Panel Data,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, (2011) 27 (2): 301 
 
Summary of Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin’s Determinants of Nationalization 
Guriev, Kolotilin and Sonin analyzed the determinants of oil and gas asset nationalizations 
(expropriations) from1960 to 2006.  They found that the largest number of nationalizations took 
place when oil prices were rising rapidly relative to the long term price trend; and were more 
likely to occur in countries in which political institutions were weak.417  
 
Empirical Method 
Their model has two testable hypotheses (1) a positive oil price shock increases the risk of 
nationalization and (2) weak political institutions increase the risk of nationalization.  The 
dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether an expropriation took place in a 
given country in a given year (yes = 1, no =0) in firms in SIC codes 1300 (Oil and Gas 
Extraction) and 1310 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas).  Their study covers the period from 
1960 to 2006 and includes 98 nationalizations in 42 countries.  Hypothesis 1 asserts that the 
probability of nationalization depends on the deviation of the oil price from its long term trend, 
rather than on the trend itself.  To model this theory and derive empirical implications, they 
removed the trend from the data.    
                                                          
417 Sergei Guriev, Anton Kolotilin and Konstantin Sonin, “Determinants of Nationalization in the Oil Sector: A 
Theory and Evidence from Panel Data,” Journal of Law, Economics & Organization, (2011) 27 (2): 301 
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The independent variables include:  
(1) The deviation in price from the trend.  They refer to this variable as the “oil price shock”. 
 
(2) They also included the logarithm of the real oil price to determine whether the 
nationalizations were better explained by the oil price itself, or the “de-trended” change in price 
(1 above). 
 
(3) To evaluate the influence of the quality of institutions on the probability of expropriation they 
used the Polity IV data set prepared by Marshall and Jaggers.  This variable which they 
designated, XCONST, ranges from 1 to 7 (in which 1 is the lowest quality of institutions and 7 is 
the highest quality.  The XCONST variable captures the strength of institutions, understood as 
the rules of the game. (This reference to the “rules of the game” is included in their paper.) 
 
(4) They controlled for the general level of economic development by using the logarithm of the 
real gross domestic product (GDP) per capita.  The data was taken from the World Development 
Indicators, but they note that there are many gaps in these data prior to 1980 in less developed 
countries, where and when most nationalizations took place.  For this reason, they estimated the 
regression specifications with and without per capita GDP (the latter to increase the sample size).   
 
(5) In their model, governments are infinitely lived, but in reality, nationalizations may be driven 
by a change in regime.  The authors used the data on leadership turnover to control for this 
relationship.  The change in a ruler is a dummy variable, which indicates that there was a 
transition in a given country in a given year or there was not.  The data were compiled from 
www.worldstatesmen.com. 
 
Main Results 
The authors used a linear probability model with fixed country effects.  The results are presented 
in Table A.5.  Regression 1 indicates that nationalizations are more likely to occur when the oil 
price shock is large.  For example, an oil price shock of 38%, increases the probability of 
nationalization in a given country and year by approximately 1.2% (.030 x 38.0% = 1.14%)   
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There are approximately 130 countries in the sample, therefore a 38% increase in the price of oil 
relative to the trend, increases the number of nationalizations in a given year by approximately 
1.6, (130 x .012 = 1.56).  This is statistically and substantively significant given that oil 
nationalizations are rare.  The average number of nationalizations per year in 1960 - 2006 was 
2.1 (98 nationalizations/47 years = 2.09) with a standard deviation of 3.3 expropriations). 
 
 
Table A.5 - Regressions Using the Nationalization Dummy 
 
(1960-2006) 
      
  
Regression 
1 
Regression 
2 
Regression 
3 
Regression 
4 
Regression 
5 
Regression 
6 
 
Oil price shock 0.030 0.038 
  
0.037 0.037 
 
Standard Error (0.011)*** (0.013)*** 
  
(0.014)** (0.014)** 
 
Executive constraints 
 
-0.004 -0.004 -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 
 
Standard Error 
  
(0.001)*** (0.001)** (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
 
Log real price change 
  
0.042 
   
 
Standard Error 
   
0.042 
   
 
Log real oil price 
   
-0.002 
  
 
Standard Error  
   
(0.005) 
  
 
Log GDP per capita 
    
0.000 0.000 
 
Standard Error 
     
(0.005) (0.005) 
 
Change in 
government 
     
0.009 
 
Standard Error  
     
(0.005)* 
 
Observations 7567 5759 5759 5759 5030 4978 
 
R-squared 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.09 
 
Observations = 161 countries x 47 years per country = 7,567 
Observations = 161 countries x an average of 36 years per country = 5,796 
Observations = 107 countries x 47 years per country = 5030 
Observations = 106 countries x 47 years per country = 4,978 
 
All regressions use the linear probability model with country fixed effects; Standard errors are clustered at the year 
level.   
In regressions 1, 2, 5, and 6, the authors use the oil price shock, that is, the deviation of the log real price of oil from 
its 50-year trend.  
In regression 3, the authors replace the oil price shock with the log of the change in real oil price.  
In regression 4, the authors use the log of the real price of oil.  
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
*Significant at 10% level; **Significant at 5% level; ***Significant at 1% level. 
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Regression 2 indicates that controlling for price shock and country fixed effects (i.e. factors that 
do not vary with time, such as legal origin, colonial legacies, religion and culture), a higher 
quality of institutions reduces the risk of nationalization.  The effects are statistically and 
substantively significant.  For example, if the quality of institutions change by 1.9 points (on a 
scale from 1 to 7).  This change in institutional quality implies a change of .8% in the number of 
nationalizations in a given country-year (1.9 x -.004 = .008).  Multiplying the number of 
countries in the sample (130) by .8% gives 1.0 more nationalization per year.  Again this is 
statistically and substantively significant given that expropriations in general are rare.   The R
2
 
value in every regression involving the quality of political institutions, XCONST, is between .07 
and .09 however R
2
 is not an appropriate measure of goodness of fit in a dichotomous linear 
probability model. 
 
Regressions 3 and 4 tests whether the results are similar for the year over year change in price 
and the price itself, respectively.  Neither is statistically significant, therefore nationalizations are 
not correlated with the year over year change in price or the price itself.   
 
Regressions 5 and 6 control for GDP per capita and for changes in government leadership; 
adding these variables does not affect the coefficients of the oil price shock or executive 
constraints; and per capita GDP and a regime change does not increase the risk of 
nationalization.  
 
Figure A.2 - Number of oil expropriations (left vertical axis) and oil price deviation from 
the long-term trend (right vertical axis), 1910-2006 
 
 
Source: Guriev et al. (2008). 
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Table A.6 - Detailed Chronology of Privatizations and Expropriations (1989 to 2014) 
 
1989 - Repsol (a Spanish oil company) was privatized by selling 100% of the company to the 
public between 1989 and 1997.   
 
1990-1991- No expropriations were reported. 
 
1992 - Total (a French oil company) began the process of privatizing the company.  The 
company sold a 30% interest to the public in 1992 and the remaining 70% to the public in 1998.   
 
08/24/1992 - ARCO and Sun Co. Inc. agreed to separate settlements totaling almost $261 million 
that resolved their claims over oil field assets expropriated by Iran in 1978-80.  The agreements 
were subject to approval by the Iran-U.S. claims tribunal at The Hague.  The tribunal was set up 
in 1981 to resolve foreign claims to assets nationalized by the government of Ayatollah 
Khomeini following the fall of the Shah of Iran during the 1978-79 Iranian revolution.
418
  
 
12/13/1993 - (1) Effective November 18, 1993 Peru established a new state petroleum company, 
Perupetro SA, to oversee new and existing contract responsibilities of Petroleos del Peru SA 
(Petroperu), which was to be privatized in 1994.  Petroperu would continue to operate its oil 
field, refining, transportation, and marketing assets.  (This privatization had not occurred as of 
August 7, 2014.)  (2) In addition, the government of Peru made a $30 million payment to AIG in 
late September 1993.  AIG was owed $184.8 million because they were Belco’s insurer.  Belco’s 
assets were expropriated by the Peruvian government in December 1985.
419
 
420
 
 
1993 - Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited (ONGC) sold a 16% interest to the public. 
 
1994 - OAO Gazprom (a Russian natural gas company) sold a 62% interest to the public; and 
Lukoil (a Russian oil company) became a private sector company (100%).   
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http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-90/issue-34/in-this-issue/general-interest/arco-and-sun-agree-to-
settle-iranian-claims.html 
419
 Oil & Gas Journal, “Peru Marks Progress in Privatizing Petroleum,” (12/13/1993) 
http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-91/issue-50/in-this-issue/general-interest/peru-marks-progress-in-
privatizing-petroleum.html 
420
 Oil & Gas Journal, “Industry Briefs,” (10/04/1993) http://www.ogj.com/articles/print/volume-91/issue-40/in-
this-issue/general-interest/industry-briefs.html 
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09/05/1994 - Peru agreed to pay $55 million in compensation to a German group for the military 
government's 1974 expropriation of the undeveloped Aguaytia gas field and the producing 
Maquia oil field in Peru's central jungle.
421
 
 
1995 - (1) Three privatizations occurred.  IndianOil Corporation Limited sold 11% of its shares 
to the public.  As of 2014, the Indian government owned 79% and the public owned 21%.  (2) 
Enersis S.A (ENI, Italy) sold a 15% interest in the company to the public.  (3) Petróleo Brasileiro 
S.A. sold a 49% interest in the company to the public. 
 
1996-1999 - No significant privatizations or expropriations occurred. 
 
2000 - Two significant partial privatizations occurred.  China Petrochemical Corporation 
(SINOPEC) began the sale of a 24% interest in the company to the public; and PetroChina 
Company Limited (PetroChina) began the sale of a 14% interest in the company to the public.  
 
2001 - Three significant partial privatizations occurred.   (1) The Chinese National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) sold a 29% share of its common stock to the public.  (2) Statoil, a 
Norwegian national oil company, sold a 38% interest to the public.  (3) Public ownership in ENI 
was increased to 70%. 
 
2002 - No expropriations were reported.  
 
2003 - Following a tax reassessment, the Russian government presented OAO Yukos with a 
series of tax claims that totaled US $27 billion.  Yukos' assets were frozen by the government at 
the same time and the company was therefore unable to pay these tax claims.
422
  Most of Yukos's 
assets would subsequently be sold at low prices to oil companies owned by the Russian 
government.
423  
(See entry for 11/19/2004.)  The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of 
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Europe condemned Russia's campaign against Yukos and its owners as “manufactured” for 
political reasons and a violation of human rights.
424 
 
 
03/02/2004 - Marathon Oil Corp. cancelled its proposed LNG complex in Baja California, after 
the state government appropriated the land near Tijuana known as "Il Monumento," for public 
use, an area which included land Marathon had selected for its project.  Marathon had options to 
purchase the land, but did not own it at the time the property was taken.
425
 
 
07/20/2004 - Bolivian President, Carlos Mesa, declared victory regarding the referendum to 
increase state involvement in the country’s gas reserves, after early returns showed that Bolivians 
approved all five measures on the ballot. 
426
 
 
08/02/2004 - The Overseas Private Investment Corp (OPIC) denied charges made by 
Venezuela's state-owned oil company Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) that the U.S. 
agency's decision to pay $6 million on an insurance claim to Science Applications International 
Corp. (SAIC), an information technology contractor, was politically motivated.
427
 
 
11/19/2004 - The Russian government announced bidding opened for an auction of a subsidiary 
of OAO Yukos to be held on December 19, 2004.  The auction of 76.79% of Yuganskneftegaz 
was open to international companies.  The Russian government required a $1.7 billion deposit to 
bid and set the minimum bid at $8.6 billion. Yukos claimed the subsidiary's value was $20 
billion.
428
 
 
2005 - There were no expropriations or threats of expropriation. 
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05/08/2006 - Bolivia demanded that Brazil’s state-run Petroleo Brasileiro SA (Petrobras), Royal 
Dutch Shell PLC, and other private firms turn over their Bolivian retail networks to state-owned 
Yacimientos Petroliferas Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB) within 180 days.
429
 
 
05/17/2006 - Occidental Petroleum Corp. filed an arbitration claim against Ecuador on May 17, 
2006 seeking reparation for losses following Ecuador’s termination of Occidental’s exploration 
and development contract and the immediate confiscation of the company’s Amazon oil field 
operations in Block 15 and its Eden-Yuturi, Limonchcha, Indillana, Paca Norte, Paca Sur, and 
Yanaquincha fields on May 15, 2006. 
 
Occidental filed a claim with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes 
(ICSID), invoking the US-Ecuador Bilateral Investment Treaty to try to restore the company’s 
rights in Ecuador and prevent the Ecuadorian government from turning operations over to a third 
party, until the claim was settled.
430
 
 
06/05/2006 - (1) Bolivia’s President Evo Morales issued a decree reaffirming that Brazil’s state-
run Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. (Petrobras), Royal Dutch Shell PLC, and other private firms must 
turn over their Bolivian retail networks within a month to state-owned Yacimientos Petroliferas 
Fiscales Bolivianos (YPFB).  He also demanded that Petrobras, which owned 25% of the 
country’s retail outlets, give up its 27,250 b/d refinery at Cochabamba and a 20,000 b/d refinery 
at Santa Cruz de la Sierra.
431
  (2)Alaska’s Governor Frank H. Murkowski released a revised 
natural gas pipeline agreement negotiated with the three North Slope oil producers, which he 
said the oil companies were ready to sign if the state legislature approved it.
432
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08/01/2006 - A Russian court declared OAO Yukos bankrupt.
433
  
 
09/25/2006 - (1) A Russian government injunction rescinded permits for the second phase of 
Sakhalin-2, alleging threats to marine life resulting from inadequate environmental safeguards.  
Shell and its partners Mitsubishi and Mitsui, disputed the claims, but revocation of the permits 
effectively suspended the project.  In addition, Interfax reported that an official of the Natural 
Resources Ministry had implied that the other projects at Sakhalin Island were in violation of 
their licenses.  At the same time, Gazprom was lobbying for a stake in the Sakhalin-2 venture. 
(2) The Financial Times reported threats by Russian prosecutors to suspend the license of TNK-
BP to develop Kovytka gas field in eastern Siberia.  In that case, as with Sakhalin-2, the 
allegations were related to environmental issues.
434
 
 
01/15/2007- An agreement was signed between Royal Dutch Shell PLC and OAO Gazprom, the 
Russian state-owned natural gas company, under which Gazprom would become the majority 
shareholder in the Sakhalin-2 LNG Project.  Under the terms of the agreement, Gazprom would 
purchase 50% plus one share of the project for $7.45 billion, thereby forcing Shell and its 
partners, Mitsui & Co. Ltd. and Mitsubishi Corp. to dilute their interest by 50% in order to 
accommodate their new partner, Gazprom.  Shell was forced to give up majority control in one 
of its most valuable assets after having invested over $6 billion to develop the project. 
 
Immediately following the agreement, Russian President Vladimir Putin held a press conference 
at which he announced that the environmental violations at Sakhalin-2 had been resolved to the 
satisfaction of the Russian regulatory authorities.
435
 
 
06/27/2007 - Petroleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) assumed ownership of ConocoPhillips's 
interests in the Petrozuata and Hamaca heavy-oil ventures in Venezuela and the offshore 
Corocoro development project, after PDVSA and ConocoPhillips were unable to reach an 
agreement under which ConocoPhillips would transition to a “Empresa Mixta" structure 
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mandated by Venezuelan law.  ConocoPhillips said it intended to record a complete impairment 
of its interest in its oil projects in Venezuela which it valued at $4.5 billion.  Prior to the 
expropriation of its interests, ConocoPhillips held a 50.1% interest in Petrozuata, a 40% interest 
in Hamaca, and a 32.5% interest in Corocoro.
436
   
 
10/2007 - In October 2007, Ecuador’s President Rafael Correa imposed a windfall profits tax on 
oil and operations whereby the government would receive 99% of oil profits, changing the prior 
law which required a 50-50 split of profits.
437
  
 
2008 - There were no reports of expropriation or privatization.    
 
04/19/2010 - Rafael Correa, president of Ecuador, the smallest oil producer within the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, said a bill would be introduced in the legislature 
that would allow expropriation of those companies that refused to convert their production-
sharing contracts into service contracts.
438
  
 
07/02/2010 - Venezuela nationalized 11 oil rigs owned by Helmerich & Payne (H&P).
439
  
 
03/29/2011 - Madagascar Oil of Houston, declared force majeure under the four production-
sharing contracts for Blocks 3104, 3105, 3106, and 3107 that it operated in Madagascar in order 
to safeguard its rights under those agreements.  The company said the declaration of force 
majeure was made in response to the threat of expropriation made by the Minister of Mines and 
Hydrocarbons and the failure by the Ministry to instruct the state regulatory authority to proceed 
with the approval of Madagascar Oil’s 2011 work program.440  
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04/23/2012 - Argentina took control of the energy company YPF SA.  The Spanish company 
Repsol, part owner of YPF SA issued a statement saying it would take all legal measures to 
preserve the value of its assets and the interests of its shareholders.  Repsol valued YPF SA at 
$18 billion of which Repsol owned 57.43%.
441
 
 
04/26/2012 - Argentina’s Senate approved a bill to expropriate YPF and the Lower House of 
Congress was expected to vote on the measure.
442
 
Source: Entries above not assigned a citation are from Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil & 
Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance, (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation,), 2011, p. 62 
The complete listing of media reports of expropriations can be found at the Oil & Gas Journal website, 
http://www.ogj.co*m/_search?q=expropriation. 
 
Appendix III - List of Cases Reported by UNCTAD Related to Oil and Natural Gas 
 
Table A.7 - Complete List of Cases Reported by UNCTAD Related to Oil and Natural Gas 
Year 
Case 
was 
Initiated 
Year 
Award 
was 
Rendered 
Parties 
Amount 
Sought by 
Investor 
Amount 
Awarded to 
Investor 
Status 
1996 1999 
Biederman v. 
Kazakhstan 
unknown 
US$ 8.9 million 
awarded 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
2002 2004 
Occidental Exploration 
and Production 
Company v. Ecuador 
(LCIA Case No. 
UN3467) 
US$ 
201,563,930 
US$ 71,533,649 
awarded plus 
simple interest of 
US$ 3,541,280 to 1 
January 2004, plus 
simple interest of 
2.75% to date of 
award; London 
Court of Appeal 
dismissed request 
for review on 4 July 
2007 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
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2001 2005 
CMS Gas Transmission 
Company v. Argentina 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/01/8) 
US$ 261.1 
million (or 243.6 
million and 
shares) plus 
interest 
US$ 132 million 
plus interest 
awarded; The 
application for 
annulment of 
Argentina was 
partially dismissed 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
2003 2005 
Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan (Arb. No. 
126/2003) 
US$ 4,084,651 
plus interest 
US$ 1,130,859 
awarded plus 
interest; 
Application for 
setting aside of 
award rejected by 
Svea Court of 
Appeal on 13 April 
2006 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
2001 2007 
Enron Corporation 
and Ponderosa Assets 
LP v. Argentina (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/01/3) 
up to US$ 582 
million 
US$ 106.2 million 
awarded plus 
interest (2%); 
annulment 
proceeding 
pending 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
2002 2007 
Sempra Energy 
International v. 
Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/16) 
approximately 
US$ 210 million 
US$ 128,250,462 
awarded plus 
interest (2% 
beginning on 1 
January 2007 until 
the date of the 
award); annulment 
proceeding 
pending 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
2005 2009 
Saipem S.p.A. v. 
People's Republic of 
Bangladesh (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/05/7) 
US$ 
5,883,770.80, 
and US$ 
265,000.00 and 
€ 110,995.92 
awarded plus 
interest 
US$ 5,883,770.80, 
and US$ 
265,000.00 and € 
110,995.92 
awarded plus 
interest 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
2003 2007 
BG Group Plc v. 
Argentina 
US$ 238.1 
million 
Tribunal has 
jurisdiction and 
awards US$ 
185,285,485.85 
plus interest and 
arbitration costs 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
investor 
     
8 
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2001 2004 
CCL Oil v. Kazakhstan 
(SCC Case 122/2001) 
Euro 
178,892,338 
Tribunal has 
jurisdiction; 
Tribunal rejects 
claims on the 
merits (awards 
only partly public) 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
1999 2005 
Methanex Corp. v. 
United States 
US$ 970 million 
including 
interest and 
costs 
claim dismissed in 
its entirety 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
2003 2006 
Encana v. Ecuador 
(LCIA Case No. 
UN3481) 
Approx. C$ 100 
million 
(equivalent to 
approx. US$ 70 
million) 
$330,000 awarded 
to plaintiff 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
2002 2007 
LG&E Energy Corp., 
LG&E Capital Corp. 
and LG&E 
International Inc. v. 
Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/1) 
Approx. US $248 
million plus 
interest 
Tribunal partially 
granted investor's 
claims; US $57.4 
million plus 
interest 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
2003 2008 
Plama Consortium 
Limited v. Republic of 
Bulgaria (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/24) 
US$ 300 million 
Tribunal has 
jurisdiction but 
claims dismissed 
on the merits 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
2006 2009 
Azpetrol International 
Holdings B.V., 
Azpetrol Group B.V. 
and Azpetrol Oil 
Services Group B.V. v. 
Republic of Azerbaijan 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/15) 
unknown 
tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
2008 2010 
Mohammad Ammar 
Al-Bahloul v. Republic 
of Tajikistan, SCC Case 
No. V (064/2008) 
$227 million  300,000 Euros 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
2010 2010 
RSM Production 
Corporation and 
others v. Grenada 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/6) 
unknown 
Tribunal finds 
claims manifestly 
without legal merit 
awarded 
in favor 
of the 
state 
     
8 
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2003 Pending 
Camuzzi International 
SA v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/2) 
unknown pending pending 
2003 Pending 
Gas Natural SDG, S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/10) 
unknown pending pending 
2003 pending 
Pan American Energy 
LLC and BP Argentina 
Exploration Company 
v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/13) 
(consolidated with 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/8) 
unknown pending pending 
2003 pending 
El Paso Energy 
International 
Company v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/03/15) 
unknown pending pending 
2004 pending 
Wintershall 
Aktiengesellschaft v. 
Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/14) 
unknown 
tribunal lacks 
jurisdiction 
pending 
2004 pending 
Total S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/1) 
Approx. US$ 1 
billion 
pending; Tribunal 
has jurisdiction 
(decision not public 
yet) 
pending 
2004 pending 
Mobil Exploration and 
Development Inc. Suc. 
Argentina and Mobil 
Argentina S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/16) 
unknown pending pending 
2005 pending 
RosInvestCo. UK Ltd. 
v. Russian Federation 
(V 079 / 2005) 
unknown pending pending 
2005 2014 
Yukos Universal Ltd. v. 
Russian Federation 
(PCA Case No. AA 227) 
$114 billion 
sought by 3 
investors 
against the 
Russian 
Federation  
Court orders Russia 
to pay $50 billion 
for seizing Yukos 
assets 
 
Award in 
favor of 
Investor 
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(amount sought 
by each investor 
is not available) 
2005 2014 
Hulley Enterprises Ltd. 
v. Russian Federation 
(PCA Case No. AA 226) 
$114 billion 
sought by 3 
investors 
against the 
Russian 
Federation  
(amount sought 
by each investor 
is not available 
Court orders Russia 
to pay $50 billion 
for seizing Yukos 
assets 
 
Award in 
favor of 
Investor  
2005 2014 
Veteran Petroleum 
Ltd. v. Russian 
Federation (PCA Case 
No. AA 228) 
$114 billion 
sought by 3 
investors 
against the 
Russian 
Federation  
(amount sought 
by each investor 
is not available 
Court orders Russia 
to pay $50 billion 
for seizing Yukos 
assets 
 
Award in 
favor of 
Investor 
2005 pending 
Ioannis 
Kardossopoulos v. 
Georgia (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/05/18) 
US $350 million 
pending; Tribunal 
has jurisdiction 
pending 
2006 Pending 
Chevron Block Twelve 
& Chevron Blocks 
Thirteen and Fourteen 
v. People’s Republic of 
Bangladesh (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/10) 
unknown pending pending 
2006 pending 
Occidental Petroleum 
Corporation and 
Occidental Exploration 
and Production 
Company v. Republic 
of Ecuador and 
Empresa Estatal 
Petróleos del Ecuador 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/11) 
US $1 billion pending pending 
198 
 
2006 pending 
Renta 4 et al v Russian 
Federation (SCC Case 
No 24/2007) 
up to US$ 40 
million 
pending; Tribunal 
has jurisdiction 
pending 
2006 pending 
Chevron Corporation 
and Texaco Petroleum 
Corporation v Ecuador 
up to US$ 553 
million plus 
interest 
pending; Tribunal 
has jurisdiction 
pending 
2006 pending 
The Rompetrol Group 
N.V. v. Romania (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/06/3) 
unknown 
pending; Tribunal 
has jurisdiction 
pending 
2007 pending 
Liman Caspian Oil BV 
and NCL Dutch 
Investment BV v. 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/07/14) 
unknown pending pending 
2007 pending 
Shell Nigeria Ultra 
Deep Limited v. 
Federal Republic of 
Nigeria (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/18) 
at least $500 
million 
pending pending 
2007 pending 
Ron Fuchs v. Republic 
of Georgia (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/15) 
unknown pending pending 
2007 pending 
ConocoPhillips 
Petrozuata B.V., 
ConocoPhillips 
Hamaca B.V. and 
ConocoPhillips Gulf of 
Paria B.V. v. Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/30) 
More than $6 
billion 
pending pending 
2008 pending 
Itera International 
Energy LLC and Itera 
Group NV v. Georgia 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/7) 
unknown pending pending 
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2008 pending 
Perenco Ecuador 
Limited v. Republic of 
Ecuador and Empresa 
Estatal Petróleos del 
Ecuador 
(Petroecuador) (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/6) 
unknown pending pending 
2008 pending 
Murphy Exploration 
and Production 
Company 
International v. 
Republic of Ecuador 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/4) 
unknown pending pending 
2008 pending 
Burlington Resources, 
Inc. and others v. 
Republic of Ecuador 
and Empresa Estatal 
Petróleos del Ecuador 
(Petroecuador) (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/5) 
unknown pending pending 
2008 pending 
Caratube International 
Oil Company LLP v. 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/12) 
unknown over US$ 2 billion pending 
2008 Pending 
Repsol YPF Ecuador, 
S.A. and others v. 
Republic of Ecuador 
and Empresa Estatal 
Petróleos del Ecuador 
(PetroEcuador) (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/10) 
unknown pending pending 
2009 pending 
Mærsk Olie, Algeriet 
A/S v. People's 
Democratic Republic 
of Algeria (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/09/14) 
unknown pending pending 
2009 pending 
Itera International 
Energy LLC and Itera 
Group NV v. Georgia 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/22) 
unknown pending pending 
2010 pending 
Ascom S.A v. 
Kazahkstan 
unknown unknown pending 
2010 pending 
Oil Tanking GMBH v. 
Bolivia 
unknown unknown pending 
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2010 pending 
Pan American Energy 
LLC v. Plurinational 
State of Bolivia (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/10/8) 
unknown unknown pending 
2010 pending 
Universal 
Compression 
International Holdings 
S.L.U. v Venezuela 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/10/9) 
up to US$ 380 
million 
pending pending 
2011 pending 
The Williams 
Companies, 
International Holdings 
B.V., WilPro Energy 
Services (El Furrial) 
Limited and WilPro 
Energy Services (Pigap 
II) Limited v. 
Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/11/10) 
unknown pending pending 
2011 Pending 
National Gas S.A.E. v. 
Arab Republic of Egypt 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/7) 
unknown pending pending 
2011 pending 
Mamidoil Jetoil Greek 
Petroleum Products 
Societe Anonyme S.A. 
v. Republic of Albania 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/11/24) 
USD 24 Million pending pending 
2012 pending 
Ampal-American Israel 
Corporation and 
others v. Arab 
Republic of Egypt 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/11) 
unknown pending pending 
2012 pending 
Repsol, S.A. and 
Repsol Butano, S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/12/38) 
$10 billion US pending pending 
     
38 
1997 1998 Ethyl Corp v. Canada 
not less than 
US$ 251 million 
plus interest 
case was settled 
for US$ 13 million 
after decision on 
settled 
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jurisdiction 
2003 2005 
Pioneer Natural 
Resources Company, 
Pioneer Natural 
Resources (Argentina) 
S.A. and Pioneer 
Natural Resources 
(Tierra del Fuego) S.A. 
v. Argentine Republic 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/12) 
unknown 
case was settled on 
undisclosed terms 
settled 
2004 2008 
BP America 
Production Company, 
Pan American Sur SRL, 
Pan American 
Fueguina, SRL and Pan 
American Continental 
SRLothers v. Argentine 
Republic (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/04/8) 
(consolidated with 
ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/13) 
unknown 
Tribunal has 
jurisdiction; 
settlement reached 
(terms are 
unknown) 
settled 
2006 2008 
Técnicas Reunidas, 
S.A. and Eurocontrol, 
S.A. v. Republic of 
Ecuador (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/06/17) 
approx US$ 35 
million 
settlement reached 
in May 2008 and 
proceedings 
discontinued 
settled 
2007 2008 
Mobil Investments 
Canada Inc. and 
Murphy Oil 
Corporation v. Canada 
(ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/07/4) 
approx US$ 60 
million 
parties reached a 
settlement (details 
of the settlement 
agreement are not 
public) 
settled 
2007 2008 
Eni Dación B.V. v. 
Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/4) 
up to US$ 1 
billion 
settlement agreed 
by the parties and 
proceeding 
discontinued at the 
request of the 
Claimant 
settled 
2008 2008 
AEI Luxembourg 
Holdings v Bolivia 
unknown settlement reached settled 
202 
 
2007 2009 
Trans-Global 
Petroleum, Inc. v. 
Hashemite Kingdom 
of Jordan (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/25) 
US$ 540 million 
claim is only partly 
manifestly without 
merit 
settled 
2012 2012 
Slovak Gas Holding 
BV, GDF International 
SAS and E.ON Ruhrgas 
International GmbH v. 
Slovak Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/12/7) 
unknown unknown settled 
2007 2014 
Mobil Corporation 
and others v. 
Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/07/27) 
Over $10.0 
billion 
$1.6 billion settled 
     
10 
2001 2006 
F-W Oil Interests, Inc. 
v. Republic of Trinidad 
& Tobago (ICSID Case 
No. ARB/01/14) 
over US$ 200 
million 
concluded (award 
not public) 
unknown 
2011 pending 
Türkiye Petrolleri 
Anonim Ortakligi v. 
Republic of 
Kazakhstan (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/11/2) 
unknown pending unknown 
2005 unknown 
Swiss investor v. 
South American Govt. 
unknown unknown unknown 
2008 unknown Tatneft v. Ukraine US  $1.1 billion unknown unknown 
     
4 
 
Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) 
http://iiadbcases.unctad.org/cases.aspx?col_year=show, no longer available, a “reduced” version is available at 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx 
 
Appendix IV - Production Service Agreements and Service Contracts 
Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 below demonstrate the distribution of revenue between an IOC and a 
host government or its national oil company in a Concession or Lease Agreement and a 
Production Sharing Agreement.  In both examples, the price per barrel is $100.  No inference 
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should be made regarding the split in revenue, because the percentages that the parties negotiate 
will ultimately determine how much of the revenue each will receive.   
 
In a Concession or Lease agreement, the IOC pays all production costs, receives all residual 
profits and absorbs all residual losses after paying royalties and taxes to the state.   The 
advantage to the host government is that it will receive income each quarter in the form of 
royalties whether the project is operating at a loss or a profit.  The state's royalty receipts are 
calculated before operating costs and the state’s tax receipts are calculated after operating costs, 
assuring the state an income stream even if oil prices decline or operating costs increase.  This 
example is a modern form of concession or lease agreement (royalty/tax system) because it 
contains a large “draw” on gross revenues in the form of taxes.   
 
Figure A.3 – Typical Concession or Lease Agreement (Royalty/Tax) 
($ per barrel) 
 
   
Gross 
Revenue 
    
 
IOC 
Share 
  
$100.0  
  
State 
Share 
 
 
   
  
    
 
   
Royalty @ 12%   $12.00  
 
 
   
$88.00  
    
 
   
  
    
 
       
 ($15.40) 
 
(Operating Cost 
    
 
   
$72.60  
    
 
    
Special Oil Tax @ 
60% $43.56  
 
 
        
 
   
$29.04  
    
 
    
  
   
     
Income Tax @ 30% $8.71  
 
    
$20.33  
    
    
  
    Total $20.33  
 
Profit 
  
$64.27  Total 
         
 
24.0% 
  
Percent of Total Net Cash Flow 76.0% 
  
Source: Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, 
Strategy and Finance. Chapter 6 (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2011), page 222 
 
Figure A.4 illustrates a typical production sharing agreement (PSA or PSC) with a 10% royalty, a 
60/40 profit split (state/IOC), and a 40% tax rate.  In principle, royalties should not exist in PSAs 
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because the state retains ownership of the oil and gas that is produced (reduced only by the IOC’s 
right to the percentage of oil agreed to in the PSA.  In this example the IOC’s share is $17.76 of 
each barrel of oil produced on a successful discovery).  Nevertheless, royalties are often a 
component of PSAs.)  It is also common for PSAs to provide that as production increases, the 
proportion attributable to the State also increases either in an individual year or cumulatively 
over the production life of the reservoir.  This is usually referred to as a “cumulative production 
sliding scale”.443 444 
 
Cost recovery in a PSA is in principle, the deduction of a portion of the oil, so called “cost oil”, 
to compensate the IOC for the capital and operating expenses incurred in finding and producing 
the oil.  If, these costs exceed the specified cost recovery limit, however, expenses are not 
deductible beyond this specified maximum in the current year.  The cost recovery limit is 
typically stated as a percentage of gross revenues earned during the period (40% in the example 
below).445 
 
Figure A.4 – Typical Production Sharing Agreement (PSA/PSC) 
($ per barrel)  
 
 
        
 
   
Gross 
Revenue 
    
 
IOC 
Share 
  
$100.00  
  
State 
Share 
 
 
   
  
    
 
   
Royalty @ 10%   $10.00  
 
 
   
$90.00  
    
 
   
  
    
 
  
Cost Recovery 
    
 ($16.00) 
 
(18%; 40% Maximum) 
    
 
   
$74.00  
    
 
    
Profit Oil Split @ 60% $44.40  
 
 
        
 
   
$29.60  
    
 
    
  
   
                                                          
443
 Ibid Chapter 6, page 223 
444
 World Bank Institute, Guide to Extractive Industries  Documents – Oil & Gas, World Bank Institute Governance 
for Extractive Industries Program, January 2013, http://wbi.worldbank.org/wbi/Data/wbi/wbicms/files/drupal-
acquia/wbi/World%20Bank%20Extractive%20Industries%20Programme%20-%20Oil%20&%20Gas%20Guide.pdf 
445
 Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil and Gas Industry – Management, Strategy and Finance. 
Chapter 6 (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Corporation, 2011), page 224 
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Income Tax @ 40% $11.84  
 
    
$17.76  
    
    
  
    
 
$17.76  
 
IOC Profit Oil 
    
Total $17.76 
 
Total Net Cash Flow after Cost Recovery $66.24 Total 
         
 
21.1% 
 
Percent of Total Net Cash Flow 78.9% 
 
         Source: Adapted from Andrew Inkpen and Michael H. Moffett, The Global Oil & Gas  Industry 
- Management, Strategy and Finance (Tulsa, OK: PennWell Press, 2011) p. 224 
  
The Evolution of PSAs 446 447 
The first PSA was introduced in Indonesia in 1966.  The evolution of PSAs has been influenced 
by changing petroleum market conditions and the interpretation of laws and incentives for states 
and IOCs. 
 
First generation (1966 to 1975)  
The state retained ownership of all oil and gas produced, including that oil or gas stored at export 
terminals.  Although there were no royalty rates and taxes applied, the state was guaranteed 
revenue as a result of a specified profit split, without regard for cost recovery.   
 
Second generation (1976 to 1983)  
By1976, all producing countries were aware of the market value of their oil and gas resources 
and their increased bargaining power.  Consequently, the split of so called “profit oil” was 
increased to 85/15 (state/IOC), but more flexible cost recovery limits were included in the PSAs 
to take into account the increasing technical (geological) uncertainty associated with newer 
exploration prospects.   
 
At that time, under U.S. tax law, payments made by an IOC to an NOC were not considered 
foreign corporate income taxes.  Consequently, payments made to the NOC could not be used as 
tax credits on the IOC’s U.S. tax return when the IOC remitted its foreign profits to the United 
States.  The Saudi government was the first to realize that if the provisions of the PSA were 
                                                          
446
 Ibid, page 241-242 
447
 Junseog Yi, “Merits and the Demerits of the Different Types of Petroleum Contracts,” 
https://www.google.com/#q=merits+and+demerits+of+the+different+types+of+petroleum+contracts 
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modified so that the payments were made to the Saudi government rather than the NOC, the U.S. 
Internal Revenue Service would classify the payments as foreign taxes, making them eligible for 
foreign tax credit classification in the United States.  This removed a major obstacle to the major 
U.S. oil companies signing PSAs in other countries.   
 
Third generation (1984 to 1987) 
Minor adjustments to investment tax credits, corporate tax obligations, and corporate tax rates 
increased the sophistication of PSAs, but did not significantly alter the incentives or 
disincentives to participate in PSA’s. 
 
Fourth generation (1988 to present) 
After the substantial decrease in oil prices in the mid-1980s, new PSAs included more flexible 
terms and conditions in order to attract IOCs.   
 
Appendix V - Financial Reporting Quality Indexes  
Table A.8 shows the overall and annual financial reporting quality index, capital market 
development level and sample distribution referred to in section 6.9 Financial Reporting and 
Operational Transparency.  The greater the Overall Financial Reporting Quality Index (OFRQI), 
the higher the quality of the financial reporting among private sector companies listed on an 
exchange (e.g. NYSE, NASDAQ, and Euronext).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THIS SPACE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
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Table A.8 – Financial Reporting Quality Index and Ranking 
 
 
 
 
Source: Qingliang Tang, Huifa Chen and Zhijun Lin, “How to measure country level financial reporting quality,” 
Social Sciences Research Network (May 18, 2012) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2114810 
 
Appendix VI - Accounting Terminology and Classification 
Under the rules of United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (U.S. GAAP) 
company expenditures for assets with a useful life of more than one year are classified and 
recorded as capital additions.  This includes property, equipment and infrastructure whether 
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acquired by direct purchase, through the acquisition of another company or participation in a 
joint venture.  The oil and gas industry frequently uses the more inclusive term CAPEX which is 
the sum of capital additions (which are capitalized on the balance sheet) and exploration 
expenses (which are expensed on the income statement in the period in which they occur).  For 
example in the Notes to ExxonMobil’s 2013 Summary Annual Report, the company defines 
CAPEX as:  
 
“…the combined total of additions at cost to property, plant and equipment and exploration expenses 
on a before-tax basis from the Summary Statement of Income.  ExxonMobil’s CAPEX includes its 
share of similar costs for equity companies [companies less than 50% owned].  CAPEX excludes 
assets acquired in nonmonetary exchanges (effective 2013) and depreciation on the cost of 
exploration support equipment and facilities recorded to property, plant and equipment when 
acquired”.448 
 
Loans made in exchange for oil or gas are not a part of CAPEX, nor or mergers between 
companies.  The term transaction is another grouping of expenditures used in the news media, 
but has no meaning in U.S. GAAP or IFRS.   
 
Figure A.5 below shows that the financial figures reported by the news media, industry databases 
and oil and gas companies (IOCs and NOCs) overlap each other.  Global CAPEX in the oil and 
gas exploration and development sector were $682 billion in 2013,449 represented by the largest 
circle and includes specifically identified capital projects, the large amount of capital 
expenditures that are not publically identified with a specific project, acquisitions and joint 
ventures.  
 
In 2013, the total value of reported oil and gas transactions was $337 billion, but by definition 
this figure excludes all the transactions the value of which are not disclosed.
450
  Transactions are 
therefore, a “potpourri” of deals that include specific capital expenditures, acquisitions, joint 
ventures, loans for oil deals and mergers that are made public in some way, but excludes a large 
                                                          
448
 ExxonMobil, 2013 Summary Annual Report (2014) p. 44, 
http://nasdaqomx.mobular.net/nasdaqomx/7/3395/4843/ 
449
 Barclays, “Global 2014 Capital Spending Outlook,” (December 9, 2013) 
http://www.pennenergy.com/content/dam/Pennenergy/online-
articles/2013/December/Global%202014%20EP%20Spending%20Outlook.pdf 
450 E&Y, “Global Oil and Gas Transactions Review 2013,” 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013/$FILE/EY-
Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013.pdf 
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number of transactions not identified with a specific expenditure or deal.    
 
Figure A.5 - Relationship between Various Measures of Expenditures 2013 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
These technical distinctions are only distantly related to the politics and economics of the oil and 
gas industry, but demonstrate the importance of developing and using a consistent measure of 
expenditures.  CAPEX is the term most often used in understanding investment trends in the oil 
and gas industry and the one that is used throughout this study.   
 
Appendix VII - Loans for Oil Agreements  
This section presents a list of Loans for Oil Deals from 2006 to the 2014.  Loans for oil financing 
continued in 2013 ($89 billion) and in 2014 ($463.2 billion, as of June 1, 2014).  Of the $89 
billion in loans for oil or natural gas that occurred in 2013, $85 billion is accounted for by one 
transaction that extends over 10 years.  Of the $463.2 billion loans for oil or gas that occurred in 
2014, $456 billion is accounted for by one transaction between Russia and China that extends 
over 30 years.  These transactions usually involve a long term supply agreement in which, the 
country producing the oil or gas immediately receives loans from the other country for the 
purpose of developing natural resources and infrastructure.  The country making the loan is 
repaid by delivery of gas or oil over a specified period.    
 
 
All CAPEX - $682 
billion in 2013 
Mergers  
All Reported 
Transactions 
$337 billion 
in 2013 
Specific JVs & 
Acquisitions  
Specific 
Capital 
Projects 
CAPEX not identified 
by a company with a 
specific project 
Loans 
for Oil 
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Table A.9 - Loans for oil Deals between 2006 and 2014.    
 
2006 - (1) China and Nigeria signed a $4 billion agreement for oil and infrastructure projects; an 
agreement that includes four drilling licenses for China.   
(2) Separately, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC) purchased 45 percent of 
an oil exploration block off the coast of Nigeria for $2.3 billion.451 
 
2007 - The Japan Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC) signed a $3 billion loan deal with 
the Abu Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) to increase the firm's supply capacity so that 
the United Arab Emirates (UAE) can continue providing oil exports to Japan.452 
 
2008 - The Venezuelan Economic and Social Development Bank (BANDES) and Petroleos de 
Venezuela SA (PDVSA) signed a $4 billion loan for oil deal with China Development Bank 
(CDB).  The loan was intended to fund infrastructure and other development projects.453 
 
2009 - (1) Ecuador’s national oil company, Petroecuador, signed a $1 billion loan for oil deal 
with PetroChina, a subsidiary of the Chinese National Petroleum Company (CNPC) in the form 
of an advance payment for oil to be delivered later.454 
(2) Venezuela’s BANDES and PDVSA signed a $4 billion loan for oil deal with China 
Development Bank for infrastructure development.455  
 
02/18-24/2009 - China and Russia agreed on terms of a loan from the China Development Bank 
to Russian state oil exporter Rosneft for $15 billion and pipeline company Transneft for $10 
                                                          
451
 Michail Vafeiadis, “China 'buying out' Africa: Top 5 destinations of Chinese money 
The Christian Science Monitor,” (March 1, 2012) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/0301/China-buying-out-Africa-Top-5-destinations-of-Chinese-
money/Nigeria 
452
 Jake Simpson, “JBIC Loans $3B to Buoy UAE-Owned Oil Co. Upstream Growth,” Law 360, New York, (February 8, 
2012) http://www.law360.com/articles/413892/jbic-loans-3b-to-buoy-uae-owned-oil-co-upstream-growth 
453
 Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America 
Inter-American Dialogue,” (February 2012) 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf 
454
 Ibid 
455
 Ibid 
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billion, to finance crude oil shipments over a 20-year period of not less than 241,000 barrels per 
day (15 million tons per year).456 
 
04/18/2009 - State-owned China National Petroleum Corp. agreed to lend Kazakhstan's national 
energy company KazMunaiGas $5 billion and to join with KazMunaiGas to buy Kazakh oil and 
gas producer MangistauMunaiGas from Indonesia's Central Asia Petroleum Ltd.  The Export-
Import Bank of China agreed to provide an additional $5 billion to Kazakhstan as part of the 
package.457 
 
2010 - (1) Ecuador’s Petroecuador signed a loan for oil agreement with China Development 
Bank (20% for oil related investments and 80% for infrastructure investments and other 
discretionary investments).458 
(2) China and Nigeria signed a $23 billion agreement for China to build three oil refineries and a 
fuel complex in Nigeria.459 
 
09/2010 - (1) Ghana and China signed project loans and another deal, totaling $15 billion.  The 
China Export Import Bank and the government of Ghana signed a $10.4 billion concessionary 
loan agreement for various infrastructure projects, payable over 20 years.  A separate loan of $3 
billion, from the China Development Bank, was intended for Ghana’s expanding oil-and-gas 
sector.  The China Development Bank also guaranteed more than $400 million for water projects 
and what it called e-governance projects in Ghana.  
(2) Separately, Ghana signed an agreement valued at $1.2 billion with the Chinese company 
Bosai Minerals Group to build a bauxite and aluminum refinery in Ghana over four years.  Bosai 
Minerals will purchase 80% of the shares in Ghana Bauxite Co.460 
                                                          
456
 John Helmer, “China loan turns Russian Oil East,” Asia Times On Line, 
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Central_Asia/KB24Ag01.html 
457
 Jing Yang and Victoria Ruan, “China, Kazakhstan Sign Loan-for-Oil Deal 
The Wall Street Journal (Updated April 18, 2009) 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB123996097676128865 
458
 Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America 
Inter-American Dialogue,” (February 2012) 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf 
459
 Michail Vafeiadis, “China 'buying out' Africa: Top 5 destinations of Chinese money” 
The Christian Science Monitor (March 1, 2012) 
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/2012/0301/China-buying-out-Africa-Top-5-destinations-of-Chinese-
money/Nigeria 
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2011 - (1) Venezuela’s PDVSA signed another $4 billion loan for oil deal with China 
Development Bank for infrastructure construction.461 
(2) Ecuador’s government signed a $2 billion loan for oil deal with China Development Bank, 
30% for oil development and 70% for discretionary infrastructure spending.462 
 
07/03/2011 - Ecuador was in the final stages of negotiations with a Chinese bank for a $571 
million loan; and state oil company, Petroecuador, signed a deal to sell oil to the Chinese energy 
company, PetroChina.463  
 
12/16/2011 - Venezuela’s PDVSA signed another $4 billion loan for oil deal with Industrial and 
Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) for housing development in Venezuela 464 bringing the 
total amount owed by Venezuela to $30 billion, which was secured by Venezuela’s future oil 
production.465  
 
03/12/2012 - PDVSA announced that Citic Group Corp., China’s largest state-owned investment 
company, would acquire a 10 percent stake in the Petropiar heavy-crude project held with 
PDVSA and Chevron Corp.  It also said that the China Development Bank would spend $4 
billion to help boost production in a joint venture with China National Petroleum Corp. (CNPC).  
The Chinese bank and the Venezuelan government also agreed to renew a $6 billion bilateral 
investment fund, of which $2 billion was intended to increase PDVSA’s oil production.466 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
460
 Reuters, “China extends Africa push with loans, deal in Ghana” (September 2010) 
http://ghanaoilonline.org/2010/09/china-extends-africa-push-with-loans-deal-in-ghana/ 
461
 Kevin P. Gallagher, Amos Irwin, Katherine Koleski, “The New Banks in Town: Chinese Finance in Latin America 
Inter-American Dialogue,” (February 2012), 
http://ase.tufts.edu/gdae/Pubs/rp/GallagherChineseFinanceLatinAmericaBrief.pdf 
462
 Ibid 
463
 Reuters, “Ecuador negotiates China bank loan, signs oil deal,” 
Taipei Times (July 3, 2011) http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/biz/archives/2011/07/03/2003507255 
464
 Ibid 
465
 Los Angeles Times, “China's Venezuela presence grows with loan-for-oil deal,” (December 16, 2011) 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/world_now/2011/12/china-venezuela-loan-oil.html 
466
 Kelly Hearn, “Venezuelan oil a risky investment for China,” The Washington Times, (March 12, 2012) 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/mar/12/venezuelan-oil-a-risky-investment-for-china/#ixzz31tLhnzrI  
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04/28/2012 - (1) China agreed to provide South Sudan $8 billion in development loans over the 
next two years.  The loans were to be used for road construction, agriculture, hydroelectricity, 
infrastructure and telecommunications, which would be built by Chinese companies.467  
 
12/24/2012 - OAO Rosneft signed two loan agreements for $16.8 billion with international banks 
to buy BP Plc’s half of TNK-BP.  OAO Rosneft also agreed on a prepaid oil supply deal with 
traders Glencore International Plc (GLEN) and Vitol Group to finance its $55 billion acquisition 
of TNK-BP.468  
 
02/08/2013 - The Japanese Bank for International Cooperation and three Japanese lenders agreed 
to loan the state-owned oil company of the United Arab Emirates approximately $3 billion to 
advance the UAE's upstream development.  The Japanese bank made the loan with three other 
Japanese banks: Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ Ltd., Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. and 
Mizhuo Corporate Bank Ltd.469   
 
05/22/2013 - Essar Energy, the London listed parent of Essar Oil, signed a three-way debt 
financing deal with China Development Bank (CDB), the country's largest overseas lender, and 
PetroChina to raise $1 billion of external commercial borrowings (ECBs).  The financing 
cooperation agreement also included a guaranteed product “offtake” by PetroChina.470 
 
07/10/2013 - Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan and Chinese President Xi Jinping signed an 
agreement to facilitate $1.1 billion in low-interest loans for infrastructure in Nigeria.  China was 
offering Nigeria loans to help fund airport terminals in four cities, roads, light-rail line for its 
                                                          
467
 Jared Ferrie, “China to Loan South Sudan $8 Billion for Infrastructure Projects,” Bloomberg News (Apr 28, 2012) 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-04-28/china-to-loan-south-sudan-8-billion-for-infrastructure-
projects.html 
468
 Jake Rudnitsky, “Rosneft Clinches Oil Deal, $16.8 Billion Loans for TNK-BP,” Bloomberg, (December 24, 2012) 
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capitol, a hydro-electric power plant and oil and gas infrastructure.  This loan was one part of a 
$3 billion loan for oil agreement.471   
 
10/16/2013 - Turkmenistan's state company Turkmengaz and the China Development Bank 
signed a cooperation agreement for financing the second phase of development at Galkynysh 
field through an undisclosed loan to the Turkmen government.  Turkmengaz and China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) also signed a contract for the purchase and sale of 25 billion 
cubic meters of natural gas to China and a contract for the design and construction of an 
upstream complex with a capacity to produce 30 billion cubic meters of additional natural gas 
sales.472 
  
10/22/2013 - Russia and China signed 21 trade agreements, valued at $85 billion, including a 
new 100 million ton oil supply deal with China’s Sinopec.  Rosneft will supply China with up to 
100 million tons of crude oil over 10 years and Rosneft will export through China’s Sinopec.473 
 
02/14/2014 - Venezuela’s state oil company PDVSA and Spanish oil firm Repsol completed a 
$1.2 billion financing agreement to increase output at the Petroquiriquire joint venture.  The deal 
would increase output to approximately 65,000 barrels per day (bpd) from 50,000 bpd.474 
 
04/30/2014 - According to figures from the China-Latin America Finance Database (a joint effort 
between the Inter-American Dialogue, a think-tank, and Boston University), China committed 
almost $100 billion to Latin America between 2005 and 2013.  The largest amounts have come 
from the China Development Bank (CDB).  More than half of China’s lending to Latin America 
has been made to Venezuela.  Chinese lenders committed approximately $15 billion in 2013 
alone.475 
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05/16/2014 - Brazilian state-controlled company, Petrobras, signed a contract finalizing a 10 
year, $10 billion loan from China Development Bank Corp.476 
 
05/21/2014 - Russia agreed to supply China with natural gas for 30 years beginning in 2018 
under an agreement that has taken 10 years to negotiate.  Russia's state-owned gas company, 
Gazprom, signed the deal with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) during a visit 
by Russian President Vladimir Putin to Shanghai.  Under the deal, Gazprom will supply 38 
billion cubic meters of gas to China each year, with the possibility of increasing shipments to 60 
billion cubic meters per year.  The Russian Ministry of Energy declined to comment on the price 
China will pay for the natural gas, but the value of the 30 year deal was estimated to be $456 
billion.
477
  
 
Whether the size and pace of loans for oil and gas will continue is uncertain, but it has been an 
important source of financing for developing countries.   
 
Appendix VIII - Major Transactions in 2013 
This appendix presents the largest transactions made in the upstream sector of the oil and gas 
industry in 2013.  Since the number of major transactions that occur each year averages between 
1,500 and 1,800, it is clear that the list in Table A.10 is not complete but it demonstrates the 
liquidity of the market for oil and natural gas properties and the diversity of transactions and 
partners.   
 
Table A.10 - Major Upstream Transaction in 2013 
Africa 
• ONGC and Oil India’s acquired Videocon’s 10% equity stake in Area 1 in Mozambique. 
• Pavilion Energy was expected to complete a 20% interest in deep-water Tanzanian Blocks 1, 3 
and 4 for $1.3 billion from Ophir Energy. 
• Petrobras “farmed out” some of its equity interest in two exploration stage assets offshore 
Tanzania to Shell and Statoil.    
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• Oil discoveries in Kenya by Tullow and Africa Oil attracted other dealmakers into Kenya and 
the promising geology and proximity to current discoveries resulted in a small number of deals 
in Madagascar. 
• In a pan-African deal, Petrobras “farmed out” 50% of its interests in Angola, Benin, Gabon, 
Namibia, Tanzania and Nigeria to Brazilian investment bank BTG Pactual for $1.5 billion.  
• Other large deals in the region included Marathon Oil’s exit from two Blocks in Angola, selling 
its 10% interest in each to Sonangol Sinopec International and Sonangol for $1.5 billion and 
$600 million, respectively.  
• In Algeria, state-owned Sonatrach exercised its pre-emption right to acquire 18.375% in 
Petoceltic’s Isarene development.  
 
Asia 
• China acquired Petrobras’ assets in Peru for $2.6 billion. 
• China acquired of a 25% stake in the West Qurna field in Iraq from ExxonMobil. 
• Sinopec acquired a 33.33% interest in Apache’s Egypt’s oil and gas assets for U.S. $3.1 billion. 
• Sinopec’s acquired Marathon’s 10% stake in Angola. 
• CNPC’s acquired a 20% interest in the Yamal LNG project. 
• Sinochem’s acquired a 40% interest in Pioneer Natural Resources shale properties. 
• China Development Bank/Petro China signed a loan for oil deal with Petroecuador. 
• Japan Bank for International Cooperation signed a loan agreement for $3 billion with Abu 
Dhabi National Oil Company. 
• Temasek (based in Singapore) invested $2.3 billion in Repsol, acquiring 5.4% of its treasury 
shares. 
• Japex (34% Japan state owned) acquired 10% interest in Progress Energy’s 
North Montney gas assets and the LNG plant that it is developing in Prince Rupert. 
• Pertamina (Indonesian NOC) and PTT (Thailand NOC) jointly acquired Hess’s Indonesian 
assets for $1.3 billion. 
• Petronas (Malaysian NOC) acquired natural gas assets from Talisman for $1.4 billion. 
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Australia 
• Chevron agreed to invest up to $349 million in two stages in two of Beach Energy’s 
prospective permits (PEL 218 and ATP 855).   
• In Papua New Guinea, Total SA, Santos and Osaka Gas began acquiring stakes in emerging 
onshore gas fields to position themselves for the next round of gas projects as ExxonMobil’s 
PNG LNG project moved toward completion and the production of first gas in 2014. 
 
Canada 
• Centrica plc and Qatar Petroleum’s acquird Suncor Energy’s producing conventional gas assets 
for $986 million. 
• ConocoPhillips sold its 100% interest in the undeveloped Clyden oil sands leasehold located in 
Alberta’s Athabasca oil sands region to Imperial Oil and ExxonMobil for $720 million. 
• A group of institutional investors acquired a 6.5% stake in Canadian Oil Sands Ltd., including 
its Alberta oil sands Syncrude Project, from Newmont Mining Corporation for $710 million. 
• PKN Orlen SA’s acquired the publicly traded E&P Company, TriOil Resources Ltd, for a total 
transaction value of $244 million.  This was Poland’s first venture into the Canadian energy 
market. 
• CNOOC acquired Canadian oil-sands operator Nexen Inc. for $5.2 billion.478 
 
Russia and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
• Activity in this region was dominated by the crude oil supply deal between Rosneft and the 
Chinese NOC, CNPC valued at $60 billion.  
• Rosneft acquired the remaining 49% share in ITERA Oil and Gas Company LLC for $2.9 
billion. 
• Rosneft (through its new subsidiary ITERA Oil and Gas Company LLC) completed the 
acquisition of a 40% stake in Arctic Russia BV from Enel for cash consideration of $1.8 
billion.  Arctic Russia BV owns 49% of the share capital in SeverEnergia which owns licenses 
in four large oil and gas fields (Samburgskoye, Yaro-Yakhinskoye, Yevo-Yakhinskoye and 
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Severo-Chaselskoye) in the Yamal-Nenets Autonomous Region of Russia.  The aggregated 
interest of Rosneft in SeverEnergia is 19.6% (.49 x .40). 
• Rosneft signed the Completion Deed for Russian offshore blocks in the Barents Sea and the 
Sea of Okhotsk, confirming agreements on the Arctic shelf exploration with Statoil and Eni. 
• Rosneft acquired the remaining 65% stake of Taas-Yuriakh Neftegazodobycha LLC for more 
than $2 billion. 
• NOVATEK sold a 20% stake in the Yamal LNG project to CNPC. 
• LUKOIL purchased a 100% stake in Samaranafta, an exploration and production unit 
operating in the Volga region, from Hess Corporation for $2.1 billion.   
• LUKOIL also acquired the remaining 50% of the shares of Kama-oil, operating in the Volga 
region containing oil reserves of 12.8 million tons, for $400 million, increasing its ownership 
to 100%. 
• Rosneft signed an agreement with Corporacion Venezolana de Petroleo, a subsidiary of 
PDVSA, to create a joint venture to develop heavy oil reserves in Venezuela as part of the 
Carabobo-2 project.  
• Rosneft also acquired a 30% interest in 20 deep-water exploration blocks in the Gulf of Mexico 
held by ExxonMobil.  
• LUKOIL and Rosneft were awarded licenses on the Norwegian continental shelf in the Barents 
Sea (30% and 20%, respectively).  
• Transaction volumes and the number of deals increased significantly in Kazakhstan. The deals 
that were disclosed were valued at more than $11 billion.  The cornerstone of this initiative was 
CNPC’s entry into the Kashagan offshore project.   CNPC acquired an 8.33% stake for $5.4 
billion from KazMunaiGas, which had earlier acquired ConocoPhillip’s stake in the project. 
 
Europe 
• The largest North Sea transaction was OMV’s $2.65 billion purchase of a portfolio of UK and 
Norwegian assets from Statoil. 
• Canadian company, Ithaca Energy, acquired Valiant Petroleum in a deal valued at close to $500 
million, and Spike Exploration (backed by Norwegian PE) acquired Bridge Energy for 
approximately $200 million.  
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India 
• There were three large outbound transactions by OVL and OIL totaling $5.6 billion.  Of these, 
two transactions involved acquiring a 20% interest (10% each from Anadarko and Videocon) in 
the Rovuma Area 1 Offshore Block in Mozambique. The other large transaction involved 
OVL’s exercise of its pre-emption rights to increase its interest in the BC-10 heavy oil offshore 
concession in Brazil. 
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
• The largest deals of the year included: PetroChina and CNPC’s acquisition of assets in Peru 
and Ecuador; Pacific Rubiales purchase of regional independent Petrominerales; ONGC 
Videsh’s purchase of assets in Brazil from Petrobras; and Chevron’s purchase of a stake in YPF 
SA in the Argentina.  
 
United States 
• Two of the largest deals in the upstream sector included: Devon Energy’s acquisition of 
GeoSouthern Energy for $6 billion; and Fieldwood Energy’s acquisition of producing assets of 
in the Gulf of Mexico from Apache Corporation for $3.75 billion. 
• Chesapeake and Chinese state-owned oil company China Petrochemical Corp. (Sinopec) 
announced an agreement in which Sinopec would purchase a 50% undivided interest in 
850,000 leasehold acres controlled by Chesapeake Energy in northern Oklahoma.479 
• Pioneer Natural Resources agreed to sell a 40% interest in some of its West Texas Wolfcamp 
Shale reserves in the Permian Basin to a U.S. subsidiary of Chinese company Sinochem Group, 
for $1.7 billion.  Sinochem paid Pioneer $500 million in cash when the joint venture closed and 
the remaining $1.2 billion by carrying 75% of Pioneer’s share of future drilling costs, until the 
$1.2 billion drilling carry is utilized.  Pioneer would continue as the operator of the properties.  
 
Source: E&Y, Global Oil and Gas Transaction Review 2013, 
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013/$FILE/EY-
Global_oil_and_gas_transactions_review_2013.pdf 
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